

HUGO MANFRED BEER

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
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Hugo Manfred Beer

# Moscow's As im Battle of the secret services

The role of Martin Bormann  
in the German leadership

2nd Edition



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## INTRODUCTION

This writing about Martin Bormann does not claim to be complete. This can only be expected if the Soviet Russian archives were opened without reservation to every researcher from all over the world. So far it has been impossible to get hold of files and documents that are in Soviet archives. It is not even possible to determine what material the Red Army captured and took away at the end of the war. Therefore, a comprehensive and complete picture of

Martin Bormann can only be worked out and handed over to the public when the archives of all the victorious powers of the Second World War can be evaluated by anyone in their current state, as is possible at any time and by anyone in the archives of the Federal Republic of Germany. The French lawyer and writer Gilles Perrault made similar statements in his

book "On the Trail of the Red Orchestra" in connection with "Operation Bear", a radio game with Moscow approved by the Nazi leadership, in which Martin Bormann and Heinrich Müller ( "Gestapo-Müller") had worked closely together. This will be reported in a later section.

Gilles Perrault writes:

*"... one could only find out if one were allowed to see the archives at headquarters, which are not open to the public... Perhaps one day we will learn the whole truth about the 'Big Game' (Operation Bear), but that will take a long time and the enlightenment will probably not come from Moscow ... (36)*

Colonel Erich Helmdach (47) also

thinks: *"But first of all, in order to clear up history, prejudices of all kinds, including intentional linguistic ambiguities, should be cleared up so that historiography and everyday political life are freed from them. With deception and concealment, entanglements in new calamities can arise continuously. Ideological 'captivity' and 'lawfulness' must lead to personal disadvantage and harm. The concealing and locking of the archives and thus making it more difficult to find the truth cannot promote relaxation, understanding or cooperation ..."*

A factual portrayal of Martin Bormann as a person, his appearance, his work as an estate manager in Pomerania, his rise in the NSDAP, later in the narrower and finally in the narrowest leadership circle of the Third Reich, his behavior on certain occasions, his disappearance into nothing - really into nothing? — This and many other things are reason enough, after 37 years of distance from the German and European catastrophe of 1945, to seriously investigate it within the framework of what is currently possible.

This research should be accompanied by the spirit of the ingenious Old Russian proverb "Pravda vitezi" (Truth prevails), which is matched by the legal oath of testimony in English and American courts to testify "The truth and nothing but the truth."

Incidentally, truth, as the agreement of ideas with facts, has its own purpose: it can no more be forbidden than it is possible to bring the movements of the planets to a standstill. Only the spread of truth can be stopped for a limited time. It took centuries to replace the erroneous Ptolemaic (geocentric) world system with the Copernican (heliocentric) world system, which also corresponds to the current state of knowledge. Inquisition courts and ecclesiastical bans violently prevented the spread of scientifically researched and proven truth.

Just as a declared enemy of the existing state order is not officially in the service of the state he wants to destroy - e.g. B. as a judge - can be active, just as little a partisan historian can write real history. The results have been known since historiography was placed at the service of the prevailing "zeitgeist". This can be seen in the chronicles of the early Middle Ages, which were written by clergymen by hand. The historical picture at that time was shaped by the belief in the "alone church that saves", without considering that every world religion (Christianity, Buddhism, Mohammedanism) claims infallibility in matters of faith for itself and at the same time condemns the other religions (2 ).

The increasing abandonment of Christian doctrine, which began in Europe around the time before the outbreak of the First World War, has produced historians who are tied to national and partisan politics. The totalitarianism of the rising National Socialism favored this development considerably. A foreign policy rapprochement with the older Eastern European form of totalitarianism could be observed. This approach was clearly expressed by Erich Koch, the former Gauleiter of East Prussia, when he said:

*"Because every foreign policy advance in our peace policy will go hand in hand with a corresponding economic reconciliation of interests between the powers involved. Eventually, all the Eastern powers between the Rhine and the Pacific, between Finland and the Black Sea, will be jointly touched on the big questions ..." (3)*

However, this rapprochement was short-lived. A violent conflict ensued, which ended in the military and later the political defeat of National Socialism. Although almost 40 years have passed, one still hears from Moscow that

*"the youth of the Soviet Union and the other socialist States, especially the youth of the German Democratic*



*Republic, in the spirit of peace and cooperation, is brought up in a spirit of deep hatred of Nazism" (4).*

"*Spirit of deep hatred*" against something that no longer exists is pointless. No sober-thinking and judgmental historian can outgrow a hate-filled new generation. When Wilhelm von Schramm said with regard to the campaign in the East in the Second World War, "*whoever deals with the*

*enemy long and hard, using scientific methods, stops hating him and begins to understand him, his nature and his vital interests to understand" (5), then v. Schramm here supported by the deep understanding of many contemporaries in the West and testifies to the way of thinking of knightly warfare in the past. This understanding, even remotely similar, cannot be found on the ideologically, ie Marxist-Leninistically trained, even drilled opposing side and is not to be expected only for reasons of the already mentioned hatred of the dead National Socialism, but also against the existing capitalism.*

From the numerous publications about Martin Bormann, the most interesting ones for this work will now be examined in detail. In the subject matter at hand, the boundaries set for memoirists, historians and writers merge. It can be stated that with increasing distance from Martin Bormann and the events and occurrences associated with him, more sobriety, even modest beginnings of a will to find the truth, which was largely absent in the two decades after the end of the war, appear. Only the publications linked to ideologies have remained unchanged in terms of their informative value. Only the formulations are refined and adapted to the requirements of the general level of western readers.

## FIRST CHAPTER

*Comparison between Prof. Morell's personal physician and Martin Bormann's secretary - Martin Bormann's career - extortion of the prisoner Bormann into espionage - Stalin's statements about Bormann to Benesch - Bormann's participation in Fememord*

From the large circle of supporters and employees of Adolf Hitler, two inconspicuous men in his closer and later closest circle, his personal physician and his secretary, proved to be so influential in the crucial years that it is by no means out of the question to take a critical look at their careers deal with

The medical activity of the personal physician Dr. Morell, the doctors Dr. Rohrs (6) and Henning Fikentscher (1) deserved attention in their reflections on Adolf Hitler's illness. It is surprising that Dr. Morell was hardly mentioned in the extensive post-war literature, which covered everything possible and imaginable to do with Adolf Hitler, while the secretary and closest colleague, Martin Bormann, who was also Dr. Morell avoided the public at all times and in every form, after his disappearance from the Reich Chancellery bunker (May 1/2, 1945) gave rise to a worldwide chain of legends being created, such as those of Martin Bormann's defense counsel in the Nuremberg trial (1946), dr Friedrich Bergold, had been correctly foreseen (7). These legends about Martin Bormann will be examined in more detail in a later section of this work.

Born on June 17, 1900 in Halberstadt (Saxony) as the legitimate son of the staff trumpeter Theodor Bormann and his wife Luise, née Grobler, he attended a private school in Eisenach for three years. Later, when the family moved to Weimar, Martin Bormann went to the Realgymnasium, which he left after completing upper secondary school. According to Bormann's self-written curriculum vitae, on which Jochen v. Lang (8) and Lew Besymenski (9) should support him in June 1918

joined the 55th Field Artillery Regiment in Naumburg as a recruit. After demobilization in February 1919, in August 1920 he was given the position of managing director with general powers of attorney for a Mecklenburg estate.

The last statement comes from Martin Bormann himself. Lang (8) on page 30 of his book "The Secretary": "It can no longer be determined where Martin Bormann

spent his eleven years, i.e. his apprenticeship. He himself called Mecklenburg, and relatives claim that it wasn't really a farm, but rather an oil mill. But the one need not exclude the other - at that time the two were still often connected. It is also unclear how long this training lasted and what it included.

Bormann's own curriculum vitae, which he wrote himself, inevitably leads to such considerations, because in it, after his release from the Naumburg barracks in February 1919, the next fixed date is August 1920 - and then he allegedly became 'Managing Director with general powers of a Mecklenburg estate'. According to this, in a year and a half he should have learned everything about the fields and stables, and even though he took part in a specialist course during this time and did well through diligence and quick perception, for which there are witnesses, it is unlikely that anyone so inexperienced and milk-bearded beginners immediately entrusted an 'estate' for management. After all, the young man was not even of legal age and therefore not fully legally competent."

They reveal how seriously the author treated this topic

Sentences:

"It is also unclear how long this training lasted and what she embraced."

"Bormann's self-written curriculum vitae inevitably leads to such considerations, because in it August 1920 follows as the next fixed date after his release from the Naumburg barracks in February 1919. .."

In the SS roll (10) Bormann made the following statements: "July 1920 to 1926 member of the association against the arrogance of Judaism.

Section head of the Roßbach organization in Mecklenburg 1922/23.

July to December 1923 in custody in Leipzig.

March 1924 sentenced to one year in prison for political reasons. After release from the front until joining the party on February 17, 1927.

1927/28 district press chairman in Thuringia."

The times in Martin Bormann's curriculum vitae and in the SS roll (10) are almost always linked to the mention of a month. It is understandable that only in this way could the exact dates of this period of his career, which fell in the turbulent period after the First World War, be limited. The time between his discharge from the army — February 1919 — and August 1920, when he began work as an estate manager in Herzberg near Parchim, remains unclear.

Whether he actually used the eighteen intervening months to learn about farming, as Jochen v. Long suspected (8), is by no means proven, even if Jochen v. Reported further

"And even if he also took part in a specialist course during this time and did well through diligence and quick perception, for which there are witnesses ...", there is no information

at all about these unspecified witnesses. But Lew Besymenski (9), Joseph Wulf (10), Trevor Roper (11) and Ladislav Farago (12), the best-known Bormann researchers in East and West, also have nothing to report about this gap in Martin Bormann's CV, which apparently does not noticed.

We learn considerably more from Klaus Benzing (33), who reports on page 113 of his book "Der Admiral": *"Who was Martin Bormann?"*

After the First World War he fought in a Freikorps Baltic States and was captured by the Soviet Russians in 1920

taken. However, surprisingly for his comrades, he was released again after a short time. Admiral Canaris thought it possible that Bormann was being drafted into the Soviet espionage service at that time."

When asked about the source of this communication about Martin Bormann, Klaus Benzing informed the author of the following:

"Regarding your question about the primary source of my information about Bormann, I can inform you that there is a personnel file of Bormann in America, which I have looked at." (14)

The Czech journalist Pawel Havelka, who refers to oral information given by the Czech General Bartik, represents the same version of Martin Bormann's stay - at least for the first half of 1920. General Josef Bartik had been head of Czech counter-espionage on the general staff for more than ten years and was a confidant of the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Eduard Benes. Benes is said to have got on very well with Stalin and was not a little proud of the trust that the Russian dictator had in him, a non-Communist politician of a bourgeois-liberal character. Nevertheless, General Bartik declared, according to Pawel Havelka in the Malmö (Sweden) social-democratic newspaper "Works", that Bormann had been an agent of Stalin. In 1920 Bormann belonged to a Baltic Freikorps that fought with the Bolsheviks. He was caught and knew what to expect. Bormann saved his life by signing a paper pledging to work as an agent for the Russians (15). Pavel Havelka also reports:

"When Bormann was next heard from, he was one of Hitler's closest associates. From 1943 onwards, he was the second most powerful man in the Führer's headquarters. When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, the Soviet counterintelligence was instructed to search archives for German citizens about whom they had material that could be used to force them to become Soviet agents. The commitment signed by Bormann in 1920 was found in a long-forgotten corner. The rest was routine.

Bormann received a photocopy of the paper with his name underneath. The Russians had waited a day for Bormann to confess his youthful sins to Hitler. He stayed silent. Now all they had to do was put the knife to his throat. Bormann did what the Soviets told him to do. In the aftermath, the Russians learned most of it directly from Hitler's headquarters."

A spy system that works without blackmail and yet "functions" is hard to imagine. The Soviet system has achieved a certain degree of perfection in this regard through skilful blackmail. This has been reported extensively in the past, so that it is not necessary to go into it in more detail in this work. Let me just remind you of one complex that is not without resemblance to the Bormann blackmail reported by Pavel Havelka.

In a report dated June 10, 1941, Reinhard Heydrich wrote to Heinrich Himmler (16) about the methods used by the GPU against the ethnic German resettlers in order to force them to espionage against Germany:

"In such cases, the German resettlers were summoned by the GPU, interrogated for hours and threatened that they would be excluded from the resettlement if they did not comply with the GPU's request. Also popular was the method of explaining to the prospective resettlers that the relatives who remained behind would be held harmless and treated as hostages if they failed to comply with the obligations they had been forced to accept or dared to report them in Germany. They were further threatened that the long arm of the GPU would also reach them in Germany...

This citing of substantiated individual examples could be extended to hundreds of cases, since it is certain that the GPU, by a conservative estimate, dates back to about 50 BC. H. the resettlers approached to force them to cooperate through extortion threats or huge promises of money..."

Particularly clear is expressed about this blackmailing Me

Methods for recruiting agents for the Soviet foreign network David I. Dallin (18) when he writes: "Finally some rather

dubious characters were drawn into the network by financial enticements. Adventurers, unlucky gamblers, people who misjudged danger, individuals in debt, people involved in love affairs were agents or potential agents. Some were caught and brought to justice. Others tried to return to a quiet middle-class life. However, Moscow did not forget the names of the latter group: in some cases, after a period of quiet seclusion, these people were reminded of their past by Moscow agents and presented with an unfortunate alternative."

According to the German daily newspaper Die Welt (17) and the British daily newspaper "Daily Telegraph", Rudolf Ströbinger and Reginald Peek report:

"Stalin himself is said to have informed the former President of Czechoslovakia, Eduard Benesch, that Reichsleiter Bormann, under Hitler the second most powerful man in Germany, spied for the Soviet Union. The London Daily Telegraph reports this on Monday, citing the Czech journalist Rudolf Ströbinger, who left his homeland in 1968 after the Soviet invasion and lives in West Germany. As the Bonn correspondent, Reginald Peek, writes in the London newspaper, Ströbinger received his information six months before the invasion of Prague from General Josef Bartik, who was head of the secret service under Benesch. Benesch is said to have once said to Bartik: 'If Bormann is still alive, he will never be executed. He was one of Stalin's spies. Stalin himself told me that.'

According to dpa, a report with the same content can be found in the Swedish social-democratic newspaper 'Works'. The author is a Czech journalist using the pseudonym Pavel Havelka."

Besides, after the end of the First World War, in the battles of the numerous Freikorps in the Baltic States, apart from the episode of the capture and release of a soldier

named Martin Bormann have also done something else by the Soviets, which draws attention to the defensive battles of the German Freikorps in this area. Rudolf Diels (19) writes about this on the occasion of rumors about planned attacks on Hitler:

"I took care not to share these stories with Hitler; he would have sucked them in eagerly. So I didn't tell him that a former Freikorps commander, who had once gone over to the communists, had gained daily unhindered access to the Reich Chancellery, in his immediate vicinity, until the Leibstandarte leader himself exposed him as an 'assassin' and me asked for his arrest when he didn't come back.

However, the 'jack of all trades' who is still alive today came to see me voluntarily to ask me to arrange an interview with Hitler, to whom he 'only' wanted to promise loyalty and allegiance. I advised him to make himself small."

The list of the officer circle of this unit from 1921 has been preserved by credible, former members of the Baltic Freikorps Roßbach, which was then still called "Sturmabteilung Roßbach". The following entry can be found here: *"Bormann, Martin, Weimar, Belvedere-Allee 28"*

As is well known, Martin Bormann, who was born in Halberstadt, moved with his parents to Eisenach, where he attended a private school, and from there to Weimar. The Bormann family lived there in Belvedere-Allee (8). According to this, this Martin Bormann should be identical to the person named in the list of the officers' circle of the "Sturmabteilung Roßbach". It is all the more striking that Martin Bormann concealed his time in the Freikorps in the personal information he received when he was admitted to the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP); this membership in the officer circle of the Baltic Freikorps Roßbach would only have been beneficial and in no way a hindrance to him, the aspiring candidate. Every Freikorps fighter was respected even before 1933, but even more so in the Third Reich.

Gerhard Roßbach, the free corps commander of Martin Bormann, judges about the murder of Walter Kadow in Parchim from his



perspective and playing it down when he says in his book "My Way through Time - Memories and Confessions" (44):

"With the exception of Martin Bormann, Höß and his comrades were charged with murder and sentenced to prison."

In this depiction of Roßbach, in which he relies on information calling his attorney does not include the fact that Martin Bormann

" ... was sentenced to one year in prison for aiding and abetting grievous bodily harm and abetting, of which one month is counted as having been served due to the detention on remand." (4, 20)

Furthermore, this account of Roßbach can give the casual reader the impression that Martin Bormann went unpunished. In addition, the affidavit of Dr. Robert MW Kempner before the Nuremberg Military Court: "In my capacity as Oberregierungsrat and chief legal adviser to the Prussian

police administration in the pre-Hitler era, I was officially charged with the criminal record of Martin Bormann, who was charged with the crime now before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, Germany. accused Martin Bormann is known. The official criminal record of Martin Bormann contains the following entry: 'Bormann Martin, sentenced on May 15, 1924 by the State Court for the Protection of the Republic in Leipzig (Germany)

to one year in prison for participation in a political murder.'" ( Document 3355PS, US-682.45)

Evidently Roßbach was still trying to cover for his former Freikorps member Martin Bormann in 1950, whom he had included in his officers' list in 1921; There is no doubt that Martin Bormann made a special contribution at that time.

Martin Bormann's surprising return from Soviet captivity, which did not happen by chance (13, 15) and which may have taken place under dramatic circumstances, may have contributed to this. Roßbach remained loyal to his courageous comrade-in-arms. It is conceivable that Roßbach

supposedly brave act of freeing himself from captivity was rewarded with inclusion in the leadership of his Freikorps. At that time, perhaps also later, he was not informed of the agent commitments made by some "returnees". As Roßbach wrote, however, he has announced promotions in his area of command (44).

Bormann's further career is described more clearly after he joined the "Association against the Excess of Judaism" in July 1920 and when he started working as an estate manager on Herzberg near Parchim (Mecklenburg) in August 1920, which he continued to do until he began working as a Gau Press chairman in Thuringia (May 1926), with an interruption of more than a year. We must dwell on this interruption, which lasted from July 1923 to March 1925, because here another reason for Bormann's later behavior can be seen.

In February 1923, the elementary school teacher Walter Kadow, who was born on January 29, 1900 in Hagenow, Mecklenburg, applied for admission to the Herzberg Roßbach Group. This was also granted to him because he had earlier led a German national youth group in Wismar, where his parents lived. So Kadow became a member of Pfeiffer's squad of Roßbachers. However, since he was somewhat left-wing in his views and thus in contradiction to the political views of the other Roßbachers, they always disregarded him (9).

Kadow made himself unpopular by calling himself "Lieutenant a. D." spent, although he had never been an officer. He also showed medals that had not been awarded to him. He also borrowed money without returning it. In doing so he created an atmosphere of dislike around him, which turned to hatred when the rumor was spread by a certain Wiggers that Kadow was a Communist informer because he had attended secret meetings of Communist officials

men.

Now Kadow should at Bormann's instigation from the circle of Roßbacher to be released. Bormann agreed with Masolle that

a businessman in Parchim to hold Kadow in the "Louisenhof" inn should he reappear in Parchim and to notify Bormann in Herzberg, 13 kilometers away, so that Kadow could work off his debts there. Bormann later changed his mind to the effect that

Kadow should get a beating. He instructed the merchant Masolle to do this and added that Masolle might take a few comrades with him.

Kadow arrived in Parchim on May 31, 1923. He went to the "Louisenhof" inn, where he received numerous schnapps, so that he was soon lying on the sofa in the dining room. Papers were pulled out of his pocket, from which his communist activities are said to have emerged. There is also said to have been a blue card from the communist youth in the name of Kadow. There was a large amount of Russian money in his backpack (4, 8, 9, 10). About this evening Jochen v. Lang (8) determined the following: "The master tailor Heinrich Krüger still lives in Hamburg today. At that time he was living in Parchim and was an eyewitness to the Roßbacher's feast in the 'Louisenhof'. From the counter he observed with a colleague that Bormann also appeared in the restaurant that evening. A Roßbacher showed Bormann papers that had been found on the drunken Kadow. Krüger went on to report: I saw Bormann pull a pistol out of his pocket and hand it to Roßbacher. Krüger did not report to the police at the time because he wanted to avoid difficulties with his forthcoming master's exam."

Late at night, some Rossbachers—including Rudolf Hoess, whose name would later become known as the head of the Auschwitz concentration camp—dragged the heavily drunk Kadow to a hunting vehicle that Bormann had made available. They drove into the forest near Parchim, where they cruelly murdered and buried Kadow.

In the trial, which took place in Leipzig from March 12 to 15, 1924, Hoess was sentenced to ten years in prison as the ringleader and not Bormann, as might have been expected.

Bormann got away with a year in prison plus a month of pre-trial detention. The reason given was: "for aiding and abetting serious bodily harm and favouritism".

The judicial investigation of this case had broadened Kadow's picture: ... Above

" all, however, the suspicion had arisen that Kadow was a communist informer. In fact, this suspicion cannot be dismissed as unfounded if one considers that, according to the testimony of the witness Wiggers, Kadow was still taking part in secret meetings of the Communist Party in January when he was still teaching /February 1921 traveled to Russia for three weeks, tried to get a job there, also had the picture of Lenin in his possession..."

(From the pronouncement of judgment on March 15, 1924, according to Besymenski "The last notes of Martin Bormann".)

In a "report on that time", which Lew Besymenski published without citing a source (9), we read: "In this

group" (Roßbacher) "there was also the youth Walter Kadow. But he soon broke away from the reactionary gangs, sided with the cause of the working class and the revolution, and supported the Parchimer comrades.

He had to pay for this courageous act with his life; he was brutally murdered by the Feme murderers on May 31, 1923."

After describing the murder, Besymenski continues:

"Today, however, one can state with certainty that Kadow—convinced that his colleagues were bandits—contacted the KPD organization and decided to leave Parchim. That was also the reason for his murder. When Kadow appeared in Parchim, Bormann was informed. He gave the order to kill Kadow."

Joseph Wulf's assessment of the murder of Kadow (10) comes from a higher perspective when he

writes: "Martin Bormann owes his activity during the

In any case, the blood order during the Roßbach period. So it had the following

Background: When Albert Leo Schlageter was arrested by the French in the Ruhr area for sabotage and was driven away by them on May 23, 1923, the Mecklenburg Roßbach group decided to punish Schlageter's alleged traitor to the French. Although there is no evidence that Walter Kadow betrayed Leo Schlageter to the French in Mecklenburg, the Roßbach people murdered him..."

It cannot be denied that Admiral Canaris suggested to General Gehlen that Bormann was blackmailed (21), its justification can have in the following two points in Bormann's curriculum vitae:

a) Almost identical reports from Pavel Havelka and Klaus Benzing that Martin Bormann, as a 22-year-old Freikorps fighter in the Baltic States, had been taken prisoner there by the Soviets and had to buy his life by signing a spy contract for the benefit of the Soviets. b) Possible Soviet threat of

announcing the role played by Bormann in the Parchim Fem murder trial, that he was sentenced by the Leipzig Reichsgericht on March 17, 1924 "for aiding and abetting serious bodily harm and for favoritism to one year in prison, of which one month through the pre-trial detention was considered to have been served" (4) and that he was later awarded the Order of Blood for this prison sentence (9).

## SECOND CHAPTER

*Adolf Hitler's knowledge of human nature - his trust in Prof. Morell -  
Bormann stands behind Prof. Morell - Schellenberg on  
Himmler's opinion and distrust of Prof. Morell - Gauleiter  
Jordan's last encounter with Hitler - Bormann's "barrier wall" around  
Hitler - reputation of Prof. Morell - contradictions between Words and deeds of Bo*

Apparently Adolf Hitler made very lonely decisions on personnel matters. In doing so he has often relied on "intuition" (inspiration), although, as is well known, no intuition or "inner voice" of any kind can replace sound professional knowledge and the usual examination. On this subject, Hans FK Günther, pointing out the pernicious selection of Hitler's sub-leaders, says

"As he (Günther) had already called incompetent and unworthy people around Hitler who had been chosen by Hitler, who lacked the knowledge of human nature. The personal physician chosen by Hitler was his undoing the most" (1, 22,23).

Following on from "misdeeds by high-ranking bigwigs that had become known", Günther further notes, "whose perpetrators, however, no one and no newspaper dared publicly accuse. I need only mention the name of Koch, the Gauleiter of East Prussia. Koch is said to have been recommended to the Führer by Streicher and Bormann — knowledge of human nature?"

Günther aptly poses the question:

"Who foolishly applied the word 'master race' to the Germans of our time? Was it Hitler? I doubt it; — Hitler was an optimist who believed in the environment and education, who expected a 'progressive' improvement of the German population from education and training through National Socialism ... in a delusional wishful thinking (he proclaimed) at a party conference that the German people were made even more beautiful by National Socialism. From such untenable notions one could also understand that he allowed the foolish word 'master race', a word

In terms of foreign policy, it is just as harmful as the term 'Slavic sub-humans', which was transferred from Koch, who was chosen by Hitler, a real sub-human, even to the initially German-friendly Ukrainians."

Gottfried Feder, Adolf Hitler's old comrade-in-arms from the early days of the party and author of the party program of the NSDAP, found himself, after Dr. Ernst Hanfstaengl, the foreign press chief of the NSDAP (46), "was repeatedly challenged to criticize whenever the conversation turned to Hitler. 'Would like to know,' he said, 'how Hitler intends one day to steer the ship of state without endangering himself if he only tolerates half-educated and blind yes-men around him. In order to be successful in the long run, he will probably need other people than such half-know. How right Feder was in this

assessment of the uncritical yes-sayers around Hitler was shown by the gradually spreading cult of the Führer, which Hess in his boundless admiration built up for Hitler around the person of his idol. Up until the putsch" (of June 30, 1934) "no one had thought of addressing him other than 'Herr Hitler', so Hess now only called him 'Chef', and soon afterwards - in translation from the Italian 'Duce' — to put the term 'Führer' into circulation."

The other inconspicuous man in Adolf Hitler's immediate vicinity was his personal physician, Dr. medical Theodore Morell. He managed to win Adolf Hitler's satisfaction and trust by surreptitiously using questionable drugs and injections(!). The reported apparent successes strengthened Adolf Hitler's trust in Dr. Morell's treatment was so effective that the healing methods and medication used were not reviewed (1.6). Dr. Morell was appointed Adolf Hitler's personal physician on the recommendation of the photographer Heinrich Hoffmann, without questioning or consulting the medical leadership in the party. Conti, the Dr. Brandt, the former medical officer of the head of state and other physicians of rank.

How great was Adolf Hitler's trust in Dr. Morell was and how he justified it emerges from the conversation that the architect Professor Hermann Giesler had with Hitler in his headquarters in late autumn 1944. Hitler:

"In addition to all the troubles, I was also exposed to the quarrels of the doctors. Morell was under fire, accused of mishandling me just when I was ill and needed him. The surgeons went against him, relying on the judgments and arguments of internists I don't know, because they stayed hidden - unbelievable to be doing this to me too!

I was in bad shape, I had abdominal cramps with pain, colicky conditions, and some kind of jaundice as well. Morell was at his wits end, I had to get him up again. I know you don't like him, for reasons I understand but overlook - he's a good doctor and he helps me!" (25)

Furthermore, Hermann Giesler reports on a conversation with Martin Bormann about Dr. Morell on the

same day: "I went back to Bormann to find out about the doctors' dissonance. I had always had the impression that Bormann shared my sympathies for Dr. Karl Brandt. Bormann said: Karl Brandt certainly raised his concerns about Morell's treatment and medication responsibly and in good faith, but after all he was a surgeon and relied on the opinions of internists he knew, perhaps also analyzing the medications in question from them permit.

He considered the interference of these internists to be careless, the Fuhrer was not their patient, and he felt that only a thorough examination should be the prerequisite for a critical assessment of Morell's therapy. It's easier to reconcile the architects - and that's saying something - than the doctors. This is where the schools of thought clash.

But I, too, am prejudiced against Morell! Well, he admits he's not an aesthetic phenomenon, but come on



on to? — Yes, too! And my dislike is justified: I had to let Morell examine me, that was arranged when I was assigned to Munich and often sat at the Fiihrer's table."

After Professor Giesler gave a detailed description of his impressions of a visit to the practice of Dr. Morells am Kurfürstendamm, he continues in the conversation with

Martin Bormann: "I've already said to the boss: The Morell steams like ... I told Bormann, but now, writing from memory, it would be a bit hard to make the comparison to fetch again. Bormann made a face and said: You can allow yourself all kinds of mockery, even with the boss, but only because he knows that there is no spite behind it. What did the guide say about this?

He said: Giesler, I don't have Morell here to smell good, he's supposed to help me as a doctor—and he's doing it! But there are certainly many competent doctors, I said to Bormann, which is why - - - Bormann interrupted me: he consulted various doctors, but Morell helped him then, and quickly! His condition was dire, he couldn't eat anything but oatmeal and stewed carrots, and finally he couldn't take it anymore... Well, there's no doubt that Morell helped him, and of course that led to the trust he now enjoys . It was therefore foolish and utterly untimely to question Morell's therapy—I use the word cautiously! Please stay out of it, despite your sympathy for Karl Brandt, whom you call your 'Hellene'. Again, Giesler, seriously, don't worry us, confine yourself to your field." (25)

To enrich the knowledge about Dr. Morell, the "quiet man in the top leadership of the German Reich from 1936 to 1945" are some of the facts ascertained by Henning Fikentscher (1): "Although until then known as a specialist in venereal diseases, he worked in his new position as an internist and health leaders.

As personal physician, he was appointed professor and—although he had only become a party member in 1933—he was awarded the golden party badge.

For the double fraud that he invented penicillin and was the first to produce it, the Führer and Reich Chancellor awarded him the Knight's Cross of the War Merit Cross, even though his penicillin ampoules only contained distilled water.

Morell accused the English inventor of penicillin, Alexander Fleming, of intellectual theft.

Morell enjoyed the blind trust of the Reich head, but the distrust of his closest peers and experts at the Führer's headquarters.

The American medical interrogators judged the captured German doctors as equal colleagues, but the personal physician as an unworthy creature who boasted that he had slowly poisoned his high protégé. Morell remained unmolested, the Nazi doctors who were taken with him were regarded as criminals, punished, even hanged or forced to commit suicide.

Morell's vast fortune was released, that of the other Nazi doctors confiscated, and widows made beggars. Real and alleged misconduct by Nazi doctors was rolled out in all the newspapers for years, and silence was kept about Morell even after his death.

Long after Morell's death, mutually exclusive lies were spread and written about it: He died in the camp, was eliminated, taken to America, committed suicide, or was sentenced and hanged at Nuremberg.

No historian has yet seriously grasped or openly presented the significance of Morell's work as Adolf Hitler's personal physician in decisive years. ”

At this point, the reader will ask himself the importance of Adolf Hitler's personal physician, Dr. Morell, because to come, since he is so much appreciated in a work about Martin Bormann. However, it is less about Dr. To critique Morell's medical activities when the apparently existing but well-disguised connection between

see Bormann and Morell using eyewitness accounts to demonstrate.

First of all, the subjective impression that Dr. Morell made reference to Walter Schellenberg, the later successor of Admiral Canaris, when he observed the last battles in the Polish campaign (1939) near Warsaw with Adolf Hitler's entourage (16).

Walter Schellenberg reported the following in his memoirs: "We had all returned

to the plane when it was discovered that Hitler's personal physician, Dr. Morell was absent.

After about ten minutes he came running up, accompanied by three soldiers, dripping with sweat. The soldiers declared that they had met this man in a wood; In order to get to the plane again, he wanted to avoid the firing zone and make a safe detour through the woods. In this incident, Morell received no less ridicule than in any other such front-line flight. The weather was so gusty that Morell groaned loudly and threw up. Hitler looked disapprovingly at his personal physician and said so loudly that everyone could hear: 'This fat fellow forced himself to eat so much at breakfast that he's sick of it now.' In the evening Himmler summoned me and instructed me to have Morell under surveillance from now on, but this should be done with extreme caution.

He had suspected for some time that Morell was using his connections with Hitler to get interested in more than his medical work.

The fact that Hitler now made his personal physician the laughingstock of everyone seemed to take away the fear he had harbored of Morell's position. Himmler also believed that Morell was capitalizing on Hitler's favor. In fact, Hitler's personal physician was swimming in money. In Bohemia and Moravia, among other places, he owned large factories that produced ether and medicines. Later the suspicion arose that he was deliberately undermining Hitler's health. So he constantly prescribed Hitler pills that were supposed to have a calming effect on the stomach and intestines, but in reality so much

contained strychnine that Hitler's symptoms of paralysis were attributed to it in the years that followed.

We were able to establish contact with enemy intelligence services Don't prove Morell."

Schellenberg also records the content of an agitated discussion with Himmler, during which he suggested that Hitler should either be persuaded to resign by explaining the war situation (March 1945), or that he be removed by force or isolated with the help of the doctors. The last solution appeared to Himmler to be the most favorable, since he, too, had given serious thought to Hitler's state of health and his ability to govern. Himmler then confronted Professor de Crinis, Dr. Morell and Dr. Stumpfegger with Martin Bormann. Two days later, Schellenberg learned the result from Professor de Crinis: the doctors had refused to commit themselves and "otherwise, all their arguments against Bormann had remained fruitless. When I informed Himmler about this, he asked me not to disclose the matter."

This process has already been reported above by Professor Giesler from Bormann's point of view (25).

No witness has come to light from Adolf Hitler's immediate or wider environment who told Dr. Morell would have appreciated - even Martin Bormann and Eva Braun rejected him as a person and as a doctor. as dr Morell once prescribed a medicine for Martin Bormann, Bormann did not take this medicine, but is said to have sent it to his wife with instructions that she give it away (8). So little was Bormann's trust in the medical skills of Adolf Hitler's personal physician, for whom, however, he broke a lance in a very peculiar way, as can be clearly gathered from the conversation with Professor Giesler and which will be discussed later. In one of Bormann's numerous letters to his wife, he ranted pettily and hatefully about the doctor's driver and finally named Dr. Morell "a veritable plague" (28).

However, when the removal of this "true plague" from the headquarters or from the Reich Chancellery was up for discussion, Bormann took contrary to expectations and emphatically for the Wei

ter use Dr. Morell's position with reasons a doctor would have quickly and convincingly refuted. This emerges clearly from Professor Giesler's conversation with Martin Bormann.

In the early 1930s, Dr. Karl Brandt as the "Führer's First Attending Physician". After January 30, 1933, when Adolf Hitler was faced with an enormous workload, he maintained his unregulated way of life, namely turning night into day. Sleep was induced by the use of pharmaceutical agents. Colonel Hossbach stated that during a military exercise, probably due to exhaustion in the open air, Adolf Hitler suddenly fell asleep. In the mid-1930s, the digestive problems started to increase. At this stage, the party photographer Heinrich Hoffmann advised the Führer and Reich Chancellor, the former ship's doctor Dr. to consult Morell.

"A very strange man, and fundamentally very unsympathetic to those around him. Morell prescribed a regimen to improve the intestinal flora, which was successful. He became indispensable to him and soon proceeded to prescribing vitamin and dextrose injections to artificially increase his resilience, a method which was fundamentally extremely unscrupulous and which was to have disastrous consequences." (29)

From the point of view of today's knowledge, however, these medical successes of Morell's healing practices on the head of state can only be evaluated as apparent successes. For a better understanding, it is therefore necessary to return to the Reich Chancellery, where Adolf Hitler held his last speech to the Gauleiter of the German Reich on February 24, 1945.

The former Gauleiter Rudolf Jordan reports:

"Bormann greeted us briefly and impersonally; As always, he tries to camouflage his insecurity by being busy: 'Party comrades! Please listen! The Fuehrer is at the moment in important, if not to say the most important, military conferences. Even so, he will take the time to talk to you. After his speech, he will share the meal with you; however, he can only remain in your midst for a short time today, for he becomes immediately afterwards

again expected at crucial military meetings.

I can understand that you want to present many things to the Führer today. But he must not be distracted in the current situation. I appeal to your discipline: today spare the Führer all the questions, no matter how important they may seem to you. What I have now told you is the Führer's wish and I am sure that you will fulfill it! After this announcement, there was initially an embarrassed silence.

A barrier wall even at this hour? One of us asked Bormann in a resolute voice: 'Party, enjoy Bormann! What you just said, is that the Führer's wish or his command?'

Bormann switches quickly: 'Gentlemen! What I told you is the Führer's wish - and I think that's also his order for us.'...

Our eyes are turned to the door. Adolf Hitler, led by Bormann, enters the hall with slow steps.

As if bent under a heavy load, with a serious face, he steps into our midst and at first silently offers us his greeting. Then he shakes hands with each of us. We look into sad, tired eyes, no longer the lively, all-pervading ones of yore\_\_ After this ceremony we will go together to the adjoining Reich

Cabinet Hall, where Hitler will speak to us.

We sit close around him, there is dead silence. The impression of exhaustion increases. Hitler's shoulders are slack, his back is heavily arched and his complexion is pale and sallow, his hair is noticeably grey...

Slowly, haltingly, in a deep, slurring voice, he begins: 'My comrades-in-arms.' As if

there were no urgency in this hour, no commanding present, he dwells on a historical reflection of the First World War and its end.

During his tormented speech, his shoulders twitch several times, which he tries to counteract with nervous counter-movements. He holds his left hand under the edge of the table

hidden. Occasionally he grabs her with his right hand, as if to bring her to reason...

As much as we are convinced by these almost visionary arguments - for what we are waiting at this hour: for clear and concrete instructions and slogans for our behavior in these days when the enemy is already on German soil - we are waiting in vain. Hitler ends his speech with a few brief references to 'new weapons'...

We stand up quietly to salute - and know one thing: that was a dem no longer our Hitler, as we had known him, dead, ... lonely, abandoned, already standing on the ruins of his work without fully realizing it.

As we followed Hitler into the dining room, one of the old warriors freed himself from the nightmare of the hour with the tormented word: 'For

God's sake!' In the meantime, Bormann had rushed out of the room and come back several times. Finally he interrupts the leader with a message that an orderly handed him. Hitler stands up spontaneously, raises his hand in greeting to all of us who have risen with him. On leaving, Bormann says to those around: 'Well, in a fortnight...

But we are no longer called. It was the last meeting of the party leadership corps." (30)

This dramatic report by a prominent, believing and disappointed National Socialist, which can only be reproduced in part due to its length, cannot be denied a certain historical value, as it contains several points that are essential for this work about Martin Bormann: a) Hitler must not be distracted in

the current situation (February 24, 1945).

b) "Even in this hour a barrier wall ?" c) The description of the appearance and the visible Ge

Adolf Hitler's declining health, which led the "old fighters" to the desperate exclamation "For God's sake!" move, d) "That was no longer our Hitler as we knew him - who was already standing ten ..., on the ruins of his work, without him fully realizing it."

Points a) and b) contain how - ie with what clumsy, unverifiable pretexts - Martin Bormann understood how to erect the "barrier wall" between the head of state and all those who had clearly presented facts and circumstances. In this way, Bormann prevented Adolf Hitler from being adequately informed of the real situation in the country. Adolf Hitler's declining state of health favored Bormann's actions considerably. However, Adolf Hitler's personal physician was responsible for Adolf Hitler's state of health, which was also referred to as "declining health".

The reputation of this personal physician does not seem to have been as spotless as could be expected from the personal physician of a head of state. Some eyewitness accounts may shed some light on this.

The court psychologist at the Nuremberg trial, GM Gilbert, reported the following from a visit and conversation with Emmy Goering, the wife of Reich Marshal Hermann Goering, on March 23, 1946: "After Mrs. Goering

had sent her daughter Edda to play, she agreed to me:

'Can you imagine that the madman gave the order to shoot that child?' Then, full of bitterness, she told me how Hitler had ordered them to be arrested and shot because Hitler suspected Goering of disloyalty...

'Hitler must have been mentally ill,' snapped Frau Goering. 'Did you talk to Dr. Spoken to Morell? He must have known. He treated him daily.' Gilbert: 'I've been talking

to Dr. Spoken to Morell. He seemed troubled by claims that his injections had had an adverse effect on Hitler. But he wasn't a psychiatrist and I pretty much take him for granted



a quack. In any case, he seemed to me to be on the best way to going insane.'

Mrs Goering: 'I think so! A doctor who saw him every day would have realized that something was wrong with the man. I could see it myself, he wasn't normal!' Gilbert: 'If a psychiatrist had declared Hitler abnormal,

I mean, he probably would have been shot.'" (31)

In this context, the words of Professor Giesler, which he said to Bormann about the personal physician, should be remembered once again:

"I told the boss (Hitler) before, the Morell steams like..."

The classification as a quack doctor experienced Dr. Morell, besides court psychiatrist Gilbert, also by Allied interrogators (1 and 6). Professor Albert Speer writes in his memoirs (32): "Eva Braun was also examined

by him (Morell) at Hitler's behest. She told me afterwards that he was disgustingly dirty and assured me in disgust that she wouldn't let Morell treat her any longer."

Another witness at headquarters, General Heinz Guderian, writes about dr. Morell in soldierly brevity: "Hitler

then advised me to consult his personal physician Morell because of my heart condition, which he knew, and to let him inject me. I did the consultation. After asking my doctor in Berlin, I declined the injections that were offered to me. Hitler's example did not exactly encourage treatment by Herr Morell." (33)

Albert Speer acted like General Guderian when Adolf Hitler recommended an examination and subsequent treatment by his personal physician (32).

professor dr HFK Günther reported (22): "Hitler's

personal physician: One evening in the internment camp I visited a camp comrade in his room, a Silesian count of my age. Then some comrades from an external work detail came back to their room, and one told them that in

he had read in a newspaper in the city that Hitler had a personal physician; he mentioned the name, a name that was rare in Germany but more common in England. Then the Count banged his fist on the table and yelled: 'What, that scoundrel! He drove my wife crazy.' He reported that the Countess, who was suffering from a nervous disorder, had sought the treatment of this doctor in Berlin, but that his remedies had destroyed her mind. He therefore withdrew her from this treatment and took her to a sanatorium, from which she was released after a long period of time. I later saw a picture of this doctor. How could Hitler have endured such a face around him every day? knowledge of human nature?"

With regard to Adolf Hitler's extremely late marriage to Eva Braun (end of April 1945), which was almost immediately followed by the voluntary retirement of both of these spouses, Prince zu Schaumburg-Lippe (34), formerly a senior SA leader, by establishing a connection of a conspiratorial nature between Dr. Morell and Martin Bormann suggests:

"that Hitler, as I assume, by that time at the latest, but probably for months at least, was no longer the Hitler that he had been. And this reading would ultimately be at the expense of a man who, without Martin Bormann's power in the background, would never have been able to act as he actually did.

Dr Theo Morell—later made a professor by Hitler—had come from South America as a completely unknown doctor. At a time when many of the most famous doctors were members of Hitler's party and Hitler was Dr. Brandt, a good young man who enjoyed his trust and was absolutely clean as a human being, was his personal physician, when Morell came along... Appearing like a foreign body in Hitler's environment. Without any inner connection to the party.

I myself had been treated by Morell. Because I believed that Hitler's personal physician had to be an extraordinary physician. But soon I was no longer an interesting patient for him. He left me to his resident, Dr. weaver. When I last spoke to him in Berlin, poor Dr. weaver full

come to the end of his strength. He must have been through a terrible thing. He said himself that his nerves were on edge, he couldn't and didn't want to go along with it all anymore. He cried.

I knew him as a decent man, totally apolitical and timid. What was the terrible thing that caused him to suffer so much, he could not learn from him. He said to me later: 'You are in a good position - you have been driven away - be content with that - I wish I were in your position.'

what Dr I only found out about Weber much later. But then I already knew: Morell is a man of Martin Bormann. And today I hold Professor Morell responsible for the fact that Hitler was no longer himself when the war reached its final decisive point.

I think I knew Hitler well enough to know that a normal Hitler would never have given Martin Bormann such powers. I am still convinced that Martin Bormann was only able to fool and conceal so much from this second Hitler. The extreme plight of the German people on the one hand and the serious damage to Hitler's health on the other gave the intriguer Bormann the opportunity to usurp all power for himself. He alone was always able to take direct action on Hitler's instructions and orders during this last period, even against the Reichsführer SS (Himmler) and Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, whom he also deposed."

The communications from Gauleiter Jordan, from Emmy Göring, Albert Speer, General Heinz Guderian, Professor Dr. Günther and Prince zu Schaumburg-Lippe make the desperate exclamation of the "old warrior" "*For God's sake!*" understandable.

Martin Bormann's vigilance was little missed; "*He had his eyes everywhere, the former estate manager showed himself in them,*" said Professor Giesler appreciatively (25). It is all the more surprising that he, who could not have missed Adolf Hitler's deteriorating health, found no reason to do anything about it. Martin Bormann was not lacking in ingenuity. Even if there are no changes in daily dealings with a person, for which there are various signs

recognized immediately, the "doctors' dispute" about which Adolf Hitler complained should have alarmed the omnipresent secretary at the latest. The nation and the Reich found themselves in a "total war" (35), on the outcome of which the fate of all, indeed every German depended.

Nevertheless, Martin Bormann did not push for a necessary improvement in the entire leadership of the Reich, which would certainly have happened if the head of state he held in such esteem, as he often emphasized, was taken from the hands of the "quack" (31) and given to a successful team of doctors would be. Martin Bormann also told Professor Giesler "that he had only one task and one goal, and that was to serve the Führer faithfully as a National Socialist. His whole ambition is to do this as well as he can. The authority he needs for this is given by the Führer. He uses them, but they only serve this purpose, his task." (25)

With this emphasized devotion to Adolf Hitler, it is not a little surprising that he made a decisive contribution to the confrontation of doctors caused by Himmler, which was described at the beginning of this chapter and which was caused by Himmler everything stayed the same. dr Morell was allowed to continue "treating" Adolf Hitler.

With these actions, a rift between the words or protestations and the deeds of Martin Bormann has become clearly visible. It seems like dr. Morell without Martin Bormann and the secretary without the personal physician, these two inconspicuous men, who were then unknown to the public, could not have worked in Adolf Hitler's immediate circle. They seemed to avoid each other—but they didn't fight.

### THIRD CHAPTER

*The Atmosphere Around Hitler — Witnesses About Bormann —  
General Koller and Reich Treasurer Schwarz — Prof. Morell's  
"Invention" — Prof. Killian: "Were Bormann and Morell Accomplices?"*

In the second chapter we have rushed far ahead of the chronological presentation of Martin Bormann's curriculum vitae. However, this was necessary for our Eraditen, since it was only through this that the intertwined work of Martin Bormann and Dr. Morell about the head of state could be lightened up a bit.

This section of this work on Martin Bormann not only discusses his skillful influencing of the atmosphere around Adolf Hitler, but also shows how this atmosphere could be changed with the help of Dr. Morell could be influenced in the sense of Bormann.

If Martin Bormann was able to explain to the Reichsleiter assembled on February 24, 1945 that Adolf Hitler must not be distracted in the current situation, he could also take full care of the distraction.

Hermann Giesler writes about this very vividly in the chapter "Concerns - Führer Headquarters Vinnitsa, late summer/autumn 1942" of his memoir (25): "Martin Bormann called

me from the Führer Headquarters Vinnitsa and told me to come to the headquarters immediately : Party comrade Giesler, you are urgently needed here, come with all your plans for Linz and get ready for a few weeks, hurry up please!

A little later came a call from Field Marshal Keitel with the wish to come to the Führer Headquarters as soon as possible with my architectural plans. Then an adjutant intervened, who told me which courier plane I could use to fly from Berlin. I noticed as soon as Bormann addressed me, but even more so when I heard Field Marshal Keitel's unusual request...

Borman ... just said that Adolf Hitler had expressed the wish to talk to me about Linz planning, as far as his military demands would allow. Only dealing with urban development issues and architectural planning can relax him.

Strange - Field Marshal Keitel, worried about the chief, had had the same idea that Giesler could contribute to easing the tension with his plans.

During my stay at FHQ Vinnitsa I was mostly Adolf Hitler's only guest; we ate meals together, and I spent the long evenings and nights with him in serious conversation, not just about architectural plans. We often drew together and discussed structural details until the early hours of the morning...

Exhausted from the exertion of all kinds of entertainment, I then went to my camp in the log cabin, noticing in passing that Bormann was still busy. We met once in front of my log cabin: 'Dear professor, take a rest now, you've probably realized by now how necessary you are here!'" About another measure, also suggested by Martin Bormann, to distract Adolf Hitler from his day-to-

day worries, reports Giesler in the same work; Armaments Minister Albert Speer, coming from headquarters, went to see Giesler, reported on the impressions he received there after the assassination attempt on July 20, 1944, and then explained with concern:

"After the assassination and its military and political consequences, the Führer was and still is very busy.

But I think it's about time you went to headquarters. The Fuhrer must distance himself from the assassination and all the disappointments. Giesler, you're the only one who could distract him, even if only for a few hours a day. Present him with urban planning problems, Linz and the development of the banks of the Danube, that would also interest him now and take him away from the constant brooding.

After a few days the telephone call came from the Führer Headquarters. Bormann was brief: Please come as soon as possible

as possible, the guide awaits you. Bring along anything that might interest him from your planning, and of course everything that relates to Linz!"

Writes about his further stay at the headquarters the author:

"Bormann asked me to come over the next morning. He gave me instructions: Please do not ask the Fuhrer any questions about July 20th and what is connected with it, unless he speaks about it of his own accord. Instead, try everything to distract him — talk to him about your plans, mainly Linz, that interests him the most."

The longer the war lasted, the more massive the "barrier wall" that Martin Bormann erected around the head of state became; Adolf Hitler lived in such isolation that not even "old fighters" of the NSDAP, such as the Reich Treasurer Franz Xaver Schwarz or the Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers, were admitted to the required reporting. Franz Xaver Schwarz discussed this verbally with General Karl Koller (37) and Dr. Lammers wrote to Martin Bormann (38) bitterly but unsuccessfully complained.

General Koller, who stenographed his diary entries phically wrote in early May 1945: "In the afternoon,

Reich Treasurer Schwarz, who lives in Thumersbach on the east side of Lake Zell in a small house close to the water, comes with his doctor, Dr. farmer, to me. Black wants to know how to behave; he may not be hidden in Thumersbach, so to speak. I'll take it upon myself to report him to the American authorities through his liaison team in Zell. Up to now I have had no close personal contact with Schwarz; he is 70 years old and has a heart condition. He complains bitterly about the conditions in the party and about the fact that for several years he has been systematically kept away from Hitler and prevented from discussing the situation with him. When he was invited to dinner by (adjutant) Schaub, Bormann and his cronies framed him in such a way that he would join in on any intimate conversation

Hitler had to give up. Whenever he wanted to say something Bormann or his assistants immediately seized the speech.

Schwarz describes Bormann as Hitler's evil spirit, the gravedigger of party and state. He says: 'But I don't understand Hitler either. After all, I was the Reich Treasurer of the Party, enormous sums, billions, passed through my hands, and Hitler wouldn't let me in for years, he must have felt the need to speak to me himself. I could do who knows what with all the huge funds.' Afterwards I asked Dr. Bauer about Hitler's personal physician Morell.

In Berlin at the beginning of April I happened to see a sign on the Kurfürstendamm with the inscription — 'Dr. Morell - Skin and Venereal Diseases'. I then asked my doctor Dr. Sajitz from Westsanatorium about the identity that was confirmed to me. From what Sajitz told me, Hitler's trusted medical adviser and treating physician had a rather disreputable clientele.

Why did Hitler choose this person instead of a well-known internist or other specialist? ... Bauer told me that Hitler's photographer Hoffmann gave him Morell."

The head of the Reich Chancellery had similar experiences, Reich Minister Dr. Lammers. In a ten-page letter to Martin Bormann dated January 1, 1945, he complained that he had not been called to give a lecture since September 24, 1944, despite repeated urging. His attempts to resume the good relationship with Martin Bormann had also failed, so that he felt "left behind". The detailed justifications, which culminate in the fact that certain areas of the state apparatus must not be shut down even during war, seem to have impressed Martin Bormann enough that he decided to give an answer as early as January 5, 1945.

This letter clearly expresses Martin Bormann's ability to formulate facts in a concise and understandable way. At the same time he mixed in his deep regret that Dr. Lammers z. Currently not in his vicinity, because he too



see, of course, those of Dr. Lammers described disadvantages. This regret seems disingenuous when one considers that parts of the Reich Chancellery, which were attached to Adolf Hitler's headquarters as "field quarters," had been transferred back to Berlin on October 21, 1944, hardly against the will of the then almighty Martin Bormann may have been ordered.

The pretexts in this letter concerning the "telephone block" and "perpetual line disruptions" were also unfounded, since in addition to the telephone he also had a telex network, the so-called "Gauleiter network" and a radio station set to the party code (39). We owe another reference to the communications links of Martin Bormann's party chancellery to the General of the communications troop, Albert Praun (5): "Reichsleiter Bormann claimed in 1944 that his telex connections

to the Gauleiters were not sufficient and that he was demanding his own radio network. But that was exactly what General Praun did not want to make available to civilians because of the danger of abuse. In addition, the army at that time had neither the necessary radio equipment nor radio operators that it could have freed up for this purpose. The Navy stepped in, much against the will of the Chief of Wehrmacht Intelligence, and made the radio network available to Reichsleiter Bormann, which he requested. The Kriegsmarine had hoarded radios for submarines and they were now freely available because they were no longer being built. She also had radio operators, whom she now assigned to the party chancellery and not to the army, where they were needed more urgently. It is not known whether and how the radio network newly created for Reichsleiter Martin Bormann was checked or monitored. A dark zone has certainly developed here."

According to this information, Martin Bormann was always able to talk to anyone, especially the head of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers, who had tried to do so in the correct manner until, as a last resort, he drafted the ten-page letter to Bormann mentioned at the outset.

— The dr. Incidentally, Lammer's promised interview with Adolf Hitler never materialized.

The influencing of the atmosphere around Adolf Hitler by Martin Bormann, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, also with the help of the personal physician Dr. Morell, appears so clear in one case that this process should not go unmentioned here.

Apparently everyone bothered the secretary, who found his way into the leadership circle of the Third Reich and was not agreeable to Martin Bormann. The party photographer Heinrich Hoffmann, an old comrade-in-arms from the early days of the party, knew how to convey gossip from Munich party circles and other circles in a good, Bavarian-witty way to Adolf Hitler in an amusing way. There had been nothing wrong with that in peacetime. During the war the situation changed radically; Discontent arose among the German people, which increased with the terrorist attacks by Anglo-American bomber fleets on Reich territory. Adolf Hitler was to learn as little as possible about the depressing losses of the civilian population and the extensive destruction in the residential areas. Jochen v. Long (8):

"Once when Goebbels sent a number of aerial photos of the rubble districts to the Reich Chancellery, Bormann returned them with the remark that the Fihrer's confidence must not be compromised by such photos. The Gauleiter's reports on the effects of the war also went straight from Bormann's desk to the safe."

Accordingly, Martin Bormann suppressed the written communications from the Gauleiters, just as on February 24, 1945, he conveyed to the Gauleiters, who had almost all gathered in the Reich Chancellery, as an order to the Gauleiters who were supposed to be there "under no circumstances should they be distracted from his military duties by bothering questions distract".

The presence of the relaxed, cheerful party photographer Heinrich Hoffmann, who as an "old fighter" of the NSDAP hardly had to restrict his statements, would have known some of the information that Martin Bormann so anxiously and consistently kept away from Adolf Hitler

let become. This had to be avoided at all costs. Therefore, the head of state was kept isolated from the population.

In addition, the partial results on "Mood and attitude of the German population in the Second World War" by Marlis G. Steinert(4l):

"Hitler slowly receded into the background; This can be seen from the weak echo and the lack of impact of his New Year's speech (1944), a further decrease in Hitler jokes and the attacks on his person: the criticism was directed above all against the government he embodied and its measures. .

The desired distance becomes even clearer with an arrangement by Bormann. Here Hitler is not only presented to the masses in historical proportions, but also transported into religious spheres. Since the term 'Führer' has gained world significance, it is necessary to exercise restraint when using this word in other contexts... The title 'Führer' should remain a privilege for Hitler in order to avoid profanation. (Order 91/44 of April 29, 1944)"

If it was finally possible to block Heinrich Hoffmann's headquarters, even Martin Bormann would not have been able to do it alone. Apparently he found in Dr. Morell energetic support.

Here is the facts: At the end of 1944, Heinrich Hoffmann When Adolf Hitler wanted to visit headquarters, Martin Bormann (8) advised him to consult his personal physician because of his supposedly bad appearance. Heinrich Hoffmann accepted this advice, all the more so since it was he who had introduced Dr. Morell had recommended to Adolf Hitler. Meanwhile Dr. Morell became the head of state's personal physician. Appreciated by Adolf Hitler, but not by those around him, Dr. Morell was appointed professor and awarded the Knight's Cross for War Merit (26).

The examination carried out on Heinrich Hoffmann revealed nothing negative, but two weeks later the photographer, who had meanwhile returned to Munich, learned from Dr. Morell

*by telephone* that he was "a paratyphoid excretor without being ill himself". Adolf Hitler therefore refused further visits, and Martin Bormann had meanwhile ordered that Heinrich Hoffmann be isolated immediately (8). He immediately went to Vienna for a check-up, which, however, yielded the opposite result. Although this result was immediately forwarded to Martin Bormann, the party chancellery did not reply.

"The Vienna health department reported against it because instructions had come from the Führer headquarters to isolate Hoffmann as a dangerous disease spreader. Only the medical certificate with the protection of his family" (of the Gauleiter of Vienna, Baldur von Schirach) "saved him from the coercive measure." (8th)

At the end of 1944 the matter had not yet been settled; A detective from the headquarters escort appeared with the task of "interrogating all the people who are dealing with the Hoffmann case and arresting them if necessary". The further bacteriological examinations had to be carried out under SS supervision.

These findings, which were always negative, also went to the party chancellery. Nevertheless, Hoffmann no longer had access to headquarters.

Heinrich Hoffmann was persistent in pursuing his intentions. He, who had learned his profession under difficult conditions in England, made a name for himself as a "political sensational photographer" in 1905; he had recorded Tsar Nicholas II and Kaiser Wilhelm II together in the park of Fürstenberg Castle (Donaueschingen). The pictures of Joachim v. He wrote Ribbentrop and Joseph Stalin after the signing of the German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in Moscow in 1939. He had the monopoly of being allowed to make pictures of Adolf Hitler and party events for about twenty years (42).

At the beginning of April 1945, a few weeks before the collapse, he appeared again, but unannounced, at the

Reich Chancellery. Here he was unwillingly received by an obviously influenced Adolf Hitler. Martin Bormann barked at him with the words:

"Who told you to come here? It would have been better if you had invented beams to bring down planes." (8th)

Heinrich Hoffmann's son today takes the view that Dr Morell was not privy to this game, on the grounds that the bacteriological examination had not been carried out by him but by an (unnamed) institute from which Martin Bormann was able to "order" a positive finding (8).

Whatever the case may have been, Martin Bormann would not have been able to act so tenaciously against Heinrich Hoffmann without the approval of his personal physician. Written reports about this process are not available. All that is known is that Heinrich Hoffmann from Dr. Morell received a *telephone* message about the positive result of the bacteriological test.

A written communication from the personal physician himself confirming the wording of this telephone call, as would have been appropriate to the importance of the matter, is not mentioned, apparently not made or lost. These ambiguities probably allow the question of whether the secretary, who is characterized as dynamic, could have forced the personal physician, who was described as "soft", to make this serious message to Heinrich Hoffmann *by telephone*. It is conceivable, considering the changeable circumstances that Dr. Morell from the ship's doctor of the "Hapag" and "Hamburg-Süd" to his notorious practice in Berlin (1) to Adolf Hitler's personal doctor and further. Martin Bormann may have used knowledge of these circumstances to achieve his intentions.

Dr Morell announced in a lecture in August 1942, which was also attended by the Reich Press Chief Dr. Dietrich, witnessed that within ten days he had developed a highly effective lice powder for the Wehrmacht fighting in the east. The Reich Press Chief uncritically acknowledged these statements by Adolf Hitler's personal physician. In an expert circle of listeners would have

this claim dr. Morell's amusement because, as is well known, in the chemical industry it usually takes years from laboratory tests to the point where a product is ready for manufacture.

dr However, Morell's "Russla lice powder" did not prove itself when used on the Eastern Front (1942: 100 tons distributed), as doctors at the front and senior medical officers unanimously confirmed (43); The report of a senior doctor in the Eastern Army (43): "The Russla powder was a scam

and probably a bad business that cost countless of our comrades their health, even their lives. This weakened our troops more and more. In our army we have had about a division of typhus patients every year. All of our corresponding reports and submissions have never reached their destination."

The previously successfully used preparation, the lice powder from IG Farben "Lauseto", was no longer distributed to the troops by General Physician Bickerth. In doing so, he relied on a "Führer order" that prohibited further issuance (43).

Only much later did it become known that Dr. Morell used letterhead with the headline "DER FÜH RER UND REICHKANZLER" for his own letters and occasionally even used Adolf Hitler's special typewriter, which was equipped with oversized types, for his communications. Through such machinations, Dr. Morell faked and issued "Fuhrer orders" (43).

Furthermore, Dr. Morell in Ölmütz (Bohemia) allegedly set up the first penicillin production in the Third Reich. Thirty ampoules were taken from this and subjected to a professional examination at the University of Wroclaw. No trace of penicillin was found, the ampoules contained only pure water. Prof. Dr. medical Hans Killian in the chapter "The Great Bluff of Dr. Morell" in his book "Light Above All Might—The Fight Against Sepsis" (26). At the end of this chapter are the words: "Officially, nothing was known about our results at the time

become. We had to remain silent, otherwise there would have been too much trouble." (26)

For these demonstrably fake achievements and successes, the head of state awarded his personal physician the title of professor and the Knight's Cross of the War Merit Cross. It needs no explanation what Dr. Morell would have happened if Adolf Hitler had found out the true facts, since Hitler himself would have known that he used the questionable drugs.

Whether and to what extent Martin Bormann was informed of these matters by Dr. Morell's knowledge, due to the z. Currently available documents cannot be reliably determined. But it is probable that Martin Bormann knew some things and used them accordingly. He has always known how to control others from behind the scenes, as was clearly demonstrated in the murder of Walter Kadow.

Prof. Dr. med. Hans Killian, when he writes about "Hitler's personal physician Morell" (43) in the "Deutsche Hochschulprofessorszeitung", appreciating the article by Henning Fikentscher:

*"Were Morell and Bormann accomplices?"*

The very close relationship between Bormann and Morell, which undoubtedly corresponds to the facts, is now emphasized in the article in the university lecturer's newspaper. This inevitably leads to the idea of a conspiracy against Hitler's ability to act or even his life. If General Gehlen's thesis is correct, and there is much to suggest that

Bormann was the traitor in Hitler's closest circle who reported every secret decision to Moscow, then the cooperation of these two gloomy men takes on an almost infernal significance."

The interrupted chronological presentation of Martin Bormann's biography will be continued in the following chapter.

## CHAPTER FOUR

*Bormann's rise in the NSDAP - In the party's aid fund - Darre and General Lenz about Bormann - Röhm is looking for material against Bormann and others opponents - Heydrich creates "flammable documents" — Bormann strikes — June 30, 1934*

After Martin Bormann's release from Leipzig prison in February 1925, a clearer course of his career began to emerge than before. Since he was now penniless, he went back to Parchim, where he stayed until May 1926, before finally leaving. He lived with his mother in Weimar, who, although widowed for the second time, was able to keep her apartment on Belvedere-Allee thanks to the donations of her son Albert, who later became one of Adolf Hitler's adjutants.

It must have been difficult for someone with a previous conviction to find employment at that time, also for national-political motives. So his entry into the "Sturmbann", an originally national and later National Socialist organization, is understandable. In the years 1925/26, disagreements between the writer and Gauleiter of Thuringia, Arthur Dinter, and Adolf Hitler smoldered for ideological reasons. This situation ended when Arthur Dinter was replaced and Fritz Sauckel was appointed.

Hans Severus Ziegler, then the publisher of a Nazi weekly newspaper and a freelance writer, took on the jobless Martin Bormann in 1927 by successfully entrusting him with tasks such as debt collection, bookkeeping, driving and the distribution of his weekly newspaper. At the end of 1927, thanks to his reliability and diligence, he became managing director and press officer for the Thuringia region. His attempts to appear as a speaker failed. The first successes came in his work as managing director, since he "directed" through circulars, orders, etc. from his desk



ren" learned, a skill that he developed to perfection in the war to a considerably expanded extent. It was also here that Martin Bormann made his first connections beyond the Thuringia region, be it through visits by party leaders or through his own business trips to the "Brown House", the headquarters of the NSDAP in Munich.

In Weimar, Martin Bormann also met Adolf Hitler known. Martin Bormann had earned a good reputation in party circles through honesty in financial matters, reliability and diligence. So his transfer to the party headquarters in Munich in October 1928 came as no surprise.

He arrived there at a time when serious difficulties had arisen between the Supreme SA Command (OSAF) and an insurance company. The SA leadership wanted to give their SA men injured in "battles in the hall" general insurance cover, while the insurance company only wanted to pay compensation in the event of disability or the death of the SA man concerned. After some deliberation, Martin Bormann succeeded in converting this insurance into the "party relief fund". When the desired goal was achieved through this skilful measure and through legal protection against state financial controls with the assistance of a lawyer, the initiator Martin Bormann was highly praised by the laypeople around him, but also by Adolf Hitler himself as a "financial genius".

In September 1929, Martin Bormann married the daughter of Major a. D. Walter Buch, who was chairman of the investigative and mediation committee for disputes within the party. The witnesses were Adolf Hitler and Rudolf Hess. In the late autumn of the same year, Martin Bormann had the idea of setting up a Nazi automobile corps. This thought was applauded; on April 1, 1930, the founding of this corps was officially announced. A year later, Adolf Hühnlein, a former officer, took over this automobile corps, which was renamed "NSKK" (National Socialist Motor Corps); Adolf Hitler received membership number 1, Martin Bormann appeared under number 2.

Disagreements in the summer of 1930 between the

Supreme SA leadership (Pfeffer v. Salomon) and Adolf Hitler, he eliminated by "Gleichschalt", a term that was often used in the Third Reich. Adolf Hitler appointed himself supreme SA leader, chief of staff became the captain a. D. Ernst Rohm.

At that time, the future Minister of Food, Walter Darre, who was held in high esteem, was accepted into the inner circle of management. Martin Bormann recognized that, so he joined him in his own way. Apparently he was too stormy, because Darre later said: "You could do whatever you wanted, he (Bormann) always found a reason to sit down with you ...

I loathed the man in his oily sycophancy."

General Lenz, the former commander of the 100th Mountain Infantry Regiment, expressed himself less drastically about his encounter with Martin Bormann on the occasion of a report to the state that took place at the end of November 1938 at the "Berghof":

"When I ... climbed the wide steps to the house entrance, the SA adjutant and former army officer, Obergruppenfuhrer Brückner, received me there with the apologetic remark that the Führer still had a visitor at the moment and I would ask you to be patient to have. Immediately thereafter, the then Reichsleiter and later all-powerful chief of the Reich Chancellery" (confused with the party chancellery) "Bormann told me I would like to come over to him for a moment. He lived diagonally across from the driver's cab. On the advice of Brückner, who was obviously happy to be able to bridge the unforeseen break in this way, I accepted the improvised invitation. Warmly welcomed by the host, who led me through his beautiful house to the 1st floor and onto the balcony, where I enjoyed the wonderful view of the southern side of the Untersberg and the whole, uniquely beautiful area.

In his almost overturning politeness he immediately offered me a schnapps, which I declined with the emphatic remark that I couldn't possibly meet the Führer (who was known to be a teetotaler) with a 'flag'! Incidentally, this was the only time that I was together with Bormann

men met, a man who acquired a dreaded name in the years that followed..." (27)

In September 1931, during this period in Martin Bormann's life, which was marked by hard work and occasional sycophancy for specific purposes, an event took place that should not go unmentioned. Political police officers appeared in his apartment with a search warrant and found a writing: "The most important political parties and associations". There was a stamp in this writing that identified it as police property. For this reason, Martin Bormann, who had come under suspicion as a result of his possession of this document of also being politically active in addition to his purely commercial duties in the aid fund, was summoned to the presidency. There he was taken into temporary custody because of the risk of collusion. However, surprisingly for everyone involved, he was released within a few hours (8).

The reasons that led to his unexpectedly quick release from custody have not become known. The second part of this process recalls his similarly surprising release from Soviet captivity during the Freikorps battles in the Baltic States, which was reported on in the first chapter (13.15).

Minor incidents at a time marked by street, election and hall battles, such as the strengthening of the relief fund by his brother Albert Bormann, who differed pleasantly from Martin in every way, are irrelevant to these considerations and can therefore be omitted .

In 1932 the waves of the election campaign ran particularly high; nevertheless, the election result for the National Socialists was poor. In the autumn of the same year the Reichstag was dissolved, an event which understandably tested the impatience of party officials, who feared for their existence. There was also disagreement between party judge Walter Buch, Reich Treasurer Franz Xaver Schwarz and the head of the relief fund, Martin Bormann. The temperamental chief of staff of the SA Ernst Röhm was extremely upset about this "climate" in the party leadership. To this

at an inopportune time he approached Hauptmann a. D. Karl Mayr, an old confidant, unsuspectingly approached.

These internals of the NSDAP seeped into the social democratic press ("Münchner Post") in an unexplained way. In the end there was a court hearing, during which Röhm made an affidavit, but this was not enough to pull him out of the affair.

At this stage, Martin Bormann intervened. On October 5, 1932, he sent a lengthy letter to Rudolf Hess, in which he bitterly complained about the incriminating material Röhm was looking for or wanted against higher party members, as well as insults and abuse of party officials as "bonzes". In emphatic terms he denounced the tremendous damage that SA Röhm's chief of staff had inflicted on the movement. At the end of this letter he writes: "God have mercy on my own brother if he did even a fraction of what the chief of staff did against the movement." (8th)

Martin Bormann was sensitive because Röhm had asked for incriminating evidence. He had every right to fear revelations. His livelihood, which he had laboriously built up, was at stake. That's why he had to attack effectively—he wasn't a man of half measures. No doubt he would have been given an appointment to speak to Rudolf Hess or Adolf Hitler, since he had been a familiar party member since his marriage to Hilde Buch. However, he seems to have been aware of the limits of his abilities as a *lecturer*, for he could hardly have presented his request orally without hesitating. For this reason he may have chosen the written route. This was psychologically well thought out and at the same time the most effective. Martin Bormann's haunting, almost imploring words in this letter addressed to Rudolf Hess, which was certainly also presented to Adolf Hitler, certainly had their effect and thus created explosive fuel.

Ernst Röhm has repeatedly been described as a "ruffian".

His open, straight nature contributed significantly to this. In retrospect, it can be said about him that it was not so much his abnormal disposition, which Adolf Hitler had known for years, but rather his careless statements and intentions about "a fundamental change in the political leadership" (44) that were his undoing. Röhm also spoke about this with Gerhard Roßbach, Martin Bormann's former Freikorps commander. When Roßbach asked what the Führer had to say about these changes, Röhm replied: "Hitler is surrounded by subjects who are as stupid as they are dangerous

and who do not leave him out. He banged his fist on the table: But I will free him from these bonds! You can believe me, Roßbach!" (44)

Dr Rudolf Diels, NS police chief and senior president, the creator and "first chief of the Gestapo", draws a picture of Röhm that differs from the depictions of the NS propaganda minister Dr. Goebbels significantly: "Röhm was not an

enigmatic man, he was tolerable in his Bavarian liberality. He stood with both feet on the well-rounded earth. He demanded no divine worship and did not strive for excess. He clearly and simply called Goering a bugbear and Hitler a fool. He laughed at extravagance. He was a nationalist, and he had to be, because that was his trade. He was a soldier—not a Prussian militarist, but of the easy-going, fun-loving South German kind. He, too, strove for power.

In return, he was a condottier and an adventurer. But he was not vain and without demonic striving. He liked the noise of the camp and the appropriate hustle and bustle in the canteen.

That his brown legions were followed by marauding troops gave him as little headache as it did to a lansquenet leader in the Thirty Years' War.

He caused me the least trouble when I set and tamed her. The expense he went to in his quarters in Berlin and Munich was later grossly exaggerated by Hitler, as was his disposition. I knew about it long before I knew him, but I don't have any 'playboys'

I could never believe Goebbels' angry story that he had been caught in flagrante delicto. Rohm contented himself with lazily observing when his SA leaders were in high spirits; he was moderate in eating and drinking. Only Bavarian beer, sauerkraut and sausages he could not do without either in Bolivia or on his trip to Italy." (19)

On April 18, 1934, about ten weeks before the murders of June 30, the unsuspecting Ernst Röhm called the diplomatic corps and the foreign journalists to a press conference in Berlin, where he wanted to make a few statements. Participation was high, because interesting things were expected from the Chief of Staff of the SA, who was also Reich Minister and one of Adolf Hitler's very few intimate friends. Max Gallo (40), who also quotes parts of Röhm's speech, reports on this: "The struggle in all the long years leading up to the path of the German

revolution on which we are currently finding ourselves has taught us to be vigilant. On the basis of many years of experience, often bitter enough, the SA recognizes the open and hidden enemies of the new Germany through all masks.' Doesn't that mean that they also wear the Nazi mask? Can't everyone be an enemy of the SA? A clumsy, aggressive formulation by Röhm

that frightens everyone who is not with him, behind him, and in his SA.

'We did not make a national revolution, but a National Socialist one, with special emphasis on the word *socialist*.' The speech now takes shape in front of an audience of

diplomats and foreign journalists are unusual.

'Reactionaries, muckers and philistines' he exclaims, '... we get sick when we think about them.'"

The further prehistory and the course of the events of June 30 and July 1, 1934 have become known through numerous descriptions. The detailed work by Heinz Höhne, *Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf* (48), in which he partially relies on primary sources, is valuable for this consideration. Walter

Hagen, aka Dr. Höttl, who held a leading position in the foreign secret service of the Third Reich, reports in *Dieheime Front* (49) that Heydrich had a "sense of intuition" which is said to have enabled him to recognize the discrepancies between Adolf Hitler and Ernst Röhm and to interpret.

Added to Röhm's intentions, which have already been discussed, was his striving to set up a National Socialist people's army. These secretly known intentions of Röhm aroused the suspicion of the head of state and the Wehrmacht leadership. Heydrich saw it as his task—perhaps suggested by Himmler—to stir up this suspicion by providing both the Wehrmacht leadership and Adolf Hitler with "material" that was bound to have a provocative effect on those affected, such as e.g. B. Deportation of Adolf Hitler to a representative post (48 and 49).

However, the rumors that arose and reached the head of state were not enough to initiate action against Röhm. Heydrich constructed - in the truest sense of the word - ignitable bases. From his point of view, this had become necessary because higher Wehrmacht circles had already given up believing in a putsch by Röhm (48).

Heinz Höhne (48) determined: "Against the skeptics like (Colonel) Heinricis and (General) von Kleist, Heydrich set in motion an avalanche that was supposed to cover up all concerns with a swathe of rumours, false reports and manipulated documents. Even the last Reichswehr officer had to be made to believe in the putsch. Sepp Dietrich" (higher SS leader) "showed the Reichswehr Ministry an alleged hit list of the SA leadership, from which it emerged that Röhm wanted the top ranks of the Wehrmacht to be replaced by Generals Beck and v. Liquidate Fritsch downwards, while other SS officers present SA lists to military district and city headquarters, according to which practically all senior officers were to be thrown out.

With the chief of staff of military district command VI (Münster), Colonel Franz Halder, an SA Obergruppenführer reported

and asked for instruction in Halder's official business, since the SA leadership would soon take over the Reichswehr. Halder declined, but asked the Reichswehr Ministry. The matter seemed strange to the colonel; the SA visitor didn't even say his name and quickly left the scene. He didn't call back either. Halder suspected that the supposed Obergruppenfuhrer was not an SA man at all, but an agent provocateur of interested circles.

Another trick Heydrich used was to pass around alleged Rohm orders, which the Reichswehr mostly believed. But once an SA leader got on the trail of the false reports, the SS men also knew how to lie around the SA's corrections.

One day, Karl Ernst, leader of the SA group in Berlin-Brandenburg, confided in the SS group leader Daluege, who came from the SA: The most nonsensical rumors about an impending SA putsch were circulating in the capital of the Reich; he, Ernst, asked his comrade Daluege to make it possible for him to talk to Reichsminister Frick so that he could counteract such slander against the SA. Instead, Daluege ... went to the Reichswehr Ministry and reported to the Deputy Intelligence Chief: An SA leader who had taken part in an internal meeting to prepare for an SA putsch had just spoken to him, but had concerns and now these wanted to warn the Reichswehr of the impending danger...

When Defense Chief Patzig" (Captain z. S., predecessor of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris) "suddenly found on his desk, as if thrown by a ghost hand, an alleged arming order from Röhm, from which he had to conclude that the SA was planning an attack on the Reichswehr, and the document (General) v. Reichenau submitted, showed the face of General v. Reichenau's outrage. Von Reichenau: 'Now it's high time.' But were Heydrich's false reports aimed only at Reichswehr officers? There is some evidence that the forgeries were also aimed at Hitler..."

The above-cited investigations by Heinz Höhne he will



complemented by Max Gallo (40). Accordingly, the counter-intelligence reported to General von

Reichenau: "In a house opposite the apartment of a French diplomat, the SA is practicing the use of heavy machine guns. The diplomat undoubtedly reported this to Paris, because the shots could be heard from the street. They just started doing this a week ago. The notice is serious. Much more serious than what is written in the document that Captain Patzig found on his desk."

Walter Hagen (49) is of the opinion that it was Heydrich who encouraged Adolf Hitler in the opinion that Rohm not only had ambitions to become Minister of Defense but also wanted to oust Hitler or deport him to a representative post.

According to Hagen, Heydrich is also supposed to have proved a conspiracy between the SA and foreign powers. Furthermore he says:

"Hitler gave ... Heydrich general authority to act.

Heydrich compiled the lists according to which shots were taken in both Munich and Berlin; Goering also received Heydrich's execution list."

This "general power" of Adolf Hitler to Heydrich opened all the avenues for him to "justify" massive action against the "SA ruffians, the foot soldiers of the revolution". Regarding Max Gallo in "Der Schwarze Freitag" (40): "Goebbels knows very

well that Heydrich's lists are getting longer and longer: every name has a number there. He also knows that Hess, Martin Bormann and Major Walter Buch, the head of the party court (USCHLA), collect material on corruption and excesses in the SA leadership. The files on Heine, who took part in the murder of Minister Rathenau, are piling up.

Goebbels also knows that hatred of Röhm and his people is growing: Major Walter Buch and his son-in-law Martin Bohrmann" (Bormann is written with an 'h' in the original.) "have had an ax to grind with Röhm for a long time, for years ...

As early as 1932 Buch tried to liquidate Röhm and his staff. Sprei, Count v. Moulin-Edkart and Georg Bell, SA newsman, were to be the victims of a

A group of hired killers, led by Buch, former Standartenführer Emil Traugott Danzeisen and Karl Hörn. Hörn betrayed the plan to the SA. One morning the killers tried to get rid of him, but without success.

Now Rohm, Sprei and Moulin-Eckart know that Horn was not lying.

Terrified, they handed the matter over to the police, and in October 1932 Emil Danzeisen was sentenced to six months in prison for attempted murder. To protect himself, Röhm contacted the opponents of the NSDAP, the Social Democrats.

There was indignation around Buch and Bormann. They will not let go of Röhm: in the spring of 1934 they have documents and lists ready."

Shortly before the climax of those days, Adolf Hitler and his entourage went to Essen to attend the wedding of Gauleiter Terboven. Immediately after his arrival, he received alarm calls from Himmler in Berlin about alleged SA machinations.

According to Heinz Höhne, Lutze, Röhm's successor:

"Here in his room in the 'Kaiserhof' in Essen, the telephone went almost continuously. The leader thought hard, but it seemed clear that he now wanted to strike. Another confidante of the conspirators burst into the Führer meeting: Paul ('Pilli') Körner, factotum of Goering and State Secretary in the Prussian State Ministry, had just arrived by plane from Berlin and was bringing more news from Himmler. All over the country, it seemed, the SA was preparing for an uprising."

These and other alarm reports from different parts of the Reich did not fail to have an effect on Adolf Hitler: he and his closest companions, which also included Martin Bormann, hurried from the Terboven wedding table to the Hangelar airfield near Bonn, from where he flew to Munich -Oberwiesefeld flew and drove on to Bad Wiessee by motor vehicle.

There on June 30, 1934 from 6:30 a.m. by the "Führer and Reich Chancellor" personally carried out arrests, which

numerous others were to follow throughout the Reich area, which are assumed to be known, as well as the subsequent murders by ordered and non-ordered shootings and in other ways - crimes which the ministerial staff sanctioned on July 3, 1934 - i.e. retrospectively - with the following law:

"The measures taken on June 30 and July 1 and 2, 1934 to suppress high and treasonable attacks are legal as state self-defense."

According to the National Socialist legal concept, the murders of SA men of various ranks were just as "legal" as the murders of Reichswehr generals Kurt v. Schleicher, Ferdinand v. Bredow, as well as to Mrs. v. Schleicher, to Vice Chancellor v. Papen's press chief v. Evil, to Dr. Erich Klausner (Ministerial Director in the Reich Ministry of Transport), to lawyer Dr. Förster, Stadtbaurat Kamphausen, Gregor Strasser and others, a total of eighty-three Germans. They were all murdered without trial, without a chance to defend themselves. Regarding Adolf Hitler:

"In that hour I was... supreme of the German people  
lord of the court."

What role did Martin Bormann play in these days and hours of the  
*"German Bartholomäusnacht"* ?

John v. Lang (8) has determined "that there is no evidence that Bormann was privy to the plan days beforehand". He always carried a notebook with him as an appointment book; there is an entry from June 30, 1934: "Röhm conspiracy uncovered: Schneidhuber, Graf Spreiti, Heines, Heyn, Schmid, Heydebreck, Ernst shot." (7)

Is striking, concludes v. Lang, "that these eventful days did not result in any detailed writing – and that, although Bormann was already one of Hitler's closest entourage, had to take part in all internal party events, commuted between the Reich Chancellery and the Brown House and was already in charge of his Führer's private affairs. The course of events rather allows the conclusion that he, together with the Munich Gauleiter Adolf Wagner, enigmatically like

had to make sure that the drama at the Fememord in Parchim went without a hitch on the Bavarian stage."

This somewhat bold statement is based on v. The Munich Gauleiter Wagner reported on the evening of June 29 by telephone to Adolf Hitler in Bad Godesberg that SA storms, alarmed by coup leaders, were marching through Munich. Wagner's report "fitted" into the series of reports already available Heydrichs and others and may have contributed to speeding up Adolf Hitler's decision to go to Bad Wiessee.

The events in Bad Wiessee have already been mentioned above. What is certain is that Adolf Hitler, coming from Bad Wiessee, was expected by Rudolf Hess and Martin Bormann in the "Brown House" in Munich, and Hess and Martin Bormann called the assembled party officials to the Senators' Hall.

Here Adolf Hitler took up Martin Bormann's suggestion, made in his letter to Hess on October 5, 1932, that Röhm be replaced by Viktor Lutze as Chief of Staff of the SA.

Jochen v. Lang (8) continues: "In his study (according to Hess) the Fuhrer

makes the first judgments.' The only documentation for this was a list of the names of the arrested SA leaders, compiled by the Stadelheim prison officials with whom they were being held.

Now the list was in the hands of Bormann, who, like no other in the group, guaranteed the painstakingly precise processing of files, who did not mind that this summary procedure dispensed with charges, witnesses, defense counsel, judges and who, obeying blindly, ticked a name as often as Hitler pronounced a death sentence.

The executive was meanwhile waiting in the adjutant's room: Sepp Dietrich, group leader of the SS and commander of the Leibstandarte... Before he was admitted, Hitler dictated statements and press reports for the public... Bormann had to see to it that these texts were typed and corrected and handed over to those responsible... By Bor

man he (Sepp Dietrich) was handed the list, and Hitler ordered the SA leaders who had been marked there to be shot. Here, too, as in Parchim, Bormann did not murder himself, here too he only assisted ...”

Max Gallo's (40) description of what happened before and during Adolf Hitler's "verdict" in the Brown House differ from the description by Longitudinally (8) slightly off. Max Gallo: "Hitler has withdrawn into a

room with his surroundings. Lutze, Goebbels, the party judge Buch, Martin Bormann, Sepp Dietrich, Rudolf Hess, Wagner and Max Amann are there, listening to him. Their presence encourages Hitler in his implacability, for all these men have long been opponents of Rohm and the SA... They will be the ones who helped the Fuhrer destroy the enemy in those tragic hours...

There is a moment of silence, then party judge Buch, from whom Röhm escaped as early as 1932" (not 1923, as Max Gallo says in his work) "again poses the question of the fate of the prisoners who are in Stadelheim. 'These dogs are to be shot,' shouted Hitler. He takes a list that Minister of the Interior Wagner is holding out to him and ticks off a number of names. Sometimes he hesitates, but then he puts down the two lines that form the death sentence. Everyone is silent, you only hear the pen scratching over the paper.

Finally, the leader hands over the list to Sepp Dietrich: 'You go to Stadelheim prison immediately. Take an SS officer and six non-commissioned officers and execute the SA leaders for high treason.' ...

The Fuhrer adds dryly: 'I pardoned Röhm because of his merits.' ... Consternation is painted on the faces of Buch, Goebbels and Bormann. So Röhm will escape from them again. As long as he lives, Hitler's change of direction is always possible. Only Röhm's death can grant them security...

Göring and Himmler persuade Hitler" (in Berlin) "Röhm still to be liquidated. Hitler gives in at 1 p.m. and

issued" (July 1, 1934) "SS-Oberfuhrer Theodor Eicke ordered to get rid of Röhm, if possible to get him to commit suicide ...

In Berlin, Hitler shows himself to the enthusiastic crowd again when an SS officer brings him a message: Röhm is dead." (Röhm did not commit suicide, but was murdered by Eicke.) "Hitler withdraws to his rooms a few minutes later. Himmler and the SS won their victory.

Göring, Heydrich, Goebbels, Bormann, Buch and their accomplices can now rule Germany in peace..."

Ernst Röhm's overly drastic, blustering, ultimately undiplomatic demeanor and his plans for the Reichswehr were fatal: he hadn't won any significant friends with it, but rather had become hostile to all the power groups of the Third Reich: "The Reichswehr

and Göring became an unwanted collaborator ran off, party apparatchiks and virtue guards were freed from a blasphemous, vicious troublemaker and the SS was finally able to free itself from its last ties to the SA." (48)

In order to illuminate the role that Martin Bormann played around June 30, 1934, the depictions of Jochen v. Lang (8) and Max Gallos (40) cited. Heinz Höhne (48) should also be consulted for complete orientation, since in his comprehensive work "Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf" the processes and figures treated are shown as precisely as possible and, above all, every statement and every quote is documented by the source: "At

2.30 p.m o'clock" (on June 30, 1934) "(Sepp) Dietrich was there like him. He was bored for three hours in the brown house adjutant's room, while through the double doors of the boardroom" ("called the Senators' Hall") "a loud but indistinct babble of voices came. Hitler and his closest associates debated the fate of the arrested SA leaders. It was the great hour of party judge Buch, who was openly able to make up for what he had failed to do in 1932: the murder of the Rohm circle. Rudolf Hess and the Nazi publisher Max

Amann" (of the Franz Eher Party publishing house in Munich) "competed for the pleasure of murder; Hess shouted: 'My Fiihrer, it's my job to shoot Rohm.' The new SA

chief of staff, Lutze, sat stunned and heard the murderous talk of the others. This was not how he had imagined the SA to be purged.

When Hitler asked him who should be shot, Lutze avoided the matter: he knew nothing about guilt or complicity, he couldn't name any names. And left the room in silence. At around 5 p.m. the door opened and Martin Bormann, Buch's son-in-law, stepped out. He led Dietrich to Hitler. He said: 'Drive out to the barracks, have six non-commissioned officers and one officer assigned to you, and have the SA leaders shot for treason and high treason.'

Then Bormann handed the group leader Dietrich a list of prisoners... it contained the names of the SA leaders who had been sent to Stadelheim...

Hitler ticked off six names with a green pencil..."

(These are the names and ranks of the SA leaders concerned, as well as their cell numbers in Stadelheim prison.)

When comparing the representations of Jochen v. Lang, Max Gallo and Heinz Höhne about the events in the senators' hall of the "Brown House" in Munich, where Adolf Hitler pronounced the death sentences based on the list from the Stadelheim prison, discrepancies stand out that should not go unmentioned.

while v. Lang speaks of the fact that *Martin Bormann* had this list in his hands and always *ticked* a name when Adolf Hitler pronounced a death sentence, Max Gallo writes that *Adolf Hitler* on this list the names of those to be shot — "*ticked with two dashes, forming the death cross*" and that "*you could hear the pen scratching on the paper*". This process is described most simply by Heinz Höhne: "*Hitler checked off six names on the list with a green pencil*".

Although the form in which the death row inmates are designated on the list is ultimately irrelevant, the question arises as to why Gallo speaks of a "*death cross*" by means of a "*quill you could hear scratching across the paper*", while Höhne

*"Checking off with a green pencil"* is called. Farthest away from these representations is v. Long, since according to him it was not Adolf Hitler himself but *Martin Bormann* who named the six SA leaders to be executed.

The verification of the information Gallo and v. Langs is made more difficult by the fact that both authors summarize their sources for the entire content of their books. Höhne, on the other hand, enables his statements to be followed down to the last detail, as already mentioned above. Höhne took the "*ticking off with a green pencil*" from the admission lists of the Munich penitentiary prison, case files of the Munich Regional Court I (48), which are in the bibliographies Gallos (40) and v. Langs (8) are missing.

Public opinion at home and abroad was of the opinion that on June 30, 1934, the Reichswehr had won a victory over Rohm and his intentions. This view is wrong. Heydrich had not acted as an ally of the Reichswehr when he hired one of their most prominent representatives, General Kurt v.

Schleicher, murdered (49). In the years that followed, the SS was armed. The Reichswehr was no longer "the nation's only weapon bearer" (Adolf Hitler).

On July 3, 1934, the certainly not pro-German "Le Temps" (Paris):

"Old Germany, you didn't deserve that."



## FIFTH CHAPTER

*Bormann increasingly powerful — He initiates Gestapo surveillance of the German people — Ban on free expression of opinion — Simultaneous "purges" in the Wehrmacht and the Red Army — Was a horoscope the cause of Hitler's unrest? — Hitler puts party thinking above patriotism*

The rise of the NSDAP created "new territory".

Here, Martin Bormann skilfully and successfully advanced. As early as May 27, 1933, he sent a letter to Rudolf Hess, in which he recalled his repeated requests for a transfer from the party's relief fund. He justified this request by saying that Reich Treasurer Schwarz was trying to simplify the accounting of contributions, which made Martin Bormann fear that he would become superfluous. While in the second paragraph of this letter he speaks "for another use and for another task in the *political* organization", in the third paragraph of the letter he repeats only the second part of his request, to find "use within the *political* organization", emphatically .

It is understandable that a 33-year-old, active young man, after the party's often-cited "seizure of power," wanted to take the place where there was a chance of success and where he could at the same time satisfy his ambition. The words of his former superior, Reich Treasurer Schwarz (according to General Koller, 37), convey a negative image — to see this page as well — which, however, do not refer to Bormann from the time of the relief fund, but to the "secretary" of later years relate.

At the beginning of July 1933, the appointment of Martin Bormann as head of Rudolf Hess's staff was announced in the "Party Correspondence". A few letters to Adolf Hitler's deputy were therefore sufficient to confirm the later "takeover of power" by the party only six months after the "takeover of power".  
Martin Bormann's to initiate within the party. from one

political review has never been mentioned. A comparison from our day suggests itself: Walter Guillaume — Willy Brandt.

On October 10, 1933, Bormann was appointed Reichsleiter and a few weeks later he was a member of the German Reichstag.

Joseph Wulf (10) divided Bormann's curriculum vitae into five stages. The first stage covers the years of "ideal orientation" from 1920 to July 1933, when Rudolf Hess was appointed Chief of Staff. The second stage probably ended with Hess's flight to England (May 10, 1941); Now the third stage began, which Joseph Wulf scheduled from May 1941 to April 12, 1943. The fourth stage is to be reckoned with until the end of 1944, when the Ardennes offensive was unsuccessful, while the fifth stage ended on May 1, 1945.

We cannot agree with this classification, since Martin Bormann's rise from "unknown party member" to the "shift levers of power" is characterized by special features that are not defined by titles or official designations such as "Reichsleiter", "Member of Parliament" and "Secretary of the leader" can be limited.

One characteristic was the trust that Adolf Hitler had in him, which could only be earned through particular diligence, attentiveness, constant presence, and a show of faith and subservience. For example, if Adolf Hitler wanted an assessment from the party's point of view, then Martin Bormann would get it done at any time of the day or night in the shortest possible time, if necessary using all means of communication such as telephones, teletypewriters, radio. Books were procured by air.

Another feature was that the trust thus acquired or surreptitiously used according to Bormann's discretion and intentions and at the same time to link it with the views of the head of state. A parallel to this is Adolf Hitler's relationship of trust with his personal physician, Dr. Mo rel, which was reported in detail in the 2nd chapter.

Martin Bormann's activities on Hess's staff were varied

and his interest extended to most areas in the Party Organization (PO) but also beyond. Some examples:

When the three "Führer adjutants" Brüdmer, Schaub and Wiedemann from Duke v. Coburg had been decorated with his house orders, these honors aroused the displeasure of Reichsleiter Bormann. He reminded us in writing that members of the party were not allowed to accept medals for services to the rise of Germany, and that it was not up to the "former potentaten" to even award medals at all. — The scope and technical content of this communication indicate the lawyer. Martin Bormann may have learned from his colleague Dr. Heim consulted before this letter received its final version, in which the dismissive attitude towards "our former monarchs" is also expressed (8).

In the autumn of 1933, the supreme SA leadership complained that in all parts of the German Reich the party officials wore olive-green coats intended exclusively for the SA. Here Reichsleiter Bormann intervened with a clarifying letter on November 8, 1933: only brown coats were permitted for the political "Amtswalter" while the SA had to wear green coats (10).

There was no freedom of expression in the Third Reich. Martin Bormann wanted to monitor those Germans who dared to criticize the NSDAP. He used denunciation and worked hand in hand with the Gestapo. Here, too, he proceeded methodically. In the circular of February 14, 1935, he called on the party officials to "gradually drop all distrust of the Gestapo and rather help them to solve the difficult tasks of protecting the people and the party than to oppose them ..." (10). In a further circular on the matter six months later, on September 3, 1935, he gave the order to all party offices to carry out his demand according to the circular of February 14, 1935 (10):

"On September 3, 1935, Chief of Staff Bormann then gave all party offices the very unequivocal order to report to the Gestapo conscientiously anyone who dared to criticize or denigrate the party itself or one of its branches. In doing so, he referred to a law of December 20, 1934, according to which the party, its branches and every sovereign enjoy the same protection. If, therefore, there is a slanderous charge against the NSDAP, its branches or individual party members, the insidiousness of which is obvious, the Reich Minister of Justice must get in touch with the deputy leader immediately. "Deputy of the Führer" actually meant 'Martin Bormann' even then. At least most! Together we will then take action against the insidious slanderer."

An order to spy on the entire German people had not existed on this scale in the German-speaking area, even in Metternich's time. The older generation, insofar as they did not fully support Adolf Hitler, remembers the atmosphere created in those days. Since then, the acronym "Ge stapo" has become synonymous with fear and terror. However, exaggerations such as can be found today in the mass media at home and abroad ignore the facts, as do attempts to whitewash the Gestapo because its leader, Heinrich Müller, was Catholic, formerly belonged to the Bavarian People's Party and "through improper use of this instrument ... charged National Socialism with the odium of the police state". (50)

Finally, the letter that Martin Bormann sent to the NSDAP's foreign press chief, Dr. Ernst Hanfstaengl, wrote when he had fled abroad out of fear for life and limb.

The following happened: Dr.

Hanfstaengl, who had supported the party financially from the early days and had since belonged to the small circle of confidants around Adolf Hitler in Munich, had made a careless statement because of his knowledge of numerous internal matters. He was killed on February 10, 1937 during a

Flight from Staaken to Würzen i. Sa. on board a Ju 52 forced to jump with a parachute. He refused to comply and considered his life threatened. He fled to London via Switzerland. In Zurich, he received the following letter from Hermann Göring dated March 19, 1937, persuading him to return to Germany: "Dear Hanfstaengl! As I was

informed today, you have been in Zurich for some time and intend not to return to Germany for the time being.

I assume that the reasons for this can be traced back to your last flight from Staaken to Würzen i. Sat. I assure you that the whole affair was meant to be a harmless *joke*. They wanted to give you a chance to reflect on some overly bold claims you had made. Nothing else was really intended.

I have sent Colonel Bodenschatz to you, who will give you some explanations personally. For various reasons I think it is urgently necessary that you return to Germany with Bodenschatz immediately. I declare on *my honor* that you can move *freely here with us, as always*. So drop all *suspicion* and act *sensibly*. With comradely greetings, Heil Hitler!

Hermann Goering"

(emphasis in original)

At the height of the signature, Göring added by hand: "I expect that you will believe my *word*!" (Prev. i. Orig.)

About that Dr. Hanfstaengl in his memoirs (46): "Through the American courier I asked my old friend Truman-Smith to carefully check with my acquaintances whether my life would be endangered if I returned. He immediately turned to General v. Reichenau, who informed him after a few weeks that our mutual acquaintance should not be advised to return. The next thing I heard, my property had been confiscated. Even now

their efforts to get me back into their power didn't stop. In a letter, Martin Bormann stressed that all penalties would be lifted and that I would be reimbursed for my stay in London if I returned.

Bodenschatz came to London for the second time, bringing with him the husband of my former secretary, who worked in Goebbels' ministry. He brought me a soothing message from the 'little doctor'. When I didn't want to go into anything, Bodenschatz brought out the heavy artillery: 'If you don't come back, there are other ways to silence you,' he threatened. I replied that my memoirs had already been written and were in my lawyer's safe. If I died a natural death, they would be destroyed; but if something happened to me or my relatives, they would be published."

On November 6, 1965, Major General v. Schoenebeck in Munich issued the following statement on this matter:

"Regarding the alleged joke that was made on February 10, 1937 by order of the then commander of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Göring, against the former foreign press chief of the NSDAP, Dr. Ernst Hanfstaengl, I have the following to say: As the then commander of the

testing sites in Rechlin Müritzsee, I received the order on February 10, 1937 from General Bodenschatz (as far as I can remember), then adjutant to Reich Marshal Göring, to provide a Ju 52 with a complete blind flight crew for a 'special task'. The pilot at that time was Mr. Frodel (also as far as I can remember). Towards evening the crew reported back and expressed their indignation at the use they had found. The following had happened: At a certain place, among others, Dr. Serious

Hanfstaengl was taken on board and it was revealed to him on the way that he had to parachute down. dr

Thank God Hanfstaengl was able to evade the urgently demanded request. After my complaint on

next day about using my planes for the kind sporting events (read liquidations) the company was called a 'hoax'." (46)

But let us return to Martin Bormann. Inevitably, given the close contact he had with Adolf Hitler, he was occasionally rebuked. This happened in a particularly sharp form when Hitler paid a visit to the ailing General Ludendorff in Munich in the autumn of 1937. Above that Wilhelm Breuker (51):

"A few hours after this visit someone from Hitler's entourage said: 'I have never seen the Führer so soft. If the right man were there now who had the courage to push, Hitler would give up his war plans and throw his whole policy around.' And another person from Hitler's circle told the story: When Bormann, alarmed by the emotion with which the Führer reported his visit to Ludendorff, dared to remark that Ludendorff was certainly a great soldier, but always a bad politician Hitler barked at him with the words: 'Be quiet, Ludendorff sees more clearly than all of us.'"

Furthermore, Breuker thinks that for anyone who knew General Ludendorff there can be no doubt that he warned Hitler one last time about his policy of saber-rattling. — Incidentally, as early as March 30, 1937, General Ludendorff in the Munich General Command addressed the following words

to Adolf Hitler: "But I warn you very seriously against starting a war. We have to stay out of any military involvement at all. Only a defensive war comes into question for Germany, otherwise only strict neutrality. In any case, the new army will still need years before it can fulfill this task.

From what I learned about the formation of the new Wehrmacht, you will be assured of great success at the beginning of the war. You may even get as far as Cairo and India. However, further war will lead to complete defeat

intervene on such a scale and Germany will eventually be annihilated." (52)

After the danger that Röhm had "threatened" for the party leadership had been radically eliminated on June 30, 1934, Martin Bormann turned to the expansion of the Obersalzberg, the planned summer residence of the head of state, with his own energy. With funds from the "Adolf Hitler donation from industry" he took possession of the Obersalzberg around the Berghof in "Protecting Hitler's personal interests" and thereby skilfully played his way into Hitler's private life and over the years made himself so in anchored in him that Hitler increasingly considered him indispensable and then gave this brainless man more and more political influence because he had found in him the absolute and blindly obedient tool for passing on his orders to the terrible end ". (42)

The armaments minister and architect at the time, Albert Speer, remembers:

"Bormann was the true master of the Obersalzberg. Under duress, he bought up centuries-old farms and had them torn down, as well as the numerous consecrated shrines, although the parish objected. He also collected state forests until the terrain reached from a mountain almost 1900 meters high to the valley 600 meters below and covered an area of seven square kilometers. The fence around the inner perimeter was about three kilometers, around fourteen around the outer perimeter.

Without any feeling for the untouched nature, Bormann criss-crossed this magnificent landscape with a network of roads; forest paths, previously covered with pine needles and crossed by roots, became asphalted promenades. A barracks, an entire garage, a hotel for Hitler's guests, a new estate, a housing estate for the ever-growing number of employees sprang up in quick succession, like a spa resort that had suddenly become fashionable. Housing barracks for hundreds of construction workers clung to the mountainsides, trucks with building materials drove down the streets, various construction sites were lit up at night because work was done in two shifts



worked, and occasional detonations rumbled through the valley." (32)

The number and strength of these detonations have apparently increased, because "Over the years Hitler felt compelled to forbid Bormann to carry out these detonations until 12 noon so that they would not rob him of his sleep. The work and earthmoving did not decrease over the years, but increased. Because Bormann's importance grew with them!

You get an idea of the scope of this work when you know that no fewer than five thousand mostly foreign workers were employed on Obersalzberg well into the war years."

As far as the Reich Press Chief Dr. Otto Dietrich. (42)

## CHAPTER SIX

*Tukhachevsky's Development and Fall — Was He a  
Freemason? — Ca naris refuses to help Heydrich to produce  
forgeries — Bormann intervenes decisively*

The purges of the Red Army (1937-1938) were part of the purges which began with the assassination of the Leningrad party secretary Kirov on December 1, 1934 and extended from 1935 to 1938 to all sections of the Russian population. Not excluded from this were even old fighters of Lenin and Stalin, such as Zinoyev, Kamenev, Bukharin; Karl Radek was also among them, who held the introductory talks with General v. Seeckt had spoken a few years earlier about the cooperation between the Red Army and the Reichswehr.

These "Trotskyist trials," as the purges were called in Soviet terminology, or "show trials" in Western terms, would not have received much attention in 1935-38, when Adolf Hitler had the world in suspense, if not for the Red Army would have been caught by it.

When it became known that the Soviet Marshal Mihail Tukhachevsky had been arrested, tried in secret and executed, the world public took notice. The shootings of the military commanders of Belarus, Uborevich, and of Kiev, Yakir, followed, as well as the commander of the Frunze War Academy, Kork, the chief of the General Directorate of the Army, Feldmann, the chief of Osso viachim (pre-military training), Eidmann, the former Soviet Military attaches in London, Putna, also of General Primakov's corps.

"The chief of the general staff Egorov, the commander of the air force Alksnis, the commander of the navy Orlov, the inspector of artillery and armored forces, 13 army generals out of 15, 57 corps generals out of 85, 110 divisional command

195 commanders and 220 brigade commanders out of 406 had disappeared in less than a year. The head of the Army Political Directorate, Gamarnik, committed suicide in his office... By 1938 only two out of five marshals were left. Of the 80 members of the Supreme Military Council, 75 disappeared, 35,000 officers and commissars had been liquidated or deported, as did 90% of generals and 80% of colonels. The headquarters of the military districts of the future armies, corps and divisions were sten ... completely swept out. No war, no matter how murderous, could have had such devastating consequences..." (59)

The events of the October Revolution of 1917, the civil war and various purges had taught historians the extent of the liquidations involved. However, when it became known that even the leaders of the militant Soviet power, the Red Army, had fallen victim to a particularly radical purge, this process seemed incomprehensible, also because among those affected there were some Soviet commanders who were still few Years earlier they had been trained by officers of the German Reichswehr and were counted among the most secure pillars of the Soviet system.

Therefore, the events surrounding the person of the second man in the Red Army, the Soviet Marshal Tukhachevsky, occupy a large space in Western literature. It is reported that the man born in 1893 was of noble origin. He served as a lieutenant in the Semeonowski Guards Regiment of Tsar Nicholas II. In 1914 he was wounded and taken prisoner by the Germans. Tukhachevsky's membership in the "Polarstern" lodge, to which other officers of the Tsar's guard are said to have belonged, was published by Viktor Alexandrov (60), who refers to the exiled Russian General Skoblin. However, this information is not documented. This will be discussed later in connection with Heydrich.

Tukhachevsky joined the Red Army shortly after the collapse of the Tsarist government. Here he fought successfully against the Belarusian units of Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin. He also took part in the Soviet defensive struggle against the Polish troops under Pilsudski who had invaded Ukraine and occupied Kiev on May 7, 1920.

Not only did he succeed in driving the Polish troops out of the Ukraine, but he advanced to the outskirts of Warsaw, where his formations, exhausted and without reserves, came to a standstill.

In this situation, the High Command of the Red Army ordered its Southern Army, under Yegorov and Budyonny, to come to the aid of Tukhachevsky. However, the commanders of the Southern Army, who accompanied Army Commissar Stalin, disobeyed this order and advanced on Lemberg. As a result, the Poles, with the help of French arms under General Weygand, succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat on Tukhachevsky, who had been left in the lurch at the gates of Warsaw.

(Miracles on the Vistula, 59, 61)

Tukhachevsky was also entrusted with the suppression of the sailors' uprising in the sea fortress of Kronstadt, which was joined by the regiments stationed in Oranienbaum on the opposite side. He solved this task under heavy fighting in the short period of nine days (March 7th to 16th, 1921).

It is astonishing that, despite his aristocratic origins, his career in the Red Army remained steep: he became commander of the Leningrad Military District and director of the Frunze Academy. His reforms of the Red Army included the creation of mechanized and armored formations; Parts of the infantry and cavalry divisions were to be motorized.

The establishment of an air force including airborne units, which were once based on the maneuver guest General v. Hammerstein had made such a big impression were planned. In 1931 he was commissioned by the party's Politburo to carry out his plans.

Tukhachevsky was pleased not only with the soldiers, son

which was very popular with the entire population of the Soviet Union. In addition, he went into political areas. That was his undoing.

Tukhachevsky was a Russian through and through. The above measures he took indicate a national way of thinking. This is also indicated by the construction of motor roads, which were created for the new weapon type "motorized transport corps" (59). Here the comparison with the Reichsautobahn and the NS motor corps is not unreasonable.

His political considerations went hand in hand with his plans to strengthen Soviet power militarily. In January 1936 he addressed the Central Committee in Moscow on the general political situation in Europe. Here he had been conspicuous for his passionately anti-German tone, in sharp contrast to Stalin's moderate statements on the same matter (53). In the winter of 1936/37 the exiled Russian General Skoblin, who was said to have also been in the service of the GPU, reported to the head of the German security service, Heydrich, that the Red Army was planning a conspiracy against Stalin, headed by Tukhachevsky and General Putna stood (53). The author of the book "The Marshal was in the Way" (60), Viktor Alexandrov, expresses himself more clearly when he says,

"that the Soviet Marshal" (Tukhachevski) "had prepared everything to set up an alliance directed against the Third Reich, which was ready to initiate preventive action at the first opportunity".

At this point General Skoblin's statements that he is said to have made about Tukhachevski and Heydrich (60) should be discussed. Accordingly, a)

Tukhachevski was very anti-German and b) as a former officer of the Tsar's Guards, he was a member of the "Polarstern" lodge in the 23rd degree

- d) Tukhachevsky is related to Jews; his grandfather is said to have married a Jewess who had converted to Christianity
- e) Skoblin to Heydrich: "If, with your help, we succeed in defeating the communists, then I guarantee you, Herr Heydrich, that not many Jews will remain in Russia."

It is obvious that General Skoblin put forward arguments designed to make the Soviet Marshal appear extremely dangerous in Heydrich's eyes and at the same time to stir up feelings against him. Skoblin's arguments ran parallel to the political course of the NSDAP. He approached Heydrich with his knowledge, which enabled the liquidation of Tukhachevsky planned by Stalin to be initiated, because Heydrich and the Abwehr under Admiral Canaris were in possession of the documents signed by Tukhachevsky, which have already been reported on. This has made it more likely that Skoblin, as the successor to the kidnapped Tsarist generals Kutieпов and Miller from Paris, was active not only for the Russian emigres living in France but also for Stalin's GPU. It was apparently not possible for Heydrich, otherwise described as highly intelligent, to see through these connections and thus clearly recognize the limits of his activity. Until his death (June 4, 1942) he believed that he had made a decisive contribution to the weakening of the Red Army (49), without suspecting that he too was working in Stalin's interests.

Regarding Skoblin's assertion that Tukhachevsky was a Freemason, it should be noted that such membership can only refer to the time of the Tsars, since the Russian lodges were dissolved and banned after the outbreak of the revolution in 1917. Friedrich Wichtl and Robert Schneider (65) report the following about this: "In Russia, the trial of Radek and his comrades has shown

that the closest connections exist between the Russian and French Freemasons. (Cf., Neue Abendzeitung\* Ludwigshafen dated February 9, 1937) Radek was master of

Chair of the Soviet Masonic Lodge 'Star of the North'. Soviet Russian diplomats and two members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party belonged to this lodge. It has meanwhile become known that Soviet Russia has admitted 6 grand lodges like that, which are in connection with the French grand lodges. The new Soviet Russian national coat of arms shows the hammer and sickle dominating the globe. Above it is the pentagonal star."

Since Viktor Alexandrov's (60) subjective claims about Skoblin's statements in the matter of Tukhachevsky and the statements by Wichtl-Schneider (65) are not related to Martin Bormann, further considerations of the complex from this point of view are dispensed with.

In order to ensure the credibility of the information in his book "Der Marshal was in the way", Viktor Alexandrov wrote in the Foreword said:

"It may come as a surprise that I am so well informed about the circumstances of Tukhachevsky's arrest, even about the words he exchanged with the officer who was responsible for the arrest. This officer, however, was sent to the embassy in Sofia in 1937 as a representative of the NKVD. He described the events in detail to the then Ambassador Ras Kolnikov. I learned it from him after he had left his post and emigrated to Paris." (60)

Such statements and possible intentions of Tukhachevsky were only suitable to unnerve the always vigilant and suspicious in the Kremlin, since he constantly feared for his power  
killed

Between Stalin and Tukhachevsky there were considerable differences in background, in the past, in character and in personal goals.

"In addition to the fear that a new Napoleon might also arise from the Russian Revolution, Stalin was sickened by the thought that among his subordinates there was someone who was superior to him in intellectual gifts, in working capacity, in appearance and in the level of education. Tukhachevsky belonged

not to those who sought Stalin's favor... During the Spanish Civil War the first serious tensions arose between the dictator and the marshal..." (59)

Tukhachevsky only wanted to send volunteers to support the Red Spaniards against General Franco (1936) in order to keep the Red Army intact for Central European tasks.

Stalin secured the support of the Red Spaniards, including the future Chancellor Willy Brandt, by ordering regular Red Army troops to Spain. Furthermore, in his written report on the Polish campaign (1920), Tukhachevsky held Stalin responsible for his defeat near Warsaw, which Stalin never forgot

(62). After all, the Red Army under Tukhachevsky had become stronger and more national.

"It represented a power that knew how to make itself more and more independent of the party. The political apparatus in the army had become more and more like the soldiers and was no longer an instrument with which the party could have controlled the army —"

Similar developments were also apparent outside the army in the political and economic spheres of the state structure. These were modest beginnings of a "democratization process" that no dictator could tolerate. Hence the purges already mentioned, which were carried out particularly radically in the compact army body.

Here Stalin proceeded particularly cautiously, since he could have fallen over the purges. Today it is clear that the elimination of Tukhachevsky and his comrades was in the interests of both Stalin and Adolf Hitler. Leopold Stepper, the "Chief of the Red Orchestra" during the Second World War, who can be counted among those in the know, takes the view that

"that Stalin, using the complicity of Hitler, dealt this fatal blow to the armed forces of the Russian people." (63)

In addition to the Soviet official account of Lew Nikulin (64), there are also Walter Hagen (49), Walter Schellenberg (16), Geoffrey Bailley (53), Viktor Alexandrow (60), who refers to a



Primary source cited, as well as Heinz Höhne (48), Michel Garder (59) and others of the same opinion, namely that it was Heydrich who had the "documents" incriminating Tuchtatsdiewski and his circle produced and forwarded to Stalin via Benesch.

The numerous details described there cannot be dealt with in more detail because of their scope and since they do not belong to the topic of this work. It should only be pointed out that Heydrich needed to obtain the originals in order to be able to carry out the forgeries.

From the time of cooperation between the Reichswehr and the Red Army there were receipts and documents that bore the signatures of the German and Soviet commanders, such as reports that Tukhachevsky had written and personally signed during his training period in the Reichswehr. Also handwritten letters to the generals v. Hammerstein and V. Fritsch were among them with a number of maneuver photos and accounts. (60)

These originals were kept in the archives of the Abwehr under Admiral Canaris. After Heydrich had unsuccessfully requested these from the uninformed and, above all, honest-minded Admiral Canaris, Hess intervened with the same request, also without success. According to Viktor Alexandrov (60), "he" (Canaris) "was convinced that the Gestapo wanted

to connect some high-ranking officers of the Reichswehr with some dark affair, probably members of the Schleicher group.

Canaris was therefore determined to thwart these devious plans. He used the most deceptive excuses to delay the delivery of the documents that Hess had asked for.

*At that moment the dynamic Martin Bormann, the Führer's eminence grise, intervened.* He simply put himself at the head of the committee of the 'three Hs' (Hitler-Himmler Heydrich) and devised a plan to get hold of the documents Canaris refused".

(italics by author)

Victor Alexandrov also reports how this happened:

*"Tired of the long wait for Canaris to hand over the documents, the head of the SD" (Heydrich) "simply had the offices of the Wehrmacht intelligence service broken into" (60)*  
(italics by author)

In the accompanying footnote, Viktor Alexandrov (60)

writes: "A robbery of the counter-intelligence office by the head of the SD" (Heydrich) "could seem quite improbable. The fact, however, is made quite clear by Schellenberg" (Heydrich's right hand) "confirmed in his memoirs. For his part, Canaris discussed this with Colonel Abshagen and Major v. Prittwitz, whose testimony is recorded by Colvin in his Chief of Intelligence. Schellenberg writes in his memoirs that the burglars were recidivist professional criminals, so-called 'ring brothers', who were sentenced to severe punishment. Heydrich had pardoned her. They worked with such speed that a fire broke out as soon as they left. This accident destroyed some important files, which had nothing to do with the Tukhachevsky affair."

The striped events, the description of which has meanwhile swelled into literature, took place in the years 1935 to 1938, when the building projects on the Obersalzberg were far from completed. As is well known, Martin Bormann made himself the client. However, he did not forget his duties as head of Hess's staff, which he often set himself.

Joseph Wulf (10) believes that

"Bormann led a *double life* as chief of staff, so to speak. Determined, but well *camouflaged* and quite secretly, he expanded his position according to his own wishes, without those around him becoming aware of it in general. *He was so skilful that he fooled almost everyone.*" (italics by author)

Unfortunately, Wulf breaks off this train of thought here, without naming the undeceived, and goes on to justify his view. He refers to the numerous and varied circulars that Martin Bormann wrote

and with whom he worked to expand his position. In this context, Wulf speaks somewhat drastically, but not entirely off the mark, of "real underground work" (10).

In fact, it seems strange when someone who left the relief fund voluntarily and was looking for a job in the political organization of the NSDAP (Bormann's letter to Hess dated May 27, 1933) writes circulars to all Reich and Gau leaders the color of the coats to be worn by magistrates and the SA. He also deals with the chauffeur of the personal physician, for whom he ordered probation from the front, which Dr. Morell canceled very quickly. In a strictly confidential circular to the Reichsleiter, Gauleiter and association leaders, he argues in great detail for the establishment of brothels for foreign workers. In his circular dated January 3, 1941, he declared the German script (Fraktur) to be "*Schwabacher Judenlettern*" and decreed - in the name of Adolf Hitler - that the antiqua script was to be designated as "normal script" in future and that after a transitional period it was only to be used on its own. The decree that the right hand should be raised in the "*German salute*" when singing the Deutschlandlied and the Horst-Wessel-Lied was also due to Martin Bormann.

At the beginning of 1938 he was ordered to Berlin by Adolf Hitler. It came to February 4th, as already mentioned, when more than ten generals of the Wehrmacht and the Reich Foreign Minister v. Neurath were dismissed and replaced by National Socialists. There was an intrigue against Minister of War v. Blomberg and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army v. Fritsch. It remains unknown whether or what role Martin Bormann played in this.

When Austria was annexed to the German Reich (March 1938) he was in Adolf Hitler's vicinity. His task was to have a former acquaintance of Adolf Hitler, Reinhold Hanisch, arrested with the help of the Gestapo. In 1910 Hanisch had sold the watercolors by the painter Hitler and lived with him in a men's home in Vienna-Meidling; Hanisch had also threatened revelations. Martin Bormann later wrote in a memorandum that "Hanisch hanged himself after the takeover of Austria" (8).

In the summer of 1938, Martin Bormann began to isolate the head of state from the population, which Rudolf Jordan (30) so aptly described in the last years of the war as the "barrier wall". He separated the Obersalzberg site from the remaining owners with a wire fence two meters high and divided this zone into an outer and an inner restricted area. The inner circle was monitored by Himmler's plainclothes officers, who reported to Martin Bormann at the Obersalzberg (8).

For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that Martin Bormann was Adolf Hitler's constant companion in the second half of 1938; He took part in the inspection of the West Wall, in a fleet parade, in troop inspections and in early September at the Nuremberg Nazi Party Rally, where Adolf Hitler awarded him the "Blood Order". Martin Bor

man present.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

*Freisler and the People's Court — "Freisler in his entire way a Bolshevik" (Hitler) — Bormann attacks General Rommel and exacts revenge on him*

The "coming to terms with the past", which is talked about again and again, includes both the knowledge of the heterogeneous composition of the top management in the Third Reich and the consideration of two other people who later, in addition to Dr. Morell and Martin Bormann should be of great importance. These were the former Soviet Commissioner Roland Freisler, who, although half-Aryan, rose to become President of the People's Court, and Martin Bormann's intimate friend, Erich Koch, the Gauleiter of East Prussia, about the Nazi occupation policy in the Ukraine will be speaking.

Freisler's curriculum vitae and career show a few oddities. Roland Freisler was born on October 30, 1893 in Celle near Hanover. He attended schools in Aachen and Kassel and had acquired a certain reputation for being quick-witted and ironic in arguments. After graduating from high school, he began to study law in Jena.

At the beginning of August 1914 he also volunteered for the war; in the autumn of 1914 he was deployed to the eastern front, where he was taken prisoner of war after a year. He learned the Russian language, which he did extremely well. He is also said to have dealt intensively with Marxism. Eventually he became Bolshevik commissar in the field of food supply (19, 66, 68). Returning to Kassel in July 1920, he resumed his studies, which he passed summa cum laude in 1921. In practice he was a good lawyer, of whom it has been said that "his temperament tinged with extreme coolness, philosophical enthusiasm, and the tone of shame" (19).

The 39-year-old was appointed as Ministerial Director in the Prussian Ministry of Justice in February 1933. However, this success did not prevent the ambitious man from storming the town hall in Kassel and Bonn at the beginning of March "at the head of his brown friends" (66). City Hall was stormed by the Reds and "occupied" forty years later. This success may have persuaded Freisler to march in front of the Kassel courthouse with his brown band the very next day, apparently in order to storm it as well. A level-headed official managed to dissuade him and content himself with hanging a swastika flag over the main portal. Gerd Buchheit (66) writes about Freisler's mental mobility: "During the 'struggle' of the movement he had no trouble mastering the principles of 'common good, people, race, genetic material' etc., just as he had during the

years of his stay in Russia had become familiar with the vocabulary of communist doctrine... As a functionary he was such a perfect nationalist that he hardly differed from the communist apparatchik..."

About the accused of the twentieth of July 1944 said Adolf Hitler according to Buchheit:

"And the most important thing is that they must not be given time to make long speeches. *But Freisler will do that. This is our Vyshinsky.*" (Notable Soviet prosecutor at the 1937 show trials. Italics by author)

Buchheit continues:

"This designation of the President of the People's Court is quite revealing, especially when one remembers that Hitler had declared another time: 'Freisler is in his entire way a Bolshevik.'"

Buchheit writes about the nature of the court hearings conducted by Freisler: "Eyewitnesses

rightly described Freisler's conduct of the lawsuit as a caricature of a court hearing.

With theatrical, brutal and merciless, apparently

With a rehearsed facial expression in front of the mirror, the chairman entered the hall at the head of his staff. Nothing of humanity in this disgusting grimace with the large, half-lidded, sly, insidious eyes ..." (66)

The head of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) SS General Dr. In his secret "Reports to Bormann and Hitler about the assassination attempt of July 20, 1944," Kaltenbrunner writes, among other things:

"Of course, there was no lack of voices linking critical observations to the chairman's conduct of the negotiations.

Thus, it is pointed out, particularly in circles of the intelligentsia and legal guardians, that the way in which the trial was organized and widely discussed in public ... reminds us of earlier Soviet show trials The 'cheap way', in which the presiding judge - so it is said - insulted and ridiculed the accused, who had actually already been judged, did not quite correspond to the dignity of the highest German court of justice..." (69)

Kaltenbrunner continues in his secret report: "Other

national comrades point out that some of the accused are personalities who, because of their merits and because of their activities, have received the highest honors and awards, especially in the National Socialist state. It was strange that these men, who not so long ago had been promoted by the Fuhrer himself and whose deeds had been hailed as heroic deeds in the press, should now be portrayed as foolish, idiotic and indecisive. If the population were informed in this way that a field marshal and a colonel general, who could have ordered the deployment of tens of thousands of soldiers, turned out to be such criminals and incompetent creatures, then confidence in the Wehrmacht would have to be given a serious boost suffer. But there should also be doubts in the personnel policy in the highest Füh mann, which had already left the inner attitude of this high and important position in the Polish campaign...

Certain concerns are also derived from the fact that

that the conduct of the trial apparently prevented the defendants from freely developing their confessions about their true motives. Despite all the detail, the official press release leaves many questions unanswered. They were undoubtedly a number of men, capable of surveying Germany's military and political possibilities, who could scarcely be supposed to have prepared and carried out such a despicable crime without reason or thought ..." (69)

Approximately three hundred people were admitted to listen to these negotiations. Many of them survived the war and left detailed accounts. Freisler not only shouted down the accused officers when they tried to make a statement, he also insulted them in a spiteful manner. Here in the courtroom of the highest German court, the hatred of the former Soviet commissar, the German "Vy Schinski", against the German nobility and highly deserving officers raged in a truly orgiastic manner. Perhaps this "political soldier of the Führer", as he once called himself, thought he was publicly proving that he was a fanatical National Socialist and, like Heydrich, wanted to compensate for his semi-Aryan origins.

This behavior of Freisler, which was fueled by hatred, finds a parallel in the "eternal adversary of the army" (33) Martin Bormann, who glaringly illuminates the inner attitude of this man even in the Polish campaign. General Walter Warlimont reports on this in his memoirs (70):

So that the grotesque, no matter how serious it may be, is not lacking, a few observations of a special kind from the stay at the headquarters in Sopot should be noted.

Early in the morning, 20-30 cars gathered at the driveway to the hotel, marching in double columns, to drive to the battlefield north of Gdynia. General Rommel, the commander of Headquarters, had to undertake the task of guiding this convoy, with Hitler at the head, on the march set.



When asked why they were driving in double columns, Rommel told the visitor that after some embarrassing experiences he had introduced this "march structure" because it was best suited to the rank and right of way claims of the not the To do justice to the visitors who belonged to the Wehrmacht and who had meanwhile gathered in large numbers at headquarters. In this way at least 6-8 of them, two "carloads", would be housed at the same height and distance from Hitler and that was what mattered most to them.

Nevertheless, Rommel had another embarrassing experience that day when the double column could no longer be maintained on a narrow dirt road and the majority of the wagons were suddenly stopped at a barrier while the lead drove away with Hitler. Although word immediately got around among those who stayed behind that a short visit to a nearby field hospital was the reason for the interruption, *Martin Bormann*, head of the Party Chancellery, raised an angry yell on the still barely cleared battlefield *and berated General Rommel for this supposed set back in an unprecedented way*. Rommel seemed powerless against such impertinence. Even when the visitor expressed his outrage at Bormann's behavior in the same minute and at the same point, Rommel only asked him to also inform the Wehrmacht's chief adjutant, Schmundt, about the incident in the same way. "

(italics by author)

Martin Bormann rarely showed his dislike, even hatred, of the Wehrmacht so openly. In the years that followed, he continued to successfully intrigue in secret, since Adolf Hitler placed considerably more trust in him than in the officers of the Wehrmacht. The incident described above also gives an idea of the climate in which the decisions were later made which, apart from the betrayal at the "Führer Headquarters", were to lead from defeat to defeat after the first major military successes.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

*Bormann expands his position — Peculiarities of Hess — Hess'  
Flight to England - "Bormann a grub in the orb" - Bormann gains  
ground through Hess' departure - character traits  
Bormanns*

The period between the brilliantly conducted campaign in Poland (campaign of 18 days) in September 1939, the occupation of Denmark, the landing and fighting in Norway, which lasted until the end of 1940, the offensive in the west (May 10, 1940), the defeat For Bormann, Yugoslavia and Greece (April 1941) was filled with dealing with party-political tasks and problems that had arisen as a result of the occupation of the conquered territories. He also dealt with the organization of civil administration in these areas, paying special attention to the Poles. In a letter to the head of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers, against the introduction of German criminal law in the eastern territories.

Orderly German legal relationships seemed too humane for the Poles. He finally achieved that in May 1941 police criminal law was introduced as a special criminal law for the Poles; it ranged from flogging to the death penalty (8).

At the same time, Martin Bormann's superior, Rudolf Hess, the "Führer's deputy" was pursuing a less responsible occupation: playing sports and skiing, much to the displeasure of Adolf Hitler. Hess was very attached to occultism and its pseudo-sciences, such as astrology, clairvoyance, pendulum interpretation, etc., "yes, he was something like their protector" (49). When Felix Kersten, Himmler's masseur, visited Hess on assignment, he found him in bed. Here is his description (71): "Fifty centimeters above his body hung a large 'car magnet' attached to the ceiling. In a whisper he  
said to Kersten that he was doing a magnetic cure. This be

It now said that under Hess's bed there were 12 strong magnets and one magnet hung above him. Their task should be to draw out all harmful substances from the body. When Kersten involuntarily laughed at the sight, Hess explained in a reproachful tone:

'Medicine does not yet know the true healing powers of nature. They are in the magnetic force. Just as the magnetic needle turns to the north under its own power, so too, if magnetic irons are applied correctly, one can draw diseases out of the body and strengthen the body.'

After a period of lying there quietly, he then said in a prophetic tone that he had to gather enormous strength to become as strong as iron so that he could use this extraordinary strength to save Germany. When Kersten asked where he saw this salvation, he replied that he could not speak about it, but that he was preparing an act of historic magnitude.

Kersten felt deep sympathy for this man, who was obviously suffering from trauma. He could often hear from him that he could no longer endure the life he now had to lead. He doesn't want to sit at a desk. Determined to risk his life in honor of Germany, he would soon act independently. At such a look into the future he occasionally said to Kersten with tears in his eyes: 'The world must see that Germany is invincible. And I must offer my hand so that the peoples may be reconciled with us.'

Speer's account of Hess (32), as it appeared with an aide-de-camp at Adolf Hitler's table, is not without its comedy: behind Hess walked his aide-de-camp, carrying a vessel with food prepared only with medicinal herbs, the miraculous effect of which was due to the "Deputy of the Führer" firmly believed. Adolf Hitler commented on this elevator very realistically.

On May 10, 1941, Hess flew to England. This act caused a sensation everywhere at the time. It has been assumed, particularly by the Soviet side, that this flight had been carried out on behalf of Adolf Hitler in order to conclude a separate peace with Great Britain. This opinion stands the oath

Hildegard Fath, who had been Hess's secretary in Munich from October 17, 1933 to May 10, 1941, the day of his flight to England. Hildegard Fath testified before the international military tribunal in Nuremberg (72): "From the summer of 1940 - I can no longer state the

exact time - I had to obtain secret weather reports on the weather situation over the British Isles and over the North Sea on behalf of Hess and forward it to Hess. I got the reports from a Captain Busch. Sometimes I also got reports from Fraulein Sperr, Hess's secretary at his liaison office in Berlin..."

Albert Speer gives an explanation for this flight in his memoirs (32): "In my

view at the time, Bormann's ambition drove Hess to take this desperate step. Hess, also ambitious, saw himself increasingly turned off by Hitler. For example, Hitler told me, around 1940, after a long-hour discussion with Hess: - With Hess, every conversation becomes an unbearably agonizing effort. He always comes with unpleasant things, and doesn't let up.'

After so many years in the background, Hess was probably trying to gain attention and success with his flight to England; for he did not possess the qualities necessary to hold his own in the midst of a quagmire of intrigue and power struggles. He was too sensitive, too open, too unstable and often agreed with all parties, in the order in which they appeared... Twenty-five years later, in Spandau prison, Hess assured me in all seriousness that the idea of supernatural powers through one dream had been entered..."

Winston Churchill's verdict was short and

apt: "With this flight, a maggot became visible in the orb." (32)

Albert Speer (32) comments on Churchill's view with the words:

"He had no idea how literally this word referred to Hess' Successor" (Martin Bormann) "applied."

From the point of view of the secret service, more can be gleaned from Walter Schellenberg's

(16) memoirs: "Hitler himself, it was said, was completely confounded by the event and was hardly able to react. In Hitler's frame of mind, Reichsleiter Martin Bormann succeeded in making a decisive move that secured Hitler's trust from then on. He invented the thesis: 'Hess has gone mad.' It was he who persuaded Hitler to include this statement in the first official communique. However, it was not considered that everyone was now asking how a madman could have been the Führer's deputy for so long. Now Hitler's executive instructions

rushed in. Müller" (Gestapo-Müller) "was in his element. He could play around with the entire keyboard of his apparatus...

From the adjutant and his friends to the chauffeur of Hitler's former deputy, everyone was arrested. Muller would have preferred to lock up the entire airfield staff and the technical directors of the Messerschmidt aircraft company, since Hess had flown in a Messerschmidt aircraft.

And while he kept it on a smaller scale, his wave of arrests still gripped many who had not remotely thought of being involved in the case.

According to reports from the domestic intelligence service, Hess was a 'silent supporter' and follower of the anthroposophist Rudolf Steiner. Numerous people from these circles were promptly arrested. As if that were not enough, the reports also revealed that Hess maintained regular relationships with astrologers, clairvoyants, magnetopaths, and naturopaths, and calculated his flight based on astrological advice. Thereupon Müller's collective arrests were extended to these groups as well.\_\_\_\_

Didn't we know beforehand that Hess had shown particular weaknesses in this direction, which experts had already described as pathological? And that Hitler, too, had shown some interest in astrology,

was deliberately overlooked. (After the disappearance of his deputy, his inclination turned into uncompromising antipathy, and all astrology was radically persecuted.)

I can still remember very well the inner reluctance with which Himmler, who also flirted with mystical prophecies, opposed the collective action against the astrologers and clairvoyants at the time, and with what undisguised joy Heydrich, who knew about it, felt in his presence Müller the detailed Hitler's orders. Heydrich had complained to me often enough that Himmler hesitated in this or that case because he had looked too deeply into his horoscope. In one of the telephone conversations that took place between Himmler and Heydrich after the Hess case, I heard the latter say: 'Some people worry about the stars on their shoulder boards, others about the sky. The question is which one is better to work with.' ...

Our secret service took the view that Hess's decision to fly to England might have been persuaded by a member of the Secret Service whom he had been familiar with for years. A certain Professor G., a specialist in thyroid diseases, who is said to have exercised a decisive influence on Hess, may also have played a role. It must also be taken into account that as a German living abroad (who grew up in Egypt), Hess was influenced by Britain in his youth. But all this together did not explain the case sufficiently.

In a conversation with Heydrich I took the view that Hess had probably gotten himself into a kind of Messianic thought, since as Hitler's closest friend he had lived in Hitler's train of thought for years and was influenced by Hitler's idea of the 'English brother people'. Corresponding statements had been made often enough by him in intimate circles.

Heydrich was sober enough . . . to let my opinions stand in their own right; however, he primarily insisted on the suspicion that the Secret Service had a hand in it and

we had to follow this trail. Then he added a few strange sentences, which I would like to reproduce verbatim: *'If these reports (concerning the Secret Service) are correct, then these circles could also do us serious damage elsewhere. I shouldn't be surprised if one day we experienced more similar surprises.* I'm sure the Secret Service is planning to go that far.' And then came the sentence: 'Well, and the Russians are no less stupid.'

The version that Hitler himself sent Hess to England with the secret order to make a last peace offer, I have to say is ruled out on the basis of our investigations...

In the time that followed, I repeatedly had access to information about his behavior and his mental state. It was Himmler who showed particular interest in this and, unbeknownst to Hitler, commissioned me to establish a postal connection between Hess and his wife. The British allowed a limited exchange of letters. The mail was routed through the International Red Cross in Switzerland. A large number of the letters were of a purely personal nature and showed great admiration and love for his wife and son. Otherwise, the content was difficult for us to understand.

I was very surprised at the time that British censorship wasn't more severe; however, on the basis of detailed interrogations, she may have come to the conclusion that these communications were often more mystical, even manic, ideas than information to be taken as the most important thing. Hess repeatedly quoted old prophecies and clairvoyant images. He referred to earlier horoscopes, the predictions of which had been confirmed by the previous fate of himself, his family, but also Germany. His wife responded to this in a touching way, without my being able to say what her objective attitude was.

The fate of Hess' first adjutant was bitter. He became the target of Hitler's anger as well as of Bormann's continued intrigues. Heydrich repeatedly tried

to get him free by skilful countermoves; if he did not succeed in this, then in my opinion Müller was to blame. He uncompromisingly followed Bormann's instructions, in whom he already suspected Hess's successor and whose stronger dynamics and penetrating power he reckoned with. The adjutant had to remain in a concentration camp until the end of the war, but this did not protect him from further punitive measures by the Allies after the collapse.

So far Schellenberg.

James Leasor (73) reports numerous details about the course of events during and after Hess' adjutant Pintsch reported to Adolf Hitler at the Berghof. The behavior of Martin Bormann described here seems worth knowing. According to this, Pintsch is said to have given Hess's letter to Adolf Hitler, who read it several times before putting it in his coat pocket. There is nothing in this description of an "inarticulate, almost animal outcry" as Albert Speer (32) puts it. Speer also speaks of two adjutants present, Leitgen and Pietsch, while Leasor (73) only mentions an adjutant Pintsch and not Pietsch writes. Pintsch was taken to lunch. On the way to the dining room he "accidentally" bumped into Martin Bormann, who understandably asked what had happened.

James Leasor further reports:

"The deputy leader has flown to Scotland, Pintsch explained. Bormann immediately flinched. He wanted to avoid anything that might involve him in unpleasant things.

'To Scotland?' he repeated in disbelief. 'I don't want anything to do with that. I didn't know anything about that,' he said, 'keep me out of it.' They came into the dining room. Dr. Goebbels was

already there, as well as Dr. Otto Dietrich, the Reich press chief, Walter Hewel, one of Ribbentrop's employees in the Foreign Office and the general of the aviators, Karl Bodenschatz... The food was simple...

The

others at the table, Eva Braun, Hitler's mistress, Martin Bormann... foreign minister v. Ribbentrop, Luftwaffe General Ernst Udet and Karl-Heinz Pintsch — got soup ...



Pintsch was relieved. The familiar faces all around him—and after all he had been sitting at Hitler's table, and not at one of the small round tables intended for other guests and aides-de-camp. From this he thought he could conclude that his news came as no surprise to Hitler. He was grateful to fate that Hitler hadn't raged and yelled at him, which is what he usually did when bad news came." (Hitler) "walked around the table and stood behind Pintsch's chair. The adjutant turned and looked uncertainly into Hitler's pale, almost gray face. He didn't know: should he get up or stay seated?

Bormann rose to one side and stepped back. He didn't want to get involved in the conversation between the two. He was far too smart to express an opinion without being asked. And he was particularly concerned that he might be involved in Operation Scotland Flight.

Bormann found himself in a dilemma. If Hess were successful in his peace mission, then Pintsch could be of some use to him. But things would probably go wrong. Then it was better never to have known Pintsch.

No one could know for the next few hours which of the two events would occur. So it seemed the wisest course tactically to remain neutral for as long as possible. But Bormann didn't get off that easily. The guide tapped him on the shoulder and gave an almost imperceptible nod toward the door.

Bormann understood. He left the room. He avoided looking Pintsch in the face. A moment later he was back, accompanied by two young captains from Hitler's bodyguard.

They wore pistols on their belts. They crossed the room in step and stood behind Pintsch's chair. Pintsch tried to see some sign of friendship in their faces, but they looked rigid and expressionless, like death masks.

Bormann cleared his throat. 'Karlheinz Pintsch,' he said in a hoarse voice, 'you're under arrest. They are placed under house arrest in Obersalzberg until a trial can take place. It shall be established

how involved you are in what happened today!' Pinch got up. He wasn't exactly small. But his guards towered over him almost by a head. Pintsch bowed slightly to the leader, then to the rest of the company, and marched the guard to the door.

The rest of the guests watched his departure. The room was so quiet that Pintsch could hear the crunch of his new leather boots. He just hoped the others didn't hear his heartbeat. The door closed behind him. The three men silently walked side by side down the marble staircase to the first floor...

A small car was waiting outside with the engine running. Not ... unfriendly, but Pintsch was pushed into the car with determination. He sat in the back seat, halfway between the two posts. They raced down the mountain road ...

Now that they were alone . . . the two captains behaved quite differently. 'Now tell me, Pintsch, what's actually going on?' ... They besieged him with questions. Pintsch shook his head. 'It's a long story,' he said, 'much too long for me to tell here.'

James Leasor tried to understand Bormann's thoughts. He continued: "Of course, Bormann knew exactly the

political terrain that he had won from his superior in the last few hours.

And his reaction to Hess's flight was exactly that of a political opportunist. Bormann thought it unlikely that Churchill would agree to peace with Germany. Bormann therefore calculated as follows: assuming that Hess did not disappear during the trip, Hitler would have to break away from him very massively within a short time. Only that could silence speculation about Hess's intentions and powers in Germany. Bormann reflected: the chances that Hess's venture would fail far outweighed it. But there was still a slim chance that Hess would succeed. Bormann's cleverness and highly developed political instinct saved him from any hasty act until that Monday

when Hitler decided that it was now necessary to admit that Hess was missing."

Apparently, Hess kept silent to everyone about his plans, let alone his destination. Otherwise his wife, Ilse Hess, would not have phoned Adolf Hitler for clarification, but she was refused, so that she had to speak to Martin Bormann. He behaved very reservedly, but sent a member of his staff, Dr.

Hansen, to her. However, the information he had hoped for did not materialize; on the contrary, he expected Ilse Hess to provide enlightenment, which she was unable to give him due to the lack of information about what was happening around Hess.

A little later it became known that Hess had landed in Scotland. Martin Bormann immediately decreed that the inventory in Hess' Berlin official apartment be marked as 'private' and 'business'. "Bormann condescendingly said to Frau Hess that she could buy the bedroom furniture cheaply 'as souvenirs'" (73). Public facilities and street signs that bore the name "Rudolf Hess" were renamed or removed.

In her distress, Ilse Hess turned to Eva Braun, Adolf Hitler's future wife. She wrote to her through a middleman:

"I liked you and your husband best of all. Please let me know when things get unbearable.  
I can speak to the Führer without Bormann finding out anything about it." (73)

as Dr Hansen appeared for the second time with some envoys from Martin Bormann's party chancellery, she was informed that the first orders given by Martin Bormann had been revoked: Adolf Hitler had decreed "that nothing belonging to Hess may be moved or confiscated" (73).

Since Martin Bormann was slowed down by Adolf Hitler himself in the course of his persecution of the Hess family, he went into an area in which he had a free hand: he left his children, Rudolf and Ilse, with their underage children, at whose baptism the Hess couple who had taken over the sponsorship, renamed Herbert Gerhard and Eike. The minister's salary for Hess, that

Martin Bormann had also blocked immediately after the flight to Scotland became known, was further transferred by order of Adolf Hitler. There was also no interruption in the delivery of mail from Hess to his wife, although his successor wanted to enforce this (8).

With these statements and considerations we have arrived on the eve of the eastern campaign. During this time and also later, Martin Bormann was fully occupied with consolidating the position that had been vacated by Hess's flight. Even if he was never awarded the party title of his predecessor, by the beginning of the Russian campaign he had more power in his hands than Rudolf Hess ever had.

## CHAPTER NINTH

*Bormann dispels Hitler's misgivings about the eastern campaign —  
exiled Russian Dallin sees through Bormann — Hitler-Bormann's  
subhuman politics — Rosenberg — Dr. Kleist wants to save "what could  
no longer be saved with weapons" - Bormann's close friend Koch not executed*

The further consolidation of his power, which Martin Bormann extended to the entire organization of the NSDAP after Hess's flight to England, extended to the churches, to the Jews (e.g. deportation of 65,000 Jews from Vienna to Poland) and to stricter orders Treatment of the Polish and later all "Ostarbeiter". His profound aversion to the Christian doctrine was expressed in the confiscation of churches, monasteries and other ecclesiastical property ordered "in the name of the Führer". He always avoided intellectual arguments and arguments about "Christianity here — National Socialism there" — probably due to a lack of in-depth knowledge. Joachim von Ribbentrop, the Reich Foreign Minister at the time, wrote in his last notes (74): "Throughout the years there was also a great deal of friction with the party chancellery under Bormann. This concerned developments in

the church question, the work of the foreign organization, etc. Reichsleiter Bormann took a completely uncompromising position on the church question. It led to the greatest tensions with the Vatican and also mobilized all church forces in the Protestant countries against us, a very important and disadvantageous development in terms of foreign policy, which became more and more acute in the course of the war. All representations at the party chancellery and also with Adolf Hitler himself did not lead to any change." About these orders, decrees, etc., which were always written by Martin Bormann and forwarded "in the name of the Führer", as well as about the numerous ones with Martin Bor

Mann-linked intrigues within the party leadership, including Goering, Dr. Goebbels, Dr. Ley etc. has been written and discussed so much (7, IMT register volume, also 8, 9, 10, 11, 32) that a repetition at this point seems superfluous.

At the beginning of the Russian campaign, when ordinary Berliners were already saying on the street: "Now we have finally lost the war," Adolf Hitler began to have doubts about this enormous risk, as his Reich press chief, Dr. Otto Dietrich (42) knows how to report:

"In the very hour in which German troops marched from the Baltic to the Black Sea at his command, Hitler was overcome by the first dark forebodings! After listening to the radio fanfare composition (based on motifs from Franz Liszt's Prelude) laid down for the announcement of the Russian campaign and the expected reports of victory, he said, as I was later told, around three o'clock in the morning in a circle of a few men: 'I is like pushing open a door to a dark, never-before-seen room — not knowing what's behind that door.'

The same gloomy atmosphere hung over Ribbentrop's press conference in the Foreign Office when I went there at around five o'clock and sat amidst the weary journalists who were feeling this new, uncanny war message with inner trepidation. Hitler must have recreated this mood when he told me a few days later that the press had not supported his step against Russia effectively and convincingly enough. Then it was again intoxicating news of military victories that drove away Hitler's gloomy forebodings and silenced his doubts."

Martin Bormann did not share these dark forebodings, although he otherwise always vigorously supported the views of Adolf Hitler - in this case Martin Bormann spoke out with detailed reasons for the war against the Soviet Union. Above that Schellenberg (16), who was Heydrich's right-hand man at the time:

"On June 21, 1941 — on the occasion of a meal at Horcher's"

(well-known restaurant in Berlin), "which Heydrich and I attended, Canaris made another effort to warn Heydrich against the overly optimistic attitude at headquarters. Heydrich replied that the day before he had been informed by Himmler about the most recent table conversation between Hitler and Bormann. Bormann tried to scare away the serious and thoughtful mood in which Hitler found himself with the following words:

'My Fuhrer, you are understandably concerned. Triggering such a mighty campaign at the right time and with the right means depends solely on you and your calling. Providence has chosen you to be the bearer of such world-determining decisions, and no one knows better than I with what care and effort you devoted yourself to the smallest problems in the preparation of your decisions and pondered them...'

The Fiihrer listened to these words without interrupting and then replied: One can only hope that he, Bormann, is right. But with such huge, fateful decisions, you never know whether you really weighed everything up correctly and calculated it with foresight. He could only ask Providence, using him as a mediator, to turn everything around for the good of the German people."

An unparalleled triumphal procession began, which led the German armies deep into Russia, until winter called a halt almost at the gates of Moscow. The military achievements associated with the conquest of such a vast area, where troops, tanks and equipment, e.g. Some had to be procured and overhauled from the Balkan theaters of war (Yugoslavia and Greece) and aroused the recognition of friends and foes alike.

The task now was to manage the stage wisely and to use the agricultural wealth of these areas, especially the Ukraine, for wartime purposes. Alexander Dallin (24) has an opinion about the candidates from the ranks and organizations of the NSDAP and about their methods of achieving this goal

authored an extensive "Study on Occupation Policy" on which this chapter is largely based.

Potential contenders for power over these areas were: Martin Bormann and the party apparatus, Alfred Rosenberg as Reich Minister for the occupied eastern territories, Hinrich Lohse, Reich Commissioner for the East, Erich Koch, Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, Joseph Goebbels with the Propaganda Ministry, Joachim v. Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office, finally Hermann Göring as commissioner for the Four Year Plan, Heinrich Himmler and the SS, and finally the Wehrmacht.

The causes of the tensions between the above-named lay in personal dislike (Rosenberg and Ribbentrop), competition for power and reputation (Himmler, Goebbels, Bormann) and competition between individual sections of the party, the state and the SS.

Alexander Dallin (24) assesses the situation as follows: "Invisible in the background was Martin Bormann. He represented an extreme point of view, which he was able to push through thanks to his key position with Hitler. 'Hitler's evil spirit', the 'Führer Mephisto', the 'brown eminence' - such and similar epithets express something of the opinion that other leading German personalities had of him. Like Himmler, Bormann had his private empire—the party apparatus—but he was unhampered by such ballast as Himmler's devotion to the cause, Rosenberg's attachment to self-made 'principles,' or the traditions and scruples of the army. Deliberately operating behind the scenes, unbridled in his hatred of anyone who opposed him, whether active or passive, he was the paragon of the Machiavellian."

It is remarkable that Dallin (24) based on the source study dums realized

"that Martin Bormann was intent on gaining influence on the course of events..."

He managed to get Adolf Hitler to discuss the problems with each candidate individually and not in large groups. Because, as Martin Bormann asserted,



"The future administration of the Russian territory, which is so important for the German living space, would be such an important political task that the NSDAP, as the political will-bearer of the German people, would have to have a decisive influence on it, so that a civil administration would have to be created that would largely be to be controlled by the NSDAP and to be staffed."

At the beginning of the Russian campaign, two tendencies could be identified with regard to Ostpolitik: Adolf Hitler and Martin Bormann were uncompromisingly opposed to the Kremlin, but also opposed to the Russian people ("Untermenschen"). On the other side were those who knew the East in the diplomatic service and in the Wehrmacht. They took the position of dividing the Soviet regime and the "Soviet people" through appropriate propaganda, with great importance attached to the preservation of Russia as a whole, in order to become a future national Russian state as a member of the European family of nations.

A few weeks after the first German victories in the East, the East Ministry was created, with Alfred Rosenberg at its head. Erich Koch reported to him as "Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine". With Bormann's help, Koch, who got along well with Martin Bormann and they were close friends, managed to gain access to Adolf Hitler, which his superior, Rosenberg, was not always able to do. A major contribution of Göring to the entire Nazi Ostpolitik was the approval and enforcement of the appointment of Koch as Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, from whom he hoped to get active economic support for the Four Year Plan and the war economy. Dallin (24) reports on the decisive meeting that triggered Koch's appointment as Reich Commissioner:

"Bormann, an enemy of Rosenberg and an old friend of Koch's, cleverly let Goering have the ball in the conference. Only in the minutes of the meeting, which was presented to Hitler, did he add a cunning note in brackets: 'It appears repeatedly that Rosenberg has a great deal of love for the Ukrainians.'"

"The man who would become notorious as the 'Brown Tsar of Ukraine'," Dallin continues, "had started his career as a minor railroad clerk in the Rhineland.

There he took part in actions against the French during the occupation in the first 1920s, where the *Communists and National Socialists worked together ...*" (*Italics by author*) One is tempted to add: like today, when it comes to fighting the truth fin

...

tion in the case of Martin Bormann." But about that later.

"Koch was able to consolidate his position," Dallin continues, "thanks to his relationship with Martin Bormann. *Even if Bormann operated so skilfully that the role he played sometimes eludes documentary definition.*"

(*Italics by author*), "German officials consulted by the author agree that Bormann was an extremely important intermediary between Koch and Hitler... Even more significant was the fact that Bormann and Koch were close friends and on first names. Bormann, for his part, became more and more Hitler's confidante, and with that the ring was closed.

In the chain of command of the Eastern Ministry, Koch was nominally Rosenberg's subordinate, but he could, through Bormann's mediation, go directly to the Führer over Rosenberg's head, which he did."

One of Rosenberg's most important and controversial employees was Dr. Georg Leibbrandt, who — born in Odessa — was regarded as an expert on Russian conditions. He was hostile to by the SS because he had studied in Paris and North America on a Rockefeller Foundation scholarship from 1931 to 1933. Because of his sympathetic "pro-Ukrainian" attitude, he was so violently attacked by both Himmler and Bormann/Koch that he had to resign from the East Ministry in 1943 and spent the end of the war in the Wehrmacht.

In the course of the war, the fronts within the National Socialist leadership hardened. While Rosenberg announced: "Our goal is a free Ukrainian state," Bormann-Koch replied: "There is no such thing as a Ukraine. We must not forget that we are the master race."

In order to be able to get an idea of how the National Socialist administration proceeded in the occupied eastern territories, let the national Russian Dallin (24) go to word come:

"Koch's appointment ushered in a period of terror and oppression, and his name became synonymous with German brutality and stupidity in the East. More than anyone else, Koch succeeded in turning the people of Ukraine against the Germans."

dr Peter Kleist, head of department in Rosenberg's East Ministry and official in Ribbentrop's foreign office, expresses himself more dramatically in his memoirs when he says: (75)

"Instead of the appeal of the peoples" (meaning the peoples of the Soviet Union) "to fight for freedom, there was the thesis of subhumanity, the Reich Commissariat took the place of the independent Ukrainian state, Erich Koch took the place of political reason. For whose interests did Erich Koch act? Every fool had to realize that with his regime he was consistently and purposefully destroying every chance of a victorious overthrow of Bolshevism. With each of his brutal blows, the resistance of the Red Army hardened, each of his measures drove the Ukrainian population into the arms of the partisans, who soon suffocated the supplies of the increasingly difficult fighting front with a deadly grip.

The Ukrainian ally turned into an enemy — over time, the Ukrainian Resistance Army UFA developed. The first partisans to fight German troops in the east were disappointed nationalists, not Soviet agents. Only later did Stalin understand how to put these forces to his service.

Was Erich Koch so stupid, the Soviet revolution  
People who came towards the German army could not be recognized, or should that anecdote be correct that says that Stalin put aside the first and highest medal when the medals were distributed in the winter of 1942/43: this one  
He cannot award medals today because his recipient,

the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, Erich Koch, was indispensable from his post."

Dr Peter Kleist concludes with the haunting words: "Today, neither Josef Stalin and his allies, nor the opponents of National Socialism can become Erich Koch's prosecutors or judges, because he did everything humanly possible to let Germany bleed to death in the East. Erich Koch and the policy of blind and stubborn violence associated with his name opened the way to the heart of Europe for the Red Army and its Generalissimo Stalin." (75)

Everything was done at the time to dissuade Adolf Hitler from Erich Koch's suicidal policy of violence.

"Not just from above," writes Dr. Peter Kleist, "Even the lowest-ranking man at the front was inclined towards a political method that was slowly gaining ground in practice and was proving its worth. There were also insightful men in the SS and in business circles who, through their daily work, recognized how every method of violence, every attempt at non-fraternization was bound to suffocate in the long run and create dangerous resistance." "That's how we used it back then," continues Dr. Kleist continued, "in the summer of 1942, again with a broad-based attempt to change the rudder. We were on the road for months, from army group to army group, from army staff to army staff, to the SS and police leaders, to general and area commissioners, to headquarters and in Berlin to the ministries, offices and party offices. We laboriously made room for 'political methods'."

It was time for memoranda. In the East Ministry was wrote a so-called "Big Memorandum", the contents of which Rosenberg brought to the attention of the head of state. Adolf Hitler was inaccessible.

"Hitler's answer was a letter from his secretary Bormann dated June 1942, which confirmed the negative policy of Koch and Sauckel, based solely on violence, a terrible document of political blindness and narrow-mindedness." (75)

The same fate befell the memoranda of the writer Edwin Erich Dwinger (author of the books "The Army

behind barbed wire", "Between White and Red") by Captains Strick-Strickfeldt, Schenkendorf and Oberländer. The memoranda of the generals v. Unruh and Gehlen were rejected by Adolf Hitler.

What was expressed in these memoranda corresponded to the opinion of many occupation officials and officers of the Wehrmacht: to represent a policy of human decency. "There was still a traditional sense of morality among career officers that dictated what was to be done and what was not to be done." (24) Criticism of the suicidal Nazi Ostpolitik slowly gained ground in the Wehrmacht. This turned parts of the officer corps into a "hothouse of the opposition"

(24). Also Colonel V. Stauffenberg must also be included, who carried out the assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler on July 20, 1944, because he could no longer stand idly by and watch the consequences of Hitler-Bormann-Koch's "Ostpolitik".

Dallin (24) gives a lot of space to the memorandum of General Gehlen, which was also rejected by the head of state. Dallin reports:

A 17-page document penned by the head of the Foreign Armies East Division, General Gehlen, who usually stayed in the background, elicited a far greater response. Like Schenkendorff eight months earlier, Gehlen embedded his criticism and recommendations in the non-political, military theme of fighting partisans and using local auxiliaries. Emphasizing how well the Soviets had been able to tie down and disrupt German forces behind the front lines, he pointed to recruiting locals as the only practical countermeasure, provided that pro-German sentiment among the population was a prerequisite for their success. What the Russians long for, but which neither the Soviet nor the German authorities have given them, the memorandum states, not without clever calculation, are 'justice, organizational power, understanding, care'.

To the basis of the entire (National Socialist) administration maxime the principle was raised: 'The Russian is objective

inferior; he is therefore to be seen as an object of exploitation without rights, to be kept alive and poorly at the lowest level of knowledge for the purpose of high work performance.' However, this disputed view is undeniably a mistake of the gravest kind when it becomes easily recognizable to the Russian masses concerned from all the measures taken. And this is indeed taken care of everywhere...

The only way to counteract the growth of the partisan movement, Gehlen continued, was a radical change in German tactics, including a programmatic declaration by the German leadership with the assurance that Russia would not have colonial status, but self-government. It was naïve to assume, he added, that Russian nationalism could be stamped out by being dead silent.

The fictitious formation of a national-Russian sham government, which appears as a 'National Committee for the Liberation of the Homeland' and is only known by its paper existence and patriotic decrees on this side and can have a propaganda effect beyond the front. Ready-to-use personalities with names from Klang are sufficiently available for this in the captured generals. (But they) do not want to appear as lansquenets who 'betray their fatherland for a piece of bread'. The better Russian had more self-respect than he is given credit for.

Eventually, such a transformation included the ruthless eradication of defamatory treatment of 'voluntary' Russian workers in the Reich, the granting of greater self-government in the occupied territories, greater cultural freedom, and greater use of native troops as true Reich allies.

The Gehlen report attracted a great deal of attention. Here, in the midst of the Stalingrad crisis, was an exhaustive restatement of virtually every expediency argument that a realistic 'patriotic' officer could make in favor of a fundamental reorientation of Ostpolitik. The report was

symptomatic of the increasing political thinking in the German military. Unusually open, especially in his advocacy of a government in exile, he reflected the confluence of three clearly distinguishable tendencies that emerged at the end of 1942: criticism of Ostpolitik per se, a surge in anti-Hitler currents in the officer corps, and disappointment with the military Setbacks that had culminated in Stalingrad. Ultimately, it was the growing probability of defeat that made more and more people in the Wehrmacht see politics as the panacea that might salvage what arms could no longer salvage: political warfare arose from the bitter yeast of defeat .”

The Italian Marshal Giovanni Messe says: “Germany is not striving to replace the Bolshevik regime with any other, but wants to secure all of Eastern Europe as a direct economic sphere of influence. The treatment of the population and the prisoners, as well as the exploitation of local mineral resources, often betray a lack of foresight ... Germany has not been able to arouse sympathy and willingness to cooperate among the population of the occupied territories ...” (76)

Bormann's influence runs like a red thread through the numerous measures, ordinances, etc., which were taken "In the name of the Führer" and which averted the above-mentioned memoranda as far as they went over Martin Bormann's desk, which in some cases "threw a spotlight on his true nature, which he was generally so good at hiding" (24). His efforts were aimed at tightening the measures ordered. "Bormann warned... against treating prisoners of war too leniently and repeatedly said that they were our enemies and that they had to be dealt with accordingly" (24).

"Many members of the Wehrmacht recognized early on how insane and also immoral the policy, which was carried out so ruthlessly, was. But their voices were initially drowned out by the noise of the National Socialist Untermensch slogans."

which Bormann emphatically represented. This also included Adolf Hitler's wish that the members of the Eastern peoples — as Martin Bormann informed the East Minister Rosenberg in July 1942 — “and thus also the so-called Ukrainians should only learn to read and write” in order to keep them at a low level of culture as planned. These intentions of Martin Bormann received active support from his intimate Erich

Koch, who even closed four-grade schools in several Ukrainian districts in the winter of 1942/43, citing a “lack of coal” as the reason for this measure. East Minister Rosenberg was so outraged that he described Koch's order as *“treason against Germany's political goals”*.

This was the first time that a prominent National Socialist had accused another prominent National Socialist and Martin Bormann himself of treason.

In his circular from the beginning of November 1941 to the political leaders, Martin Bormann decreed that the corpses of deceased Russian prisoners of war should be treated as follows: “The dead

should not be put in coffins, but only wrapped in tar paper or oiled paper and inconspicuously transported away in Wehrmacht trucks. Only when there are enough corpses should they be laid side by side in the mass grave, but not necessarily head to head. Ceremonies are forbidden in this procedure as well as later grave decorations”.

On August 19, 1942, Martin Bormann wrote about the Russian prisoners of war (8),

“They should work for us, and if we don't need them, let them die.”

The numerous above-mentioned quotations from Martin Bormann's area of work since the beginning of the eastern campaign, which illuminate his overall attitude, could be supplemented by numerous other details. For reasons of space, we have to refrain from doing this and refer to the list of sources.

His attitude, which Bormann had on the “National Socialist Weltanschauung”, he represented in a radical form, in which he issued “Führer orders” and other orders of his own accord



tightened. In fact, this meant that the supposedly liberated Ukrainians and other Eastern peoples, who had once received the Wehrmacht with bread and salt, slowly became enemies. This increased the number of partisans and

of them carried out raids constantly. From this point of view, Rosenberg's assessment of Koch's Ostpolitik was correct when he described it as a "betrayal of Germany's political goals".

This sentence takes shape when one learns that Erich Koch — sentenced to death by a Polish court after the war — is still alive and wrote his memoirs in the Polish prison of Wartenburg (East Prussia) in 1975. "Die Welt" and "Mensch und Maß" (77) reported on this: "Martin Bormann's friend, former Gauleiter Erich Koch, is writing his memoirs.

When in the autumn of 1975, under the headline 'No tears for the Gauleiter' in the daily newspaper 'Die Welt' (25/26

October 1975) it was reported that Erich Koch, Hitler's former Gauleiter of East Prussia, was still alive and writing his memoirs in a Polish prison in the East Prussian town of Wartenburg, which certainly surprised some readers. This astonishment was justified, since it is known that

Erich Koch, apprehended in West Germany only in 1949, extradited to Poland, sentenced to death on March 9, 1959 and then executed. This is what Stockhorst reports in his reference work 'Five thousand heads - who was what in the Third Reich?' (1967).

On the other hand, the "Archive of the Present" is better informed, from which it can be gathered that Koch's defense attorneys submitted a petition for clemency to the Polish Council of State, which can convert the death sentence into a prison sentence. According to 'Der Welt', this conversion did not take place, 'nevertheless, the death penalty was never carried out, allegedly because of the delinquent's poor state of health'. This 'poor state of health' is contradicted by another report in 'Welt': 'He enjoys special rights. But he is healthy. That have

one

basic investigation revealed in early September.' In view of the crimes accused of Koch in the trial (complimentary in the deaths of 200,000 Jews and 72,000 Poles according to 'Archiv der Gegenwart', or 400,000 Poles and Polish Jews according to 'Die Welt'), this fact seems surprisingly mild. 'The trial against him', 'Die Welt' further reports, 'was conducted in an unusually fair manner.' We'll come back to that.

Let's continue reading what 'Die Welt' still has to report about Erich Koch: 'In the celebrity prison in Wartenburg, Masuria, Erich Koch leads a rather comfortable life, shunned by his fellow prisoners. He is allowed to receive visits from relatives from the Federal Republic, he listens to the radio and every week he is to receive a German newspaper: the Ostpreussenblatt, of all things, which appears in Hamburg. Koch's electric light is allowed to stay on longer than in any of the other cells: because the single-seater is writing his memoirs and he's said to be almost at the end of it.

Incidentally, the memoirs of the surprisingly vital old man are soon to be published by the Wartenburg prison. Big business is expected. But the 79-year-old hopes to be pardoned and deported to the Federal Republic of Germany. As was learned in Wartenburg, he believes he is one of the 125,000 Germans who are finally to be given the green light to resettle as part of the recent Bonn-Warsaw agreements. There is no doubt: Hitler's favorite gauleiter wants to go 'home to the Reich'.

What is remarkable about the Koch case is that his trial was dragged out for so long and the death penalty was not carried out. That shouldn't be a coincidence. Therefore, by looking more closely at Koch's political past, an explanation for the remarkably gentle treatment of this radical 'political soldier of Adolf Hitler' should be sought on the basis of credible statements.

Koch belonged to the revolutionary wing of the NSDAP and, like his protectors Goering and Bormann, retained some of his anti-capitalist stance to the end. While

During the economic crisis, Koch, as one of the main National Socialist spokesmen, advocated rapprochement with the Soviet Union. As Rauschnig later recalled, Koch was one of Gregor Strasser's people, a keen advocate of pro-Russian politics. On the eve of the war, Koch confided to the League of Nations Commissioner for Danzig, Carl Burghardt, that Koch would have become a fanatical communist if he had not met Hitler...

In his book 'Aufbau im Osten' (Breslau, 1934) Koch is frank about his views. There he said: 'The future belongs to the young socialist peoples, not to the capitalist West.' He follows the traces of German-Russian cooperation from Peter III. to the Treaty of Rapallo (1922): 'Because all the powers between the Rhine and the Pacific Ocean have common interests when it comes to their major problems.' According to this, Koch thought forty years ago like today's master builders of Ostpolitik, wherever their desks may be... In his study 'The State of Hitler', N. Broszat reports the following about Erich Koch's basic political attitude: 'East Prussian NS peasant leaders filed a complaint against their

Gauleiter Koch that he was running a party dictatorship based on the Soviet model, accused the peasants of a lack of proletarian consciousness and had spoken of reaction and counter-revolution in this connection.' Based on the documents obtained and Erich Koch's shared political home with the Soviet agent Martin Bormann, who remained active even after the collapse, the halt to the execution of Erich Koch, who was sentenced to death, seems understandable. In

the current political climate, even a deportation of Erich Koch by Poland to the Federal Republic, as Die Welt considers possible, would be nothing out of the ordinary. Koch rendered valuable services to the Soviets during the war through the ongoing conspiratorial support of his friend Martin Bormann, who operated 'at the controls of power'.

Whether the anecdote handed down by Kleist (75) on the occasion of Or

Whether or not Stalin's distribution of dense truth is true or not, the otherwise incomprehensible stop of Koch's executions is a very clear statement. Giving Erich Koch his life and releasing him can in fact only be used as a reward in a different form than the anecdote to be reported, to be apprehended...

An Erich Koch ... may have been symbolically sentenced to death by the Polish prosecutor simply to save face in front of the world public and the surviving relatives of his victims. In a man like Erich Koch, who rendered such services to Soviet policy during the war that Kleist (75) was able to say with full justification: 'It is not the opponents of National Socialism who can become Erich Koch's prosecutors or judges today, for he did what was humanly possible 'To let Germany bleed to death in the East', the death penalty could not be carried out on such a man.

That is why the trial against him, as 'Die Welt' rightly remarks, was 'conducted in an unusually fair manner'. Erich Koch could only have been convicted by a German-Polish court because he caused immeasurable harm to the German and Polish people through his criminal misdeeds..."

At a distance from the events, it can be stated that the leadership of the Third Reich, after a rare start by the German Wehrmacht, lost the campaign against the Soviet Union, and not only by

- a) non-observance of the warning already repeated by General Ludendorff about the immeasurable American arms aid, b) German sabotage, but c) to a considerable extent through the subhuman politics of the 'real subhuman Erich Koch' with Martin Bormann in the background, who extremely transferred this policy to the 'initially German-friendly Ukrainians', as Professor Günther writes, (see Chapter 2 and sources 22 and 24)

It contradicts the historical facts when the main blame for the defeat in the East is unilaterally attributed to one of the three reasons mentioned above, above all German sabotage, while the other reasons are trivialized or remain unmentioned.

In this chapter, for the first time, the phrase "treason against Germany's political goals" appeared, which Bormann-Koch was accused of, and the words of the Soviet agent Martin Bormann... who remained active even after the collapse..." In the In the following chapters, the reader will be brought closer to these things.

## CHAPTER TEN

*"Führer Order" and "Commissar Order" - Why liberated  
Ukrainians became partisans - German resistance against NS - -  
Bormann for Heydrich as Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia  
- Background of the assassination attempt on Heydrich - Who  
benefited from Heydrich's death?*

Just as a valuable drug, taken in excessive doses, can aggravate the patient's condition and, in extreme cases, even cause his death, it is possible for the state leadership to lead a country and its people to ruin through too much democracy. But the opposite can also lead to the same consequences. For example, Martin Bormann formulated statements by Adolf Hitler as "Führer orders" and sent them to the relevant authorities and departments in a considerably radicalized form.

"Fuehrer's orders" were followed blindly in the Third Reich. One of the few exceptions can be seen in the very controversial "Commissioner's Order," which ordered that any captured Red Army commissar was to be shot immediately without trial. Since the overwhelming majority of the German Wehrmacht was not willing to carry out such orders, so-called task forces were set up to solve such "tasks". General Guderian (33) comments on this:

"Finally, one more matter must be mentioned, which subsequently became highly detrimental to German reputation.

Shortly before hostilities began, the OKW issued an order directly to the corps and divisions regarding the treatment of the population and prisoners of war in Russia. It contained provisions that no longer made the application of the Military Penal Code necessary under all circumstances, but left it at the discretion of the direct disciplinary superiors."

Since this order, according to Field Marshal v. Brauchitsch, General Guderian and the commanding generals was apt to damage the discipline of the troops, General Guderian prohibited the issue of this order to the troops and *ordered its return to Berlin*. The "also ingloriously known, so-called 'commissar order' did not reach my Panzer Group's knowledge at all. Apparently he had already been stopped at Army Group Center. The 'commissar order' was not applied to my troops either." (33)

The drafting of orders of this kind was determined by the official records that Dr. Henry Picker had made at a table next to Adolf Hitler's table on behalf of Martin Bormann. In his remarks on the genesis of the book "Hitler's table talks in the Führer's headquarters" (83), the author reports: "Since these 'official' minutes were to be documents for Bormann's official considerations and objectives,

he corrected them unabashedly, probably dictating parts also in the sense of a sharper formulation and sometimes even provided it with marginal notes that were *intended to make it clear to his employees in the party chancellery the course he wanted to take*. (Italics by author) In order to be covered regarding the official use of this type of transcript towards Hitler, he informed me of his desire for such a kind of record by means of cards, signs or orderlies, always so conspicuously that all the guests at the table had to see it and he could therefore assume Hitler's knowledge and tacit consent to the specific exception to his recording ban."

Orders and directives of this kind did not improve the initially good relationship between the German liberators and the local population. The measures taken by Reich Commissioner Koch, which were reported in detail in Chapter 9, also had an effect. As a result, the liberators became conquerors, even exploiters, and the locals turned into enemies.

The feared partisan activity increased. So that was one

Partial goal of Stalin achieved. Martin Bormann and Erich Koch made a significant contribution to this, even if they referred to the "National Socialist world view" with their measures. The practiced application of this "world view" finally led to the final defeat. National Socialism was defeated in the East with its supposed weapons or ideologies, whereby it must not be forgotten that it was Martin Bormann who — mostly acting in the background — through his considerably tightened regulations and through his compliant tool Erich Koch had fueled the souls of these "subhumans" to the point of desperation and finally drove them into the woods to join the partisans.

"In no question" writes Alexander Dallin, "was the disunity within the German leadership more blatant than in the Ukraine. There was no area that meant more to her than this. Yet the voices calling for new, 'enlightened' politics were ignored by those in power.

From Hitler to Koch, people remained stubbornly stuck in myths and visions. As long as the German troops were victorious, it was considered superfluous to meet the people's expectations with concessions; when the defeats came, concessions were considered dangerous, and when the resistance of the population became an avalanche, the reaction was increasing terror against the 'unbridled gangs'. Objections from dissidents were in vain. When 1944 dawned and German troops withdrew from Ukraine, neither Hitler at his headquarters nor Koch in Rovno had found a recipe for 'mastering the East'." (24)

With this population policy, that was not to be expected from the outset.

Two statements by Erich Koch illuminate his attitude: In Melitopol he gave

a speech to a large Ukrainian audience in which he said, among other things: "No German soldier dies for these Negro people." Another time explained: "If



If I find a Ukrainian worthy of sitting at the table with me, I have to have him shot." (24, 82)

However, it was not only the Ukrainian men and women who were eligible for "voluntary work" in Germany who were driven to acts of desperation, since this was the only way they could escape the threat of deportation. The German side also took action in the face of this brutal Nazi regime Ostpolitik beginning despair. When it became apparent that the memoranda submitted in this matter were being ignored, many, whose love of fatherland surpassed their affection for Adolf Hitler and the NSDAP, went into the resistance. Some exceptional personalities, such as the former German press attaché in Moscow, Wilhelm Baum, committed suicide in 1942 out of desperation and disgust at this Ostpolitik. (78)

At this point we consider it useful to draw a comparison with the Ostpolitik of Imperial Germany in World War I with regard to the Nazi Ostpolitik ordered and practiced by those responsible in the Third Reich, Bormann-Koch. More about this from General Ludendorff's war memoirs (81):

"I just want to give you a picture of the administration of the Commander-in-Chief East and I'm happy to do so, because I owe a debt of gratitude to my helpers here, just as I do to my employees in the purely military field. The work we did there together until I left at the end of July 1916 was a great, beautiful deed worthy of German men. It was of benefit to the army and the homeland as well as to the country and its inhabitants themselves

...

For the pure administration, I also had to hire gentlemen without any technical qualifications; here a clear will, general knowledge and common sense could make up for what was missing. For agriculture and forestry, the courts, finances, church and school, people from the trade were absolutely necessary ...

Everyone, like me, set about his hard and tedious work with zeal. We faced a strange population made up of different warring peoples

tribes, did not understand us linguistically and mostly rejected us internally. The spirit of faithful and selfless fulfillment of duty, the inheritance of a hundred years of Prussian breeding and German tradition, animated everyone ...

Gradually, as I got to know the country better, I saw that this and that could not be enforced and had to change ...

We paid special attention to the hygienic conditions of the population. The fight against typhus, which prevailed in many places, was successfully carried out. It cost us great sacrifices in doctors.

In order to calm the population and to improve the country's material situation, the requisition vouchers issued by the troops during the operations were redeemed. From then on we paid everything in cash. I wanted to achieve an increase in production, which was very important to me, and to help the country.

In support of the country, we allowed the activities of foreign support committees of the nationalities present in the occupied territories; I only demanded that they should not stop one-sidedly in giving help to their part of the people, but also give consideration to others. The Jewish committees, which had the most funds at their disposal and also got them from America, worked generously and profitably... The first Jewish folk kitchen that came into being in Kovno bore my name. Field Rabbi Rosenack had asked me to do this.

Applying the raw materials was a particularly important task. Here, too, cash payments took place. The Jew as an intermediary was indispensable. We supplied many hides, skins, copper and brass, rags and scrap (scrap iron) to the domestic war economy and relieved them by starting factories in Kovno, Libau and Byalystok...

The rich forest stocks particularly encouraged exploitation, but any overexploitation was forbidden. The consumption of wood for the construction of positions and for railway sleepers was extremely high... Timber went to Germany itself, and wood was also given to the population to rebuild their homes...

The economic exploitation of the country was very thorough in all directions and, as far as possible, combined with the protection of the country and its inhabitants...

The court structure corresponded to the Hague Land Warfare Convention. This demanded that the residents be judged privately according to their state laws. It had therefore first to be determined which laws actually applied. That was not easy given the confused Russian conditions which prevailed in this area before the war. After the laws were found, they had to be translated into German so that the German judges could then adjudicate...

Further benefits should be bestowed upon the populace through the guidelines for the school... They are written from High Perch, giving every creed and tribe its due. Here, as everywhere, everything that could act as a pinprick policy was to be excluded. The Confessions were not restricted in their exercise. We went so far as to ...  
accommodate the issue of wheat flour to the Jews for matzo baking...

Finally, we facilitated the intercourse of Lithuanians and Jews with their kindreds in the United States."

When Martin Bormann and Erich Koch share their decisions had enriched them with too much National Socialist ideas, another man in the leadership of the Third Reich, Reinhard Heydrich, did not attach importance to having good National Socialists or "old fighters" around him.

Heydrich only valued willing, unhesitatingly "functioning" specialists as employees in his area of responsibility. He promoted the later chief of the Secret State Police ("Gestapo"), Heinrich Müller, who had been a declared opponent of the NSDAP until 1933, because of his professional qualifications, although Martin Bormann had delayed Heinrich Müller's admission to the party until September 1939 .

In his ambitious striving, Heydrich is said to have gone so far as to separate the position of Reich Chancellor from that of "Führer", to grant Adolf Hitler the representative role of Reich President, in order to become the "First Man in the German Reich" himself.

"His God was power," is how Walter Hagen (49), who experienced him up close, describes him, "not even the state... Everything is subordinated to the possession and enjoyment of power, including ideologies, the truth content of which is irrelevant for such a way of thinking and which are only important as an instrument of mass leadership... For Heydrich, politics was nothing other than the technique of conquering and maintaining power. .. Thus, through the short life of this man, there runs an unbroken chain of murders of those he doesn't like, of competitors, of those in opposition, of the unreliable, and of diabolical intrigues that were just as bad as murders, if not more vicious. For Heydrich, the lives of others were not a self-contained good worth protecting; if the purpose of power demanded it, it was simply extinguished ... It was not the power of the German Reich that mattered to him, but his own".

(Cf. also fourth chapter)

Admiral Canaris noted in his diary on July 18, 1939: "Heydrich is deeply

uncanny and disgusting to me. His Mongolian eyes have the cold gaze of a snake. He knows no inhibitions. But he is the smartest beast there is. He's my born enemy!" (13) Similarly, Professor Carl Burckhardt, the former League of Nations

Commissioner in Danzig, judged Heydrich to be "a young, evil god of death whose unnatural lily hands were made for delayed choking." (13)

Heydrich's ambition was extraordinarily great. He may have been in complexes, which could have been due to his not entirely Aryan origins. His urge to excel in sport manifested itself in fencing, horseback riding and flying.

As an aviator, he occasionally undertook quite daring flights in his private plane. Once he had to go behind the Russian Li

never make an emergency landing; however, he managed to break through to the German front again (16). Also a former first lieutenant and recipient of the Knight's Cross d. L. reports that in 1940 or 1941 Heydrich had taken off from the field airfield of Kampfgeschwader 55 near Villa Coublay, near Versailles, on at least one flight over England.

Heydrich made fun of friendship and camaraderie, he didn't even trust voluntary allegiance. He considered only one bond reliable: the possession of the intimate private secrets of others, which allowed him to subdue the incriminated. In order to be able to rule with such extortionate methods, he not only collected incriminating evidence, for "his ammunition box", as he put it, against his employees, but also against the leading personalities in the Third Reich, whereby he did not except Adolf Hitler. Most had something to hide, like Martin Bormann, which was reported in Chapter 1.

In May 1941 - according to Schellenberg (16) - Adolf Hitler had told Heydrich that he wanted the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, Frhr. v. Neurath, and put Heydrich in his place. Furthermore, Heydrich said further, "Bormann supported this candidacy ...

Heydrich then went into lengthy explanations about the relationship between Himmler and Bormann and said that he had had a lengthy conversation with the latter and found the impression that Bormann was confirmed an opponent not to be underestimated and it seems unwise to him to be at odds with him. In the meantime, Bormann had pushed himself so much to the fore with the Führer that it would be advisable for us to pay him more attention. He advised me not only to send Bormann important situation reports, but also the occasional interesting individual report to permit. Besides, Bormann had inquired about me and asked whether he, Heydrich, would be willing to assign me to Bormann's staff for six months. He asked me suspiciously, 'What makes him think that?

Do you have any connections there?'

The internal relationship Bormann-Heydrich was not so far

been particularly good; they knew each other's strengths and weaknesses well and both operated with extreme caution. If Bormann was in favor of Heydrich's forthcoming appointment as Deputy Reich Protector, then there must have been special reasons for doing so.

He (Heydrich) also expressed how much the new task appealed to him, because he once again longed to build something new. On this occasion, Bormann indicated to him that this would also be a great step forward, especially if he were able to successfully solve the explosive political, economic and social problems in this area..."

Such words from the mouth of the all-powerful Martin Bormann were very likely to arouse Heydrich's ambition. It cannot be said that the mistrust, which was always awake, was not stirred at this opening.

Shortly after he took office as "Deputy Reich Protector", intensive persecution began against all opponents of the German occupation: Czech Prime Minister Elias was sentenced to death within a few hours, resistance groups were defeated and members of the opposition arrested.

In a few weeks "calm" had set in.

Now he systematically began to divide the Czech people by treating the workers and peasants sympathetically at the expense of the intelligentsia from which the resistance had been recruited. He increased fat rations for industrial workers, provided 200,000 pairs of shoes for armaments workers, and provided luxury hotels in world-famous spas as holiday homes for Czech workers; the backward social insurance was also improved. Furthermore, Heydrich dismantled the provisions that had defamed the Czechs. The social recognition of the workers and peasants soon began to bear fruit: relative contentment, a politically passive population and an increase in industrial and agricultural production were the further consequences. (48)

Heydrich had achieved a lot in a relatively short time and with it also proved that his policy - in this respect - was wiser than

the "subhuman" policy of Bormann and Koch in the Ukraine. In Bohemia and Moravia he practiced the opposite of Bormann-Koch's policy and thus achieved the opposite.

Apart from his moral side, which largely earned him rejection and hostility, he was, as expected, envied and hostile to his successes.

Heydrich first noticed this in the tensions that had arisen between Himmler and himself. According to Schellenberg (16), he attributed the reasons to "the fact that Himmler

looked jealously at his successes in the protectorate and obviously he didn't like the fact that the Führer was very satisfied with Heydrich's conduct of office and preferred to be with him alone, without Himmler and Bormann, entertain - But I noticed, and Heydrich let it be known, that he

was not entirely comfortable with this tension. The success of his professional work with the Führer is still covering him up, he said, but he is not quite sure how he can get rid of the 'stumbling blocks' Himmler and Bormann. An open attack on Hitler remains dangerous, because he usually reacts negatively."

But the Czech government in exile under Benes in London was not happy about Heydrich's flexible and successful occupation policy. It was a matter of survival for them to keep an active Czech resistance movement alive in the Protectorate. This could only happen by challenging the Nazi rulers. Therefore, in December 1941, the Czech cabinet in exile in London decided to assassinate Heydrich. A British plane took the two assassins to their "site of action" in Bohemia shortly after Christmas 1941.

A few weeks before the assassination that took place on May 27, 1942 and the course of which was often described, e.g. B. by Heinz Höhne (48), Heydrich convened a workshop for the heads of countermeasures in Prague. The latter (16) reports on the subsequent conversations between Heydrich and Schellenberg: "It struck me that he" (Heydrich)

"repeatedly mentioned his

worsening relationship with Himmler and Bormann came back.

Tension, he said, had grown so great that he was considering launching me into Hitler's immediate vicinity under some pretext, in order, as he put it literally, to have someone look around for him up there. I tried to talk him out of this plan, but he kept coming back to it. In the end we agreed on a six-week assignment, but that shouldn't happen again."

It should be noted that the intention of placing Schellenberg in close proximity to Adolf Hitler appears twice in Schellenberg's memoirs: on page 188 of the 1959 edition: Martin Bormann inquired about Schellenberg and suggested that he be assigned to Bormann's staff for six months, while on page 256 of the same edition this detachment is said to have been desired by Heydrich. Since it cannot be assumed that Schellenberg fell victim to an error in such a personal matter, it is possible that this contradiction found its way into the memoirs in some other way.

Let us now continue to follow Schellenberg's remarks: "At our last meeting, Heydrich told me the following experience: During his last trip to the Führer's headquarters he was supposed to report to Hitler on certain economic questions of the Protectorate and the proposals he had worked out on them. After waiting for a long time in front of Hitler's command bunker, Hitler suddenly came out accompanied by Bormann. Heydrich had greeted him according to regulations and expected that Hitler would now address him and ask him to speak. Instead, the Führer looked at him angrily for a moment and left him without a word. Bormann then launched the leader back into the bunker with a hand movement. And on that day Heydrich was no longer received by Hitler.

Bormann told him the next day that the Fuehrer no longer attached any importance to Heydrich's report, since he was already clear about the technical problems to be discussed with Heydrich



had become. Although Bormann remained extremely polite in form, the icy cold was clearly felt all along the line. An attempt by Heydrich to get through to Hitler had failed. The day after that he had to fly back to Prague without having accomplished anything.

From then on Heydrich had the distinct feeling, expressed in a remarkable uneasiness, that a decisive blow to him was imminent. I don't even think that the fact as such moved him so much as the question of when and how this blow would be struck. After all, this was also the reason why he wanted me to stay at the Führer's headquarters for a while."

Although this sentence contains a justification for Heydrich's wish to have his colleague Schellenberg in the "Führer Headquarters", it does not give any indication that Heydrich's and Martin Bormann's wishes coincided here, as would be the case if the statement Martin Bormann's regarding Schellenberg (page 188) is authentic. A clarification might perhaps be made by comparing the British edition of Schellenberg's memoirs (London, 1956).

When Schellenberg received the news of the assassination attempt on Heydrich, "the memory of the tensions between him and Himmler and Bormann that Heydrich had described to me flashed back to me, and I couldn't think of who was behind this assassination avoid directing my suspicions in this direction. There was also no doubt in my mind that, in the long run, characters like Himmler and Bormann were bound to feel uncanny when they saw the successes of Heydrich, who was far superior to them in wit and ingenuity.

Hitler's very inner circle of leaders, who always ruled by playing the various forces off against each other, knew perfectly well that these tactics would not work with Heydrich. Heydrich simply could not be outplayed and always had the necessary means at hand to be able to react to any situation at lightning speed. I am even convinced that if Heydrich had survived, Bormann

one day become entangled in that man's nets and fall from his proud height..."

It is remarkable that in this last movement only Martin Bormann is the speech and Himmler was excluded.

"No, I didn't believe in any assassination attempt by Czech or other circles," Schellenberg continues: "I was inwardly convinced that Heydrich had fallen victim to the secret fascination of the very narrowest leadership circle (Hitler-Bormann-Himmler)."

Another voice that deals with the background to the assassination attempt on Heydrich can be found in the daily newspaper "Die Welt" of September 15, 1971. The Czech journalist Pavel Havelka, who lives in Sweden, reports on conversations he had in Prague with General Bartik who had been a close associate of the then head of Czech counterintelligence, Frantisek Moravek. Here the report:

"Both together" (Moravek and Bartik) "worked out the plan for the assassination of the Deputy Reich Protector, Heydrich. Both Moravek and I had reservations, but Benes insisted that the assassination should go ahead. The final decision was not taken until May 1942" (just before Prague University reopened by order of Heydrich), "more than four months after a British bomber had dropped the assassins — code name Silver A — east of Prague. I assume that the decision was influenced by the news that the Russians were also planning an assassination attempt on Heydrich."

Pavel Havelka continues:

"General Bartik added another message to his statement: the Russians would have wanted Heydrich gone because he was dangerous for Martin Bormann, who was their agent. According to this report, Bartik first heard of Bormann's role as a spy in the autumn of 1946, when those sentenced to death at the Nuremberg trials were executed. Martin Bormann was sentenced to death in absentia. Bartik was having one of his secret meetings with President Benes when he suddenly

said: 'If Bormann is actually alive, he will not be executed, he was definitely Stalin's agent.'"

Finally, Pavel Havelka reports: "Moscow

feared Heydrich. If anyone could have discovered Bormann's dual role, it would have been Heydrich with his security apparatus, said General Bartik. That's why the Russians wanted to get rid of Heydrich. Bartik: 'But we got ahead of them.' So much for General Bartik. I had arranged to meet him in the Prague wine tavern to learn more about Benesch and Sikorski's London plans for a post-war federation between Czechoslovakia and Poland. A subject on which I was preparing a book. I had completely forgotten about this matter now that I had received significantly more interesting information. I got them on the condition that I would keep them to myself. The general intended to save the real story about the Russians, Bormann and Heydrich for his own memoirs, which he was just about to finish.

However, Bartik died a few weeks later. His memoirs will certainly not be published in today's Czechoslovakia. They are probably stored safely in a safe belonging to the security service. But the former West German Intelligence chief, General Gehlen, is not wrong in his revelations that Bormann was a Russian agent. Witnesses to this are President Benes and Stalin themselves."

According to the available sources, Heydrich had enemies at home and abroad because of his intelligence and above all because of his abilities. When Klaus Harprecht writes in the preface to Schellenberg's memoirs (1959),

Schellenberg used to say that Heydrich would not have hesitated to get rid of Adolf Hitler had he seen with his own eyes how the dictator was driving the Reich from defeat to defeat into the abyss. It can be assumed that this terrible heir of Fouché would have 'settled' the Hitler case with the same unscrupulousness as the Jewish question", then Heydrich's complicity in the political murders of June 30, 1934 ("Röhmputsch"),

in the provision of incriminating material for the currency and morality processes against Catholic clergy in Germany (to defame the church), furthermore

his participation in the *assassination attempt* on Adolf Hitler in the Bürgerbräukeller on November 8, 1939, according to Hagen (49), the

elimination of deserving Wehrmacht officers such as v.

Blomberg and v. Fritsch in a scandalous manner,

his involvement in procuring incriminating material against Tukhachevsky and other high-ranking officers of the Red Army in

complicity with Martin Bormann, finally the banknote

counterfeiting company for British notes disguised as the "Bernhard" company — as individual steps by Heydrich

towards the increase in power he was striving for consider.

It remains to be reported what happened after the assassination. Schellenberg, who was in the immediate vicinity, reports that Müller ("Gestapo-Müller") reported that Heydrich had been taken to a Prague hospital and was still unconscious.

"Numerous splinters would have formed foci of inflammation, above all the spleen had been dangerously injured. On the seventh day a general sepsis set in, which quickly led to death. Other specialists later criticized the medical treatment under the supervision of Professor Gebhardt, Himmler's personal physician. As far as I can remember, an attempt could have been made to operate on the spleen in order to remove the main focus of an anticipated sepsis in good time." (16)

At the end of these considerations are parts of a contemporary report by Olga v. Barényi, who was then living in Prague:

"The only one who understood the catastrophic mistakes of the Germans was Reinhard Heydrich. The bone of contention, the closed Czech universities, had to be reopened and the insignia back to Charles University in the hands of the Czech rector. The respectable Czechs were happy, the Czech German-haters traded in London. Immediately

the Czechs Kubis and Gabcik were brought to the Czech Republic by plane, who carried out the assassination attempt on Heydrich in a Prague suburb on May 27, 1942. However, Heydrich, severely injured by these shots, would have survived, and that is why he was poisoned on June 4, 1942 in Bulovka Hospital in Prague." (Here the author was wrong: Heydrich was not injured by bullets — the submachine gun jammed — but by fragments of a hand grenade.)

Unfortunately, the late author of this report declined to cite the source according to which Heydrich survived and was poisoned in the hospital. This view gains weight when it is considered that Professor Gebhardt, the head of the hospital in Prague where Heydrich was lying, was Himmler's personal physician and SS group leader.

He also attempted to harm or eliminate Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments, through false diagnoses and appropriate treatment, as Speer reported in his "Memoirs".

In dire straits, Speer requested help from Professor Koch, one of Sauerbruch's employees, whom he placed in Gebhardt's sanatorium. Professor Gebhardt tried Professor Koch by consulting Hitler's personal physician, Professor Dr. Morell to switch off, but that didn't work. In this context, Professor Koch referred to Hitler's personal physician, Prof. Dr. Morell as "incompetent".

"During my threatening state" — writes Speer in his "Memoirs" — "I got Gebhardt from him" (Prof. Koch) "demanded a minor intervention which, in the opinion of the internist" (Koch) "would have endangered my life. When Prof. Koch initially did not want to understand and then finally refused to carry out the operation, Gebhardt avoided the matter: *he only wanted to put it to the test.*" (32) (emphasis added)

Finally, if one considers that Professor Gebhardt had said in a circle of higher SS leaders *that "in Himmler's opinion Speer was a danger since he had to disappear"* (32), and Professor Gebhardt himself *"not just a doctor*

*but also a political doctor" (32)* and also carried out experiments on prisoners in concentration camps, then it seems entirely possible that Heydrich was poisoned in the hospital run by Professor Gebhardt.

This political murder of the deputy Reichsprotektor Heydrich created martyrs, as was probably intended.

About this writes Olga v. Barényi:

"So Heydrich was dead as requested, the Czech universities remained closed as requested, and the German protectorate authorities now acted as if they had consulted with Benesch, Senfton Delmer or Ben Gurion. Every day the Prague radio announced several times that every tenth Czech, male or female, would be shot if the murderers of SS Obergruppenfuhrer Heydrich were not found.

This appeal was enthusiastically received by radio stations in the West and extensively commented on, as new proof of German barbarism.

At the same time, it was a signal for the Czechs to anonymously report their troublesome compatriots to the Gestapo. why z. B. a divorce? The loving wife informed her husband that he '*knew something about Heydrich's murderers*', the rest was taken care of by the Gestapo. By the way, one of the unknown and hushed-up facts is that in the Gestapo headquarters on Bredauergasse in Prague there was a plaque with a Czech inscription: '*Think carefully before reporting your compatriots . False informers are punished with death*'

Even the biggest hater of Germans couldn't have imagined what followed better. They were 'reprisals' for the murder of the SS Obergruppenfuhrer. The summary court and special court in Prague worked feverishly. The Prague radio reported 50 to 70 executions daily after the 10 p.m. news. The executed Czechs were named and their ages were given. The Penkava family from a village near Pilsen, all 14 members, from the 80-year-old grandmother to the 15-year-old grandson. The reasoning of the verdict

It was almost always the same: 'Affirmation of the murder of SS Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich.' The court hearing lasted only a few minutes, there were no witnesses and the anonymous informants remained anonymous.

The victims of these courts were consistently innocent and also pro-German. The Germans did not understand that they were being foisted on them by the Czech agents. After the reading of the list of those executed—all died in the Pankracer prison in Prague, death by ax—a brisk march was played immediately, or sports news followed. The decent Germans and Czechs were almost as appalled and outraged by this stupid and horrific lack of tact as they were by the executions..."

Who benefited most from Heydrich's violent death?

Himmler fearing the more imaginative schemer?

Benes, with the Czech government in exile in London, which needed active resistance in Czechoslovakia and not peaceful conditions such as those created by Heydrich in the second phase of his activity?

Stalin because — according to Czech sources — Martin Bormann, as a Kremlin agent, had to be protected from Heydrich in the "Führer Headquarters"?

It should not be disputed that Himmler and Benesch each drew their share of the benefit from Heydrich's death. The question of Stalin's benefit from this murder becomes significant when it is considered that Martin Bormann not only approved of Heydrich's appointment as Deputy Reich Protector, but also made it worthwhile with apt words.

This gives rise to the well-founded assumption that Martin Bormann lured Heydrich into a deadly trap, skilfully exploiting one of Heydrich's extremely developed traits: ambition. We encountered a parallel to this assumption about two years later, when Adolf Hitler appointed Himmler "Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Vistula" on February 13, 1945, against Guderian's (33) most insistent advice

became. Jürgen Thorwald comments on this appointment in his "Report of the Great Treason" (80) as follows: "On

February 22 (1945) (Colonel i.G.) Herre received the news that Himmler would meet him at headquarters the next morning of the Army Group Vistula in the Prenzlauer Stadtwald wait.

When registering, Herre met two old acquaintances from the Army General Staff, Ia Colonel i. G. Eismann and Ic Lieutenant Colonel i. G. Wessel. From them he heard more about Himmler's fruitless and disappointing activities as Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Vistula. They both agreed that Himmler's appointment had been another coup by Bormann to discredit Himmler with Hitler by entrusting him with a task that was bound to fail him. After initial amateurish zeal, Himmler had begun to recognize the twilight of his situation." (80)

Heinrich Himmler's military skills were assessed by General Heinz Guderian, Chief of the Army General Staff from July 21, 1944 to March 28, 1945: "In the military field,

Himmler failed first and completely. His judgment of our enemies was downright childish. His leadership of Army Group 'Vistula' in 1945 was dictated by fear. Nevertheless, he had Hitler's ear almost to the end... I had several occasions to note his lack of self-confidence, his lack of civil courage in Hitler's presence.

Himmler had completely failed in the offensive from the area around Arnswalde after General Wenck's sortie. Conditions in his high command continued to deteriorate. I received no accurate reports from his front and never had any assurance that OKH's orders would be carried out. So I drove to his headquarters near Prenzlau around mid-March (1945) to get my bearings. Himmler's chief of staff, Lammerding, greeted me at the entrance to the quarters with the words: 'Can't you free us from our commander-in-chief?' I told Lammerding that this was actually the job of the SS.



When I asked about the Reichsführer, I found out that Himmler was ill with influenza and was in the Hohenlychen sanatorium being treated by his personal physician, Professor Gebhardt. I went there at once, met Himmler in reasonably good health, and found that a slight cold would not have caused me to leave my troops in such a tense situation. Then I made it clear to the SS officer that he combined a multitude of the highest Reich offices in his person...

By now he must have realized that leading troops at the front was not so easy. I therefore suggested that he renounce his command of the army group and retire to his other posts—

He wavered: 'I can't tell the Führer that! He will don't allow me to do that.'

I saw my chance: 'Then allow me to tell him.' Now Himmler had to

agree. That same evening I suggested to Hitler that Himmler, who was overburdened, be relieved of his command and that Colonel-General Heinrich be appointed in his place. Growling unwillingly, Hitler agreed." (33)

## CHAPTER ELEVEN

*Terboven's occupation policy steered Norway into resistance —  
NS occupation policy in Yugoslavia creates partisans — Bormann  
prevents Gauleiters from gaining access to Hitler — Tito's readiness  
for a truce with the Wehrmacht and then joint action against any  
Anglo-Americans who may land*

After a thorough appraisal of the Nazi Ostpolitik inspired by Hitler-Bormann and practiced by Erich Koch, the focus turns to other areas, such as Norway and Yugoslavia, in which occupation policies were also practiced.

Immediately after the end of the fighting in southern Norway, the Rhineland Gauleiter, Josef Terboven, was appointed Reich Commissioner for Norway. With him came a higher SS and police commander as well as task forces to Norway.

On April 9, 1940, Vidkun Quisling, the leader of Nasjonal Seedling, became prime minister, but was forced to resign on April 15. Tensions grew between him and Terboven, which is reported on below. For a better understanding of the connections, it is necessary to go into Quisling's curriculum vitae.

Born in 1887 in Telemarken (southern Norway), he became an artillery officer with distinction and chose Russia as his field of study. He became military attache in Petersburg, later in Helsingfors. Together with Fritjof Nansen, the father of the "Nansen Pass", he moved to starving Russia after the end of the First World War in order to set up an aid organization there, for which Quisling's command of the Russian language was very useful. At the end of the 1920s he was a legation counselor in Moscow.

Through his stays in Russia and his other things Knowledge who had become a connoisseur of Russian conditions had developed into an opponent of the Bolshevik system because he had recognized the elements there that also caused the split

could evoke his people. To wake up Norwegians, he wrote the book "Russia and Us". The goal pursued was "the liberation of the fatherland from class struggle and party politics as well as national unification".

In 1931 he became Secretary of Defense. This appointment was followed by a leftist press campaign against him; There was also an assassination attempt, as well as a demonstration by a thousand-strong procession under red flags, which was dispersed by the deployment of the military.

After completing the investigations into these events, Quisling made a speech before the Storting (parliament) in which he uncovered communist coup plans on the basis of documents and brought up a planned "Norwegian Soviet Republic". Receipts for large sums of money proved the COMINTERN's support, including one signed by a name that later became known around the world: Trygve Lie (UN Secretary General). (85)

Vidkun Quisling was found responsible for crimes he had not committed and sentenced to death. According to his biographer, the Englishman Ralph Hewins, Quisling was not informed of the German intention to attack Norway (84); he was also held responsible for the executions and deportations in the 1945 trial, although he ordered the executions by Terboven been prevented where possible (85). In his dissertation (86), Hans-Dietrich Looch determined the following about the relationship between Quisling

and Terboven: "The reports sent to Lammers" (Head of the Reich Chancellery) "described the first two conversations that Terboven and his

employees ... had led with Quisling to force him to leave the country. ... Rosenberg, ... who complained that the efforts of the German administration are constantly aimed at not supporting the Nasjonal Sämling under Vidkun Quisling, but at making them incapable by giving them former renegades as employees

imposes. Above all, he complained that Quisling was to be deported and was outraged that the Reich Commissioner was threatening to make his financial support for Nasjonal Samling dependent on Quisling agreeing to his demands."

Furthermore, Rosenberg announced "that the Reich Commissariat was talking about the 'unacceptability' of Quisling". Schickedanz, an official in the Foreign Office and later Reich Commissioner for the Caucasus, reported

"about the sums that Terboven had paid out to Nasjonal Samling as support, and explained in this connection that there seemed to be a protest against these machinations on the part of the Pg." (Party boss) "Eck, the former district treasurer in Frankfurt am Main, to go out in Norway, who apparently intends to make his post available to the Reich Commissioner. Mr. Eck acts as financial advisor to Nasjonal Samling in Norway. After a violent collision, Herr Eck seems to have died just before the 1st to have left Norway in July. Since the district treasurer" (Eck) "was seconded by Bormann to Norway, it cannot be ruled out that the 'theoretical effects' that Schickedanz wrote about were triggered by Eck via Bormann and that Hitler's attention to the new program of files Rosenbergs was also reached in this way." (86)

"On July 6, 1940," Hans-Dietrich Looch further determined, "Rosenberg drew up a memo about a conversation with Quisling, who was banished from Norway. ... Noteworthy are some of Terboven's more or less verbatim statements. To Quisling's argument, 'it is clear that the opponents of Germany wanted to have him gone in order to start their work', Terboven countered the cool remark: 'Quisling shouldn't be the center of attention.'"

This brought Terboven closer to his victory over Quisling. "He had Quisling's declaration in his hand that he would accept an invitation to Germany and give up the management of Nasjonal Samling 'for the time being'. So Terboven sent a telex to Bormann on the evening of June 29 (1940).

in which he announced that the preparatory work on the political decisions in Norway approved in principle by him (Hitler) had been completed. At the same time he asked for an appointment to give a lecture to Hitler, 'if possible during the course of Wednesday, July 3rd'. Bormann willingly granted him this appointment on July 2nd. One day after the conversation between Adolf Hitler and Terboven, on July 3, 1940, Scheidt (Head of the Northern Department in the NSDAP's Foreign Policy Office) wrote to the German naval attaché in Oslo, Schreiber, 'He also thanks him on behalf of the Reichsleiter and Chief of Staff for his energetic help'. (At that time Martin Bormann was still Reichsleiter and Chief of Staff to Rudolf Hess.) "But at the same time he pointed out 'that increased caution should be observed'. A letter to Hagelin (member of Nasjonal Seedling) was attached to the letter to Schreiber.

In it, Scheidt wrote: Secure all your correspondence with my local friend (Sehickedanz) and myself at Sorenskribern (scribes) or destroy them..."

The confused relationships between the Reich Commissioner Terboven and his Norwegian partners make the district treasurer Eck, delegated by Martin Bormann, appear credible as "Bormann's hand in Norway". Terboven's occupation policy in Norway was similar to that of Erich Koch in the east, as it was characterized by arrests, kidnapping of students to a camp in Alsace, exploitation of the country's natural resources and energies. These were also the reasons why the conflict between Quisling and Terboven arose, of which Peter Kleist stated succinctly: "Terboven steered Norway into the resistance with a sure hand." (87)

Since the image of Vidkun Quisling has been distorted since 1945, it is necessary, in the interest of historical truth, for the judgment of a man of integrity, Hans FK Günther, well known to the Quisling personally was:

"It was to this worthy and irreproachable man that Hitler sent an unworthy man chosen by him" (Terboven) "as his and the Reich's representative, an unworthy and

Shrewd, who apparently intended to be promoted by Hitler to a kind of Gauleiter of Norway, who, 'advised' by enemies of the Germans, perhaps also slandering Quisling to Hitler, pushed him aside until he exercised actual power in Norway. Now, to the delight of the Allies, who wanted just that, Hitler's Sending persecuted Norwegians, including shootings, which Quisling was no longer able to prevent. The senseless banishment of the Oslo students to a camp in Upper Alsace followed." (22)

The chronology of events demands that we now turn to the Yugoslavia campaign, which began on April 6, 1941 and had extended to Greece. It ended with the occupation of Crete around June 1, 1941, three weeks before the start of the eastern campaign. The observer encounters the "divide et impera" in the splitting of Yugoslavia into the states of Serbia and Croatia. While Serbia received a provisional "government", the "Independent State of Croatia" was proclaimed on April 10, 1941. The enthusiasm of the Croats was very high and was even increased when the head of state, Dr. Ante Pavelic, who brought the news from Adolf Hitler's headquarters about the agreement to annex the following areas to Croatia: Bosnia, Dalmatia, Herzegovina, Littoral, Symria, Slavonia and Zagoria. However, sympathy for Germany turned to disappointment when the plan to divide Croatia into a German and an Italian occupation zone was published on June 13, 1941 through the announcement of the "Roman Protocol". The Italian zone was again subdivided, in which the Croats recognized the intention of bringing the coastal area of Dalmatia under Italian sovereignty. The further plan to proclaim an Italian prince king of Dalmatia depressed the mood even more.

In the meantime, the "Ustascha" had been founded, a militant group of young Croats that was very popular and radically anti-Jewish and anti-Serbian. In the summer of 1941 there was a large-scale wave of persecution by the "Ustasha"

against Jews and Serbs, mass murders took place, the survivors were expelled to Serbia. (48)

After the capitulation of the Serbian army, a volunteer organization was formed in Serbia, the "Cetnici" under General Mihailovici, which took up the fight against the German occupation. Mihailovici confessed to the living in British exile King Peter of Yugoslavia.

The national political measures introduced between the end of the Yugoslavia campaign and the beginning of the Russian campaign, such as the resettlement of the Slovenes from Lower Styria, the resettlement of German and Serbian sections of the population in various areas of German dominion, have contributed significantly to the fact that in Styria the resistance and Partisan activity could become particularly strong.

Stefan Karner examined these processes using numerous sources (120):

"In mid-April 1941, Adolf Hitler entrusted the Gauleiter of Styria, Dr. Siegfried Uiberreither, and the deputy Gauleiter of Carinthia, Franz Kutschera, with the civil administration of the occupied territories and made the 'Germanization' of the country an absolute duty for them...

The importance and priority of the Führer's order to 'Germanize the occupied territories' is also reflected in a letter from Reichsleiter Martin Bormann to the Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers, to express. It says: 'So that Gauleiter Dr. Uiberreither and Deputy Gauleiter Kutschera are able to Germanize the new German areas with the necessary thoroughness and speed, the same powers should apply to them that the Führer granted to Gauleiters Wagner (Baden) and Joseph Bürkel (Lorraine).'"

At this point it should be noted that Martin Bormann endeavored to advance the resettlement or "Germanization" ordered by Adolf Hitler with the necessary thoroughness and speed. In practice, these methods have proved to be a disastrous boomerang, as will be discussed later.

Stefan Karner (120) also reports: "As early as October 6, 1939, Adolf Hitler gave a sensational speech in which he recommended the organized exchange of populations between states as a means of a policy that would eliminate nationality conflicts and create a 'new order in ethnographic conditions' should bring about in Europe.

Therefore, at the beginning of May 1941 ... the plans worked out for the resettlement of Slovenes from Lower Styria, from Oberkrain and the Miess Valley were implemented...

The intended measures quickly became public knowledge among the population and immediately aroused fear and resistance. Even sympathizers of the Nazi system and higher party members turned against the unrealistic racial policy of the Third Reich towards the Slavic nationalists

would do

In a memorandum to Himmler and Göring on July 9, 1941, SA-Sturmabführer Dr. Kaltenegger openly and factually describes the situation in Upper Carniola, which also applies to Lower Styria ... 'The expert sees the development with horror, like the mood that was 99 percent in favor of us when our eagerly awaited troops marched in, as a result of wrong measures opposite has been converted. *The Führer would be horrified if he knew what is happening here because of his mission to make this country German again, how harshness, which is necessary, is being turned into cruelty and—unfortunately—also into arbitrariness... Now there's a mood there against us, which Serbia has not been able to sire in 23 years. We did it in just under two months!*

*... I am not an advocate for the Slovenes, but an advocate for the honor of Germanness and our movement...'" (Italics by author)*

Stefan Karner (120) continues:

"In desperation, many people who feared being resettled turned to the official party offices of the Gau or, as the example of the farmers in the Rann district shows, even to Adolf Hitler. Of course, such petitions had no chance of success.



,Telegram from the Ranner farmers of October 27, 1941:  
Telegram from Gurkfeld 101/99 W 27 12.00 to our Führer and  
Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler Führer Headquarters Berlin On  
behalf of the rural residents  
of the southern Sava Valley in Lower Styria who love their  
home place and who now suddenly have to leave their homes  
and to be resettled in other areas of Germany, we are begging  
you, dear Führer, with the request that we continue to live on  
our soil, with the deepest promise of wanting to become honest  
Germans and to educate our children only in your spirit here.  
The need that has suddenly set in forces us to turn to you as  
the only helper with this request.

The farmers of the Rann district on the Save Untersteier mark.'

Despite several similar memoranda and petitions, the resettlement  
of the Slovenian population continued according to plan. From May  
1941 it took place mainly in three waves ...

The deportation of such a large number of people and the meanwhile  
intensified partisan activity naturally had an effect in the affected areas  
very soon. Reports of sabotage, looting and murders reached the  
party and armaments departments on a daily basis. After the beginning  
of the war with the Soviet Union, work discipline in the armaments  
factories also slackened ... which suffered heavy losses as a result —

From numerous reports of resettlers is also to  
see that the ethnic Germans who were resettled were also becoming  
increasingly dissatisfied with their situation...

In any case, both national-political measures of the National  
Socialists, resettlement and resettlement, made a significant  
contribution to the fact that resistance and partisan activity in Styria  
could become particularly strong in the last years of the Second World  
War.

With this, the partisan recruitment in Yugoslavia was again strengthened; At first it was General Mihailovici who took care of these desperate and expellees, whom he led to the "Cetnici". Compared to the new Tito Brigades, which had appeared since the beginning of the Russian campaign (June 22, 1941), Mihailovici saw the Germans as "the lesser evil". This apparently explains his willingness to soon stop fighting the German troops. Certainly he thought he was facing a more dangerous enemy in Tito, trained in the Spanish Civil War. However, Adolf Hitler rejected his willingness to sign an armistice. Paul Leverkuehn (88) reports how these events took place: "The commander of the 4th Brandenburg Regiment, who was in charge of the negotiations, was temporarily relieved of his duties and Mihailovici's two chiefs

of staff, Dyuresetsch and Pugowitsch, were released by SD task forces, breaking promises made arrested and deported... Accepting Mihailovici's offer would have shifted the focus of fighting Tito to the German side and in all probability would have led to the destruction of Tito's brigades. The disarmament of the old Serbian and Montenegrin mountain population, which was carried out after the arrest of the two chiefs of staff and the severing of relations with Mihailovici and was partly instigated with the utmost brutality by the SS division 'Prinz Eugen', smashed Mihailovici's Cetnici movement, but led *it Tito at the crucial moment tens of thousands of new partisans*" (*Italics by the author.*)

As is well known, all Gauleiters of the Third Reich, including Dr. Siegfried Uiberreither for Styria, and Franz Kutschera and Friedrich Rainer for Carinthia, strictly managed by Martin Bormann's party chancellery. Through his numerous and regular circulars to the Gau authorities, Martin Bormann made them aware of his orders, which were based on oral statements by Adolf Hitler and were issued as "the Führer's party orders". In addition, there was the "Confidential Information" that the Gauleiters had about all wis

important issues in the entire political field and about measures in the state and economic sector.

These reports and the resulting correspondence made the Gauleiter's visits to Adolf Hitler's headquarters, which had previously been the norm, superfluous. During the war it was easy for Martin Bormann to prevent talks of this kind, even those described as urgent, by pretending that they were "overloaded" (89).

It got to the point that two Gauleiters asked General Guderian to allow them to see Adolf Hitler—that's how high Bormann's "barrier" had become around the head of state. Guderian writes (33): "Bormann prevented Hitler from being properly informed

about the domestic political situation. He even denied the Gau leaders access to Hitler. So I encountered the grotesque thing that Gauleiters—above all Forster from West Prussia and Greiser from Warthegau—came to me, the soldier who was viewed with suspicion, and asked me to help them to give a report to Hitler because they were on the prescribed party *path Bormann could not get hold of their leader.*"

Martin Bormann attached such importance to the constant and reliable transmission of information between the Party Chancellery and the Gau leaders that he had a telex network set up — the so-called "Gauleiternetz" — and expanded it with a radio network after July 20, 1944 (5).

Accordingly, the transmission of orders from Martin Bormann's party chancellery to the Gauleiter took place with the help of wired or wireless communication media. However, it is difficult to understand how it was possible for the Gauleiters of the two southern border districts, Styria and Carinthia, to expand their territory at the expense of the Yugoslav part of Slovenia. Walter Hagen (49) justifies this expansion with the old borders from the time of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and explains the expulsion of the Slovenes from these areas with the "tend of the responsible Gauleiter to relieve their Gau of ethnic minorities as quickly as possible .. ."

It is unthinkable that the Gauleiter ordered such violent measures of their own accord; rather, these expulsions were ordered to the Gauleiter from the Party Chancellery. It is also unthinkable that these measures were carried out without the knowledge or even against the will of Martin Bormann.

To what extent Martin Bormann had a hand in this, too, cannot be clearly determined from the available sources.

The measures and events described in the Yugoslav region were well suited to creating a trouble spot a few weeks before the start of the Russian campaign (June 22, 1941) in which, through skillful leadership, military forces were tied up that the Wehrmacht failed to do in the eastern campaign until the end of the war ten.

As partisan activity continued, power shifted in favor of Tito. This is explained by the support of England and America, which increased for Tito as it decreased for General Mihailovici. Without Western military aid, Tito's partisan struggle in 1943 would have collapsed.

In the same year Tito made contact with General Glaise v. Horstenau, the German general in Agram.

One day he was surprised by Tito's offer of a truce; to deal with it went beyond the powers of Glaise v. Horsten out. In correct assessment of the assessment of such matters by the High Command of the Wehrmacht or by the Foreign Office, he turned neither to Keitel nor to v. Ribbentrop, but to Himmler in the hope that he would bring the situation to Adolf Hitler's attention. A little later, Tito made an extended offer to Glaise v. Horstenau, who had consulted a representative of the Foreign Office for these negotiations. In it, Tito officially made the offer to the German command, in the event of an Anglo-American landing on the Yugoslav west coast, with the German divisions stationed in Croatia

sion to act together against the landed Anglo-Americans.

Because Himmler had not been able to bring about a decision at Tito's first offer, General v. Horstenau with the representative of the Foreign Office directly to Ribbentrop, who made representations to Adolf Hitler.

"The answer was of laconic brevity," writes Walter Hagen (49), "Hitler literally said: 'There will be no negotiations with rebels. Rebels will be shot.'"

Tito's willingness to have his brigades fight shoulder to shoulder with German divisions against his allies, the British and the Americans, seems so absurd that a credible explanation is needed. Walter Hagen (49) gives such an explanation, which can be regarded as the primary source. Accordingly, German military authorities had intercepted and decoded Tito's radio communications with the secret service. Among Tito's radio messages there were also those in which 'there was talk of an impending landing by Anglo-American forces on the Yugoslav Adriatic coast'. At the same time, the Hungarian secret service captured a courier near Fünfkirchen who testified "that he had to convey the following orders from Stalin to Tito: The Kremlin had learned in confidence that Chur-chill had succeeded in persuading Roosevelt against the existing agreements with Moscow to make a landing on the Adriatic coast after all. Should it come to that, he, Stalin, expressly authorized Tito to take military action together with the German troops against the British and American landing units; he agreed to establishing contact with a German military office in Agram..."

If Martin Bormann had been Stalin's agent at Adolf Hitler's headquarters - one may now ask - why did he not influence the Führer in accordance with Stalin's wish to join forces with Tito against the Anglo-Americans? Such a "glitch" can be caused by faulty

messaging to have arisen. Apparently there is a dark zone here.

It is a well-known fact that historical events can be judged later, not only with a reasonable time interval, but also viewed from the perspective of their time. The Red Army had suffered terrible blows since the beginning of the war. Despite the distances, the material losses could be largely offset by American arms aid, but the human losses could not. Despite taking Stalingrad in February 1943, Generalissimo Stalin was still in dire straits.

Hence his constant calls for the "Second Front" after the Anglo-American invasion of France's Atlantic coast. This would have made it necessary to transfer German troops from Russia to the Atlantic and the Soviet Russian western front would have experienced a noticeable relief. But the invasion did not happen yet, it only began on June 6, 1944. Whether Stalin seriously considered an armistice in the subsidiary theater of Yugoslavia can be assumed.

A landing by the Western Allies on the Balkan Peninsula would have been extremely difficult for his political planning. Therefore it had to be prevented at all costs, if necessary by force of arms, even with the help of arms from Tito's partisans.

Stalin certainly maintained several channels of communication with Tito. In one of these ways the courier mentioned above went to Tito. But he was intercepted at Fünfkirchen in Hungary.

It cannot be inferred from Walter Hagen's (49) account whether he made his statements under duress or voluntarily. According to the comprehensive work on "Soviet espionage" by David Dallin (18), the "conspiratorial agent" is ordered to allow himself to be tortured to death or take poison rather than testify. The courier who had to deliver these highly important political messages and orders could not have been an insignificant man. If, despite this, Stalin's information did fall into the hands of the Hungarian intelligence, then it can be assumed that it should fall into the hands of the Hungarians, because from there it would certainly and as desired be passed on to the German authorities